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The number of listed companies and Initial Public Offerings (POs) in the Sao
Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa) has greatly increased. Firms are migrating to
Bovespa's special listing segments, which require higher standards of corporate
governance. Companies have sold control in the market, and the stock market
has recently seen an attempted hostile takeover. This paper discusses these
current developments and analyzes ownership structures of companies listed on
Bovespa's listing segments based on data from 2006 and 2007. It provides the
first evidence of the decline of ownership concentration in Brazilian
corporations.
There is, however, an important caveat: dispersed ownership is mainly found in
Novo Mercado, the listing segment that requires the one-share-one-vote rule.
This paper, then, investigates firms' migration patterns, and finds that eighty-
five percent of Novo Mercado's firms are "new entrant" firms. Traditional
firms have mostly migrated to Level 1, the least stringent corporate governance
segment. Thus, there are two corporate worlds in Brazilian capital markets:
new corporations that adopt proactive corporate governance patterns, and
established corporations that retain their main patterns of corporate
governance or ownership structure.
This paper additionally explores the consequences of increased dispersion of
ownership through private contracting, such as shareholders' agreements and
bylaws. The evidence suggests an increasing reliance on shareholders'
agreements to coordinate joint control and to bind directors' votes. Research
also shows a growing adoption of anti-takeover devices in bylaws.
Finally, this paper sheds light on the incentives that may alter preferences of
controlling shareholders. This discussion also explains why controlling
shareholders opt to create greater diversity of ownership structures. This
analysis advances our knowledge of corporate structures in other emerging
countries.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance scholars have recently begun to analyze publicly
held corporations that have controlling shareholders.1  Controlling
shareholders are the most common distribution of corporate ownership
outside of the United States and the United Kingdom.2 They are prevalent
in continental Europe,3 and are particularly common in emerging countries
1 See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1641, 1642 (2006) (surveying
this literature); Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling
Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785, 786 (2003); Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Family
Shareholders in Developing Countries: Anchoring Relational Exchange 1 (ECGI Law
Working Paper Group, Paper No. 79, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=957895.
2 See Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership Around the World, 54 J. FIN. 471, 498 (1999) ("If we look at the largest firms in
the world and use a very tough definition of control, dispersed ownership is about as
common as family control. But if we move from there to medium-sized firms, to a more
lenient definition of control, and to countries with poor investor protection, widely held
firms become an exception. Berle and Means have created an accurate image of ownership
of large American corporations, but it is far from a universal image.").
3 See Alexander Aganin & Paolo Volpin, The History of Corporate Ownership in Italy, in
A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 325, 325 (Randall Morck, ed.
2005); Marco Becht & Ekkehart Boehmer, Voting Control in German Corporations, 23
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 1 (2003); Peter H6gfeldt, The History and Politics of Corporate
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in Asia4 and Latin America.5
Scholars have attempted to explain the prevalence of large
shareholders in these countries.6 An important body of literature has shown
that the extraction of private benefits of control is a key reason why these
shareholders maintain corporate control.7 Related works have proposed
several hypotheses to explain why rivate benefits of control are large in
certain countries and small in others.
Even though this literature has advanced our understanding of
corporate governance structures, there remains a serious gap in our
knowledge. We still do not understand the dynamics of changes in patterns
of ownership. While we know why most corporate ownership is
concentrated in the hands of controlling shareholders, we must investigate
how concentrated ownership can transform into dispersed ownership, and
how ownership change operates in practice.
This gap exists partially because ownership patterns do not change
Ownership in Sweden, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 517,
518 (Randall Morck, ed. 2005); see also MARCO BECHT, ARIANE CHAPELLE & LUE
RENNEBOOG, SHAREHOLDING CASCADES: THE SEPARATION OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL IN
BELGIUM (1999); Mara Faccio & Larry H.P. Lang, The Ultimate Ownership of Western
European Corporations, 65 J. FIN. ECON. 365, 366 (2002) (showing that family ownership is
more common than widely held ownership in continental Europe).
4 See Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov & Larry H.P. Lang, The Separation of Ownership
and Control in East Asian Corporations, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 81, 92-93 (2000) (demonstrating
that more than two-thirds of public corporations in East Asia have controlling shareholders,
most of which represent family-owned companies).
5 See, e.g., Richard A. Price, Francisco J. Roman & Brian Robert Rountree, Governance
Reform, Share Concentration and Financial Reporting Transparency in Mexico 1 (April 7,
2006) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=897811; see also
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 2, at 492-96 (showing that virtually all
Mexican and Argentinian corporations are controlled by few wealthy families).
6 See, e.g., Stijn Claessens, Simeon Djankov, Joseph P.H. Fan & Larry H.P. Lang,
Disentangling the Incentive and Entrenchment Effects of Large Shareholders, 57 J. FIN. 2741
(2002) (finding that there are incentive and entrenchment effects of large share ownership,
the former refers to increases in firm value in connection with the cash-flow ownership of
the largest shareholders, and the latter refers to decreases in firm value that occur when
control rights of the largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow ownership); Gilson, Controlling
Shareholders and Corporate Governance, supra note 1, at 1644-45.
7 See Lucian A Bebchuk, A Rent-Protection Theory of Corporate Ownership and Control
1-4 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper Group, Paper No. 7203, 1999),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w7203 (surveying control structure scholarship).
8 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Do Norms Matter? A Cross-Country Evaluation, 149 U.
PA. L. REV. 2151 (2001) (looking to societal norms rather than differences in legal regimes);
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Investor
Protection and Corporate Governance, 58 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 4 (2000) (looking to differences
in shareholder and creditor protection regimes); Mark J. Roe, Political Preconditions to
Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 STAN. L. REV. 539, 543 (2000) (looking
to differences in countries' style of government).
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very quickly or often. As Nobel Prize laureate Douglass North argued,
institutional change is slow and path-dependent in nature. 9 However, there
are examples one can look to.
There are two countries where concentrated ownership has
transformed into dispersed ownership: the United States and the United
Kingdom. Scholars have already debated the causes that led to such
change. 1 0 The debate has been both furthered and hampered by the fact that
these countries completed their ownership change processes before they
became subjects of scholarly inquiry.1
One advantage enjoyed by scholarly inquiry into the United States and
the United Kingdom is that it is certain that these countries are species of
the dispersed ownership genus. They present success stories of corporate
ownership change. 12 Thus, the study of these cases bears a certainty that
does not exist when one analyzes initial stages of ownership change, which
may be instable. For example, researchers report that some countries, such
as Canada, Germany, and Japan, experienced temporary ownership
dispersion that soon reverted to traditional concentrated ownership. 13 In
contrast, the United States and the United Kingdom have successfully
surpassed the instability inherent to economic change and now present well-
defined dispersed ownership patterns. Moreover, enough time has passed
from when both countries experienced initial changes in ownership
structures to allow a more comprehensive investigation about the variables
9 DOUGLASS NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990). See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Mark Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52. STAN. L. REV. 127, 137 (1999)
(exploring the role of path dependence in "creating and maintaining differences in corporate
structures.").
1o See, e.g., Brian R. Cheffins, Does Law Matter? The Separation of Ownership and
Control in the United Kingdom, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 459, 469 (2001); John C. Coffee, Jr., The
Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the Separation of
Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L. J. 76 (2001).
11 Cheffins, supra note 10, at 461 (noting that Berle and Means argued that dispersed
ownership was the predominant type of ownership in the United States in the early 1930s).
12 See Marco Becht & J. Bradford Delong, Why Has There Been So Little Block Holding
in America?, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 613, 620
(Randall Morck, ed. 2005) (commenting that the U.S. response to the Great Depression was
to destroy family capitalism).
13 See Caroline Fohlin, The History of Ownership and Control in Germany, in A HISTORY
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 223, 232 (Randall Morck, ed. 2005);
Randall K. Morck & Masao Nakamura, A Frog in a Well Knows Nothing of the Ocean: A
History of Corporate Ownership in Japan, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AROUND THE WORLD 367, 369-70 (Randall Morck, ed. 2005); Randall K. Morck, Michael
Percy, Gloria Y. Tian & Bernard Yeung, The Rise and Fall of the Widely Held Firm: A
History of Corporate Ownership in Canada, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AROUND THE WORLD 65, 65-66 (Randall Morck, ed. 2005) (discussing the rise and decline
of freestanding widely held firms in Canada).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:439 (2009)
that may have brought about ownership change.
On the other hand, there are disadvantages to using the United States
and United Kingdom as ownership change benchmarks. Because
ownership change has already been consolidated, scholars cannot accurately
assess which variables were most important at the beginning of the process.
As such, there are competing theories that attempt to explain what happened
first: dispersion of ownership or investor protection. La Porta and his co-
authors argue that formal laws protecting investors and proper enforcement
are a precondition for pulverizing share ownership and developing capital
markets. 14 In contrast, Coffee and Cheffins contend that the development
of capital markets occurred without such formal laws. 15 Accordingly, we
do not have a clear picture of the turning point that caused the change or
development of each phase of the process. Experiencing the change at the
present moment offers the opportunity to accurately map out these phases
and major events.
This paper analyzes the micro-level dynamics of changes in ownership
structures. It investigates a unique, contemporaneous event: a process of
change in patterns of ownership in Brazil, where corporations have
historically been characterized by severely concentrated ownership.
16
These concentrated ownership patterns have recently been diluted,
indicating an early stage of diffused ownership.17 Based on this evidence of
ownership change, this paper contributes to the corporate governance
literature by inquiring how and why ownership structures change.
This case study also adds to the literature on controlling shareholders.
Recent articles have called attention to the taxonomy of controlling
shareholders' types, proposing that the simple taxonomy distinguishing
between countries with controllinm shareholder systems and widely held
shareholder systems is unrefined. According to this view, controlling
shareholders' structures are more nuanced: they can vary from efficient to
inefficient structures with controlling shareholders who extract pecuniary or
non-pecuniary private benefits of control.' 9
Brazil's system is usually classified as one with inefficient controlling
shareholders receiving both pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits.
2u
14 La Porta et al., supra note 8, at 7.
15 Cheffins, supra note 10, at 469; Coffee, Jr., supra note 10, at 76. See also Julian
Franks, Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, Spending Less Time With the Family: The Decline of
Family Ownership in the United Kingdom, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
AROUND THE WORLD 581 (Randall Morck, ed. 2005).
16 See infra notes 59-72.
17 See infra Part V.
18 Gilson, Controlling Shareholders, supra note 1, at 1643.
19 Id. at 1652, 1661.
20 See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International
Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 539 (2004) (finding that private benefits of control are worth
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Investigating recent conditions leading Brazilian concentrated ownership to
become dispersed therefore illuminates the incentives that may alter the
preferences of controlling shareholders. Additionally, this discussion
allows us to understand why controlling shareholders may opt for a greater
diversity of ownership structures. It then enables us to draw comparisons
and make deductions that can enrich the comparative corporate governance
debate and advance our knowledge of corporate structures in other
emerging countries.
Brazil traditionally had capital markets that could not sufficiently
finance corporations because of high discounts applied to security prices.
Brazilian firms were characterized by strong ownership concentration 22 and
weak corporate governance.23 Family tycoons typically retained ownership
of voting shares, 24 and extracted very high private benefits from control of
the corporations.25  Boards were composed entirely or "almost entirely of
insiders or representatives of the controlling family or group. 26
New developments in Brazilian capital markets seem to challenge the
65% of the equity value of a firm in Brazil); Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting
Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325, 327 (2003) (noting that
private benefits of control in Brazil are 16% to 23% of a company's market value). See
generally trica Gorga, Culture and Corporate Law Reform: A Case Study of Brazil, 27 U.
PA. J. INT'L EcON. L. 803 (2006) (discussing controlling shareholders in Brazil).
21 See Maria Helena Santana, The Novo Mercado, in Focus 5: Novo Mercado and Its
Followers: Case Studies in Corporate Governance Reform 2, 11 (Global Corporate
Governance Forum (World Bank) 2008), available at http://www.gcgf.org/ifcext/cgfnsf/
Content/FocusNotes (arguing that discount in shares prices was considered the most
important factor for a company's lack of interest in the stock market); Tatiana Nenova,
Control Values and Changes in Corporate Law in Brazil 23 (EFMA London Meetings,
2002), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfin?abstractid=294064 (measuring
price difference between controlling and non-controlling shares and finding that the market
applies a discount to non-controlling shares); see also David M. Trubek, Law, Planning, and
the Development of the Brazilian Capital Market: A Study of Law in Economic Change 48-
49 (New York University Graduate School of Business Administration Institute of Finance
Bulletin Nos. 72-73, April 1971) (discussing the failure of strategies that the government
sought to adopt to deal with depressed stock prices in the early beginnings of private capital
markets).
22 See infra Part IV.
23 See Gorga, supra note 20, at 857 (discussing corporate governance failures in Brazil).
24 Id. at 822, n.55 (discussing family ownership in Brazil).
25 See Dyck & Zingales, supra note 20, at 569; Nenova, supra note 20, at 327; see also
Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Law
and Economics of Self-Dealing 25 (NBER Working Paper Group, Paper No. 11883, 2005)
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract--875734 (stating that block premium is very high in
Brazil, amounting to 49%).
26 See Bernard S. Black, Antonio Gledson de Carvalho & trica Gorga, An Overview of
Brazilian Corporate Governance 1 (U. of Texas Law, Law and Econ Research Paper. Paper
No. 109), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1003059 (examining board corporate
governance practices in Brazil).
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traditional model. Firms have been looking for equity financing in the
market.27 The number of listed companies in the Sdo Paulo Stock
Exchange (Bovespa) has risen.28 Firms are adhering to higher standards of
corporate 3overnance 29 through migration to Bovespa's special listing
segments. The number of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) has increased
tremendously. 31 The stock market has seen the first attempt of a hostile
takeover in thirty years.32 Companies have been selling control in the
market, 33  and anti-takeover defenses are being incorporated into
companies' bylaws. 34 In addition to these company-related developments,
Bovespa recently merged with the Brazilian Exchange for Future Contracts
and Commodities (BM&F) and became the world's third largest stock
exchange.35
This phenomenon has received significant attention from the media.
Several articles have pointed out that the Brazilian capital market is
experiencing unprecedented momentum. They have specially focused on
the so-called trend towards dispersed ownership. According to these
commentators, Brazil is finally experiencing a transition in ownership
27 See, e.g., Giuliana Napolitano, Dinheiro mais barato para as empresas. Corn anos de
atraso, as companhias brasileiras comeqam a ter opq~o de financiamento fora dos bancos
[Cheaper Finance for Firms. After Years of Delay, Brazilian Companies Begin to Have
Financing Options Outside Banks], REVISTA EXAME (Braz.), Apr. 25, 2005.
28 See infra Table 2.
29 See infra Table 1, Table 2, Part II.
30 See infra Table 7.
31 See infra Table 5.
32 See infra Part V. A.
33 See Vanessa Adachi, Carolina Mandl & Catherine Vieira Mandl, Perdigdo pulveriza
capital e entra na onda das companhias ptiblicas [Perdigdo Diffuses Capital and Enters the
Wave of Public Companies], VALOR ECONOMICO, (Braz.) Jan. 17, 2006; Carolina Mandl &
Vanessa Adachi, Dasa vai pulverizar o controle acionirio em bolsa [Dasa Will Diffuse
Stock Control in the Stock Exchange], (Braz.) VALOR EcONOMICO, Jan. 25, 2006; Marcelo
Onaga, Empresas sem dono [Firms Without Owners], REVISTA EXAME (Braz.), Jan. 26, 2006.
34 Vitamina ou veneno? Enquanto a Europa discute os pr6s e contras das poison pills, o
Brasil desenvolve versaes pr6prias da pilula e reforqa a dose quando o controle 6
pulverizado [Vitamin or Venom? While Europe Discusses the Pros and Cons of Poison
Pills, Brazil Develops Its Own Pill Versions and Reinforces the Dose When Control is
Diffused], REVISTA CAPITAL ABERTO (Braz.), Mar. 2006. See discussion infra Part VI.C.
35 Heloiza Canassa & Edgar Ortega, Bovespa-BM&F Merger to Create Third-Biggest
Exchange, BLOOMBERG, Mar. 26, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=
20601086&sid=abTHmx9GUGwA&refer=news.
36 A vida depois da pulverizaqdo. Empresas que j6 optaram pela diluiqdo de controle
t~m aumento de liquidez em seus papis e passam a fazer parte dos principais indices [Life
After Diffusion of Shares. Companies that Have Opted for Diffusion of Control Have
Liquidity Increase for Their Securities and Become Part of the Main Indexes], VALOR
ECONOMICO (Braz.), June 29, 2006; Catherine Viera, Para Previ, pulverizaqdo de controle
valoriza governanqa [For Previ, Control Pulverization Enhances Governance], VALOR
ECONOMICO (Braz.), Jan. 18, 2006.
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patterns. Some even hypothesize that ownership diffusion may result in
Brazilian managerial control becoming more like its U.S. counterpart.37
Scholars have not yet analyzed this phenomenon. Nonetheless, these
recent developments present a very interesting opportunity for research. If
ownership patterns are indeed shifting, we need to understand how and why
ownership structure is changing.
To investigate changes in Brazilian ownership structures, this paper
analyzes the ownership structure of Brazilian listed corporations using
IANs for the year 2006 and updated in 2007. To determine whether
concentrated ownership has been decreasing recently, this paper compares
data obtained from this research with results of previous studies on
ownership structures from 1996 to 2002.38 The paper then analyzes the
types of control structures that emerge as concentration of ownership
diminishes, inquiring whether firms present minority control or eventually
managerial control.
In addition to establishing whether ownership has become more
dispersed, assessing whether shareholders have changed enables us to
understand recent developments in corporate governance. Do profiles of
the largest stockholders look the same as they used to? Has family
ownership dissipated? Has institutional investor ownership increased? To
answer these questions, this paper identifies changes in the profiles of
majority shareholders. Comparing this data with results obtained by
previous studies, this paper concludes that, contrary to what one might
expect, no relevant change in the profile of shareholders has occurred.
Family ownership is still a dominant feature of Brazilian corporations.
However, there have been other significant developments in ownership
structures. For example, government ownership has lessened considerably
and ownership by institutional investors seems to be increasing.
This paper finds that managerial control is far from being a Brazilian
reality. But this paper presents evidence that concentration of ownership
has indeed diminished in Brazilian capital markets. There is, however, one
important caveat: ownership has become more "dispersed" in Novo
Mercado, the special listing segment of Bovespa that requires firms to adopt
the one-share-one-vote rule. The largest shareholder of Novo Mercado
companies holds 36.39% of the shares on average. This datum greatly
contrasts with measures of the largest stake of shares from previous
37 See Vanessa Adchi & Catherine Viera, Controle pulverizado cria grupo de executivos
superpoderosos. Modelo exige mais participaqdo dos acionistas e atenqdo aos conflitos de
interesse [Diffused Control Creates a Group of Super Powerful Executives. The Model
Requires More Shareholder Participation and Attention to Conflicts of Interest], VALOR
ECONOMICO (Braz.), Mar. 13, 2006; Onaga, supra note 33.
" See infra Part IV.
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studies.3 9  In Level 2 and Level 1,40 segments with less stringent
requirements of corporate governance, ownership is more concentrated.
Firms' largest shareholders average 64.79% ownership in Level 2 and
63.14% in Level 1.
It may appear as though companies have been changing their
governance and ownership patterns in the ways envisioned by Novo
Mercado. 41  However, this paper argues that this conclusion is, at best,
incomplete. For a complete understanding of these current changes, any
account must analyze the players who have been changing corporate
governance patterns.
This paper analyzes the historical background of all the firms that have
listed on Novo Mercado, Level 2 and Level 1. It identifies the companies
that have migrated from Bovespa's traditional listing market to a special
segment (Novo Mercado, Level 2 or Level 1). One could suppose that
firms have been scaling-up from the standard listing segment to Level 1,
Level 2 and then to Novo Mercado to take advantage of the heightened
value of their securities in the most stringent segments.42 One could even
assume that most firms that are now listed on Novo Mercado used to be
listed on the traditional segment. However, the reality is that few
companies from the traditional listing market have migrated to Novo
Mercado. Only 15.2% of the firms listed on Novo Mercado come from the
standard market. The majority of companies (thirty-five out of fifty-seven,
39 See infra notes 59-72.
4See infra Part II.
41 See Alfonso Celso Pastore, Sindrome de Peter Pan: argumentos adicionais [Peter Pan
Syndrome: Additional Arguments], VALOR ONLINE, (Braz.), Sept. 10, 2007; Cristiano
Romero, A decolagem do mercado de capitais [The Take Off of the Capital Markets], VALOR
ECONOMICO, (Braz.), Jan. 3, 2007; see also Tiago Lethbridge & Melina Costa, Temporada
de compras [Buying Season], REViSTA EXAME (Braz.), Nov. 16, 2006.
42 See Ricardo P.C. Leal & Andre Carvalhal-da-Silva, Corporate Governance and Value
in Brazil (and in Chile) (Oct. 2005) (unnumbered working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract-726261 (finding strong evidence that good corporate governance
leads to a higher market valuation and lower cost of capital). Cf Antonio Gledson de
Carvalho & George G. Pennacchi, Can Voluntary Market Reforms Promote Efficient
Corporate Governance? Evidence from Finns' Migration to Premium Markets in Brazil 6-7
(Jan. 25 2005) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=678282
(examining positive impact of firms' migration to premium exchanges on minority
shareholdings' value). See generally Bernard S. Black, Inessa Love, & Andrei Rachinsky,
Corporate Governance Indices and Firms' Market Values: Time Series Evidence from
Russia, 7 EMERGING MKTS REv. 361 (2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=866988
(finding that governance predicts market value in a firm fixed effects framework in Russia);
Bernard S. Black & Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Can Corporate Governance Reforms Increase
Firms' Market Values? Evidence from India, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 749 (2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=914440 (noting that investors consider Clause 49's
corporate governance reforms in India valuable, as large firms' share prices react positively
to reform announcements).
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or 61.4%) that originally migrated from the standard market to any special
listing segment went to Level 1.43
In contrast, the majority of companies that have listed in Novo
Mercado are "new entrants." Nearly eighty-five percent of Novo
Mercado's firms are closely held corporations that have gone public and
issued shares directly in this listing segment. This suggests that we can
identify two corporate worlds in Brazilian capital markets. One world
consists of new corporations that adopt better corporate governance
patterns; the other consists of traditional corporations that have not changed
their main patterns of corporate governance or ownership. So, while new
entrants increase corporate governance quality and market competition, a
significant group of corporations resist changes and act in a manner
consistent with path dependence theory predictions.44
The new entrants are, on their own, changing the market as more
dispersed ownership patterns produce important consequences in corporate
control and governance. This paper, accordingly, discusses the
consequences of this phenomenon on Brazilian corporate governance and
legal regulations.
One by-product of dispersed ownership is minority control, which is
posing new issues for the management of corporations. In response,
Brazilian companies have begun relying heavily on shareholder agreements.
Main shareholders use these agreements to coordinate corporate decision-
making and exercise of control. The aim of this paper is to identify the
effects that shareholders agreements produce on corporate control. To that
end, this paper surveys shareholders' agreements of all firms with dispersed
control disclosed in 2006-2007 IANs to Comissao de Valores Mobiliarios
(CVM)-the Brazilian Securities Exchange Commission. This is the first
work to assess how shareholders' agreements interfere with corporate
governance. Corporate governance scholars usually restrict their analyses
to companies' charters and bylaws. Analysis of shareholders' agreements
in Brazil reveals that the contractual relations that affect corporate
governance may be more complex than generally assumed. Thus, this
paper contributes to corporate governance literature by showing that
shareholders' agreements are a very important piece of the governance
puzzle.
A second development refers to changes in companies' bylaws. Many
corporations are adopting legal mechanisms to prevent hostile takeovers.
Renner and Perdigao were the first companies to include anti-takeover
provisions in their bylaws.45 This paper investigates all the eighty-four
43 See infra Part III; Table 7.
44 Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 9, at 137-38.
45 See Adverstirios de primeira viagem. Oferta hostil da Sadia pelo controle da Perdigo
deixa espago para os administradores brasileiros agirem corn muito mais governanqa da
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:439 (2009)
companies without a clear controlling shareholder to assess how diluted
ownership has led to the use of anti-takeover clauses in bylaws.
After analyzing how ownership patterns have been changing and the
consequences of this process, this paper discusses why this change has
taken place. This paper then considers the Brazilian experience to suggest
how dispersed ownership has been promoted and how the law, the State,
and private players supported this development. Empirical evidence from
Brazil is then used to advance theoretical understanding of changes in
corporate ownership structures in emerging countries. In addition, this
paper highlights several problems regulators will face in strengthening
Brazilian capital markets.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section II identifies recent changes in
the Brazilian market following the creation of Bovespa's listing segments,
showing a consistent increase in the number of IPOs and the numbers of the
new listing phenomenon. Section III analyzes what companies have
migrated to Novo Mercado, Level 2, and Level 1. Section IV reviews
empirical evidence of ownership concentration in the Brazilian capital
markets. Section V discusses the recent takeover attempt and presents new
data on the decrease of ownership concentration, examines patterns of
ownership in Bovespa's corporate governance segments, and finds that
dispersed ownership is present in Novo Mercado and not in Level 2 and
Level 1. Section VI then explores the main consequences of increased
dispersion of ownership on private contracting. Section VII matches
empirical evidence with theoretical hypotheses on changes of corporate
ownership and highlights lessons we can learn from the Brazilian
experience. It identifies the reasons for and consequences of ownership
change on other emerging markets. Section VIII discusses challenges that
Brazilian regulation will have to face to sustain market development.
II. RECENT MARKET DEVELOPMENTS: SPECIAL LISTING
SEGMENTS, LISTING EVOLUTION AND IPOS
Bovespa, the main stock exchange in Brazil, launched three special
listing segments in December of 2000: Level 1, Level 2 and Novo
Mercado. These segments were intended to enhance companies'
securities prices and attract investors to the market by fostering
transparency and confidence in the stock market.47  To list in these
segments, companies must comply with stricter disclosure requirements and
pr6xima vez [First Trip Adversaries; Sadia's Hostile Offer for Control of Perdigao Leaves
Room for Brazilian Managers to Act with More Governance Next Time], REVISTA CAPITAL
ABERTO, (Braz.), Aug. 2006.
46 Santana, supra note 21, at 12-13.
47 See BOVESPA, Novo MERCADO, APRESENTA(AO available at
http://www.bovespa.com.br/pdf/Folder__NovoMercado.pdf.
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corporate governance practices than those required by Brazilian
legislation.4 Because the standard trading market continues to exist, firms
voluntarily choose to migrate to the special segments.49
Table 1 details the most important rules of the special listing segments.
Level I basically requires: (1) a maintenance of free-float of at least twenty-
five percent of the total capital; (2) improvements in quarterly information
reports, including disclosure of consolidated financial statements, cash flow
statement, and special audit revision; (3) disclosure of an annual calendar of
corporate events; (4) disclosure of trading involving securities of the
company by its management or controlling shareholder; and (5) disclosure
of contracts between the company and related-parties.50
Level 2 mandates compliance with Level l's rules and the following
regulations: (1) disclosure of financial statements in accordance with U.S.
GAAP or IFRS standards; (2) a unified term of two years at maximum for
the entire board of the directors, which must have at least five members, of
which at least twenty percent must be independent; (3) voting rights granted
to non-voting (preferred) shares in certain corporate decisions such as
merger, spin-off, or incorporation, approval of contracts between the
company and other firms of the same holding group when deliberation
occurs at the general meeting; (4) tag along rights for non-voting
shareholders who ought to receive at least eighty percent of the price paid
for the voting shares of the controlling shareholder in a sale of control; (5)
the obligation to hold a tender offer by the economic value of the shares in
the case of a delisting or going-private transaction; and (6) adherence to the
Market Arbitration Panel for the solution of corporate disputes."
Novo Mercado requires compliance with Level l's and Level 2's
standards and the following rules: (1) all shares must be voting shares; and
(2) tag along rights for all minority shareholders who must receive the same
price paid for the shares of the controlling shareholder. 52
All three segments require that public share offerings use mechanisms
favoring capital dispersion and broader retail access.5  However, Novo
48 id.
49 id.
50 See BOVESPA, REGULAMENTO DE PRATICAS DIRERENCIADAS DE GOVERNANQA
CORPORATIVA NiVEL 1, translated in http://www.bovespa.com.br/pdf/regulamento-niveisl
_ingles.pdf [hereinafter Level 1 Listing Rules].
51 See BOVESPA, REGULAMENTO DE PRATICAS DIRERENCIADAS DE GOVERNANQA
CORPORATIVA NiVEL 2, translated in http://www.bovespa.com.br/pdf/regulamentoniveis
_ingles.pdf [hereinafter Level 2 Listing Rules].
52 See BOVESPA, Novo MERCADO, translated in http://www.bovespa.com.br/pdf
/regulamento.pdf [hereinafter Novo Mercado Listing Rules].
53 Each segment's listing rules specify that dispersed ownership can be encouraged
through "(i) Ensuring access to all interested investors; or (ii) Allocating at least 10% of the
offering to individuals or non-institutional investors." Level 1 Listing Rules, supra note 50,
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Mercado is the only segment that requires the one-share-one-vote rule,54
which best enables ownership to become dispersed. Therefore, Novo
Mercado is the most stringent listing segment, followed by Level 2 and
Level 1, the least stringent segment.
Table 2 displays information on listing evolution in Bovespa's
segments. In the first three years of existence, the market did not respond
as expected. By the end of 2003, there were only two companies listed on
Novo Mercado and three companies listed on Level 2. Level 1 already had
thirty-one companies, but no clear pattern emerged because Level 1 was not
considered to require a great change in corporate governance standards.
Then, slowly in 2004, the situation began to change. The boom came in
2006. At the end of 2006, there were forty-four companies listed on Novo
Mercado and fourteen on Level 2. Interestingly, Level 1 did not share the
same growth rate. By the end of 2006, Level 1 listed thirty-seven
companies, a slight increase from 2003. The Novo Mercado's boom
continued through the end of 2007 and the adhesion rate more than doubled
during this period, making a total of ninety-two listed companies. Level 2
did not benefit from the same evolution and grouped twenty companies for
the same time frame. Level 1 also obtained just a few more companies,
leading to a total of forty-four.
Novo Mercado's firms have been responsible for the large growth in
the number of IPOs in Bovespa. Table 5 presents the numbers of the IPO
phenomenon for primary offerings, secondary offerings, and mixed
offerings, focusing on the numbers of primary and mixed offerings (these
also include a primary initial public offering). In 2004, only three
companies engaged in IPOs in Novo Mercado and two companies in Level
2. In 2005, five companies in Novo Mercado and two companies in Level 2
went public. The number of IPOs dramatically increased in 2006 and 2007.
In 2006, seventeen IPOs were conducted in Novo Mercado and four in
Level 2. In 2007, the numbers jumped to forty-one IPOs in Novo Mercado,
seven in Level 2, and eight in Level 1.
Table 6 shows that Novo Mercado has been receiving the vast majority
of the new IPOs. Novo Mercado already represents 18.59% of the market
capitalization of Bovespa. Level 2 fares much worse. Level 1 has the
largest market capitalization of the new listing segments, representing
approximately 38% of Bovespa's market capitalization-a figure more than
two times the market capitalization of Novo Mercado. Overall, the largest
capitalization of Bovespa still comes from the standard market, which has a
market capitalization slightly in excess of Level 1, at approximately 40% of
§ 5.1; Level 2 Listing Rules, supra note 51, § 7.1; Novo Mercado Listing Rules, supra note
52, § 7.1.
54 See Novo Mercado Listing Rules, supra note 52, § 3. 1(vi) (requiring ordinary shares,
which by definition have voting rights).
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the total market capitalization of the stock exchange.
Analyzing this data, we can foresee that Level 1 will surpass the
standard market in terms of market capitalization. However, this is less
likely to happen with Novo Mercado if most traditional Brazilian firms
continue to adhere to Level 1.
III. THE COMPANIES LISTED ON BOVESPA'S NOVO MERCADO,
LEVEL 2 AND LEVEL 1, AND THEIR MIGRATION PATTERNS
By the end of 2007, Bovespa had 156 companies listed on its special
segments of corporate governance (ninety-two in Novo Mercado, twenty in
Level 2 and forty-four in Level 1).55 These numbers present a notable
development considering the historical evolution of Brazilian capital
markets. As a result, many commentators have been very optimistic about
the recent growth of the market.
These developments can imply several hypotheses about stock market
and corporate governance evolution. Recent studies show that Novo
Mercado's firms receive higher prices for their securities.5 6 These prices
should encourage firms to upgrade their listing level, since firms can more
easily obtain financing by enacting stricter corporate governance practices.
Therefore, one could suppose that firms that used to be listed on the
standard market should gradually scale-up from this market to Level 1,
Level 2, and then to Novo Mercado. One could hypothesize that the
majority of firms that are now listed in Novo Mercado came from the
traditional segment. However, a careful analysis of the companies that have
been listing on Novo Mercado does not support these hypotheses.
This Section identifies the companies listed on Novo Mercado and the
dates when their shares began to be traded in this segment. It then
determines whether these companies had been previously listed on the
Bovespa standard market, Level 2 or Level 1. Checking the dates of these
companies' registrations with CVM enabled an assessment of when these
companies opened their capital and whether they had done so in Bovespa's
standard market. Telephone interviews were conducted to clarify doubts
that arose when the data were insufficient to determine whether the
company had previously been listed on the standard market.
At the end of 2007, Bovespa had ninety-two companies listed on Novo
55 Based on data gathered by the end of 2007. See infra Table 2.
56 See, e.g., Antonio Gledson de Carvalho & George G. Pennacchi, Can Voluntary
Market Reforms Promote Efficient Corporate Governance? Evidence from Firms' Migration
to Premium Markets in Brazil (Jan. 25, 2005) (unnumbered working paper), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=-678282; Alexandre Di Miceli da Silveira & Lucas Ayres B. de C.
Barros, Corporate Governance Quality and Firm Value in Brazil (June 2007) (unnumbered
working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=9233 10.
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Mercado.57 Table 7 shows that, of these companies, only fourteen
companies, or approximately 15.2% of all Novo Mercado's companies,
migrated from the traditional market. These companies include: Banco
Brasil S.A., Cia Hering, Cia Saneamento Bdsico Est Sao Paulo, CPFL
Energia S.A., Drogasil S.A., Eternit S.A., Indfistrias Romi S.A., Light S.A.,
Lojas Renner S.A., Perdigdo S.A., Rossi Residencial S.A., Sao Carlos
Empreendimentos e Participac6es S.A., Tractebel Energia S.A. and Weg
S.A. Therefore, the vast majority of Novo Mercado companies are new
entrants that listed their IPOs in Novo Mercado.
There are twenty companies listed on Level 2. From these companies,
eight firms (forty percent) have already been listed on the traditional
market. These include All America Latina Logistica S.A., Centrais
Eltricas de Santa Catarina S.A., Eletropaulo Metrop. Elet. Sao Paulo S.A.,
Marcopolo S.A., Net Sevigos de Comunicaco S.A., Saraiva S.A. Livreiros
Editores, Suzano Petroquimica S.A. and Tam S.A. This information shows
that although the majority of firms listed on Level 2 are new entrants in the
stock exchange, a significant number of firms have migrated from the
standard market.
Bovespa now has forty-four companies listed on Level 1. Thirty-five
of these companies, or approximately eighty percent of all companies listed
on Level 1, come from Bovespa's traditional listing market. These include:
Aracruz Celulose S.A., Banco Bradesco S.A., Banco Estado do Rio Grande
do Sul, Banco Itait Holding Finaceira S.A., Parapanapanema S.A., Brasil
Telecom Participag6es S.A., Brasil Telecom S.A., Braskem S.A., Centrais
Elet. Bras. S.A. Eletrobrds, Cia Energ~tica de Sao Paulo (CESP), Cia
Brasileira de Distribuigo, Cia Energ~tica de Minas Gerais (CEMIG), Cia
Fiaqdo Tecidos Cedro Cachoeira, Cia Transmissdo Energia Elet. Paulista,
Cia Vale do Rio Doce, Confab Industrial S.A., Duratex S.A., Fras-Le S.A.,
Gerdau S.A., Iochpe Maxion S.A., Itausa Investimentos Itadi S.A., Klabin
S.A., Mangels Industrial S.A., Metalirgica Gerdau S.A., Randon S.A.,
Implementos e Participac6es S.A., Fdbrica de Produtos Alimenticios Vigor,
Sadia S.A., So Paulo Alpargatas S.A., Suzano Papel e Celulose S.A.,
Ultrapar Participag6es S.A., Unibanco Holdings S.A., Unibanco Uniao de
Bancos Brasileiros S.A., Unipar Unido de Ind. Petroquimica S.A., Usinas
Sideriirgicas de Minas Gerais S.A. (USIMINAS), and Votorantim Celulose
e Papel S.A. Traditional firms are more likely to gravitate towards
segments that require small changes in corporate governance.
Several factors explain the migration patterns of firms from the
standard market to Level 1, and their reluctance to migrate to the highest
levels of corporate governance. First, these firms tend to be large,
established, and successful corporations. They can rely on internal or
governmental financing or on financing from other institutions with which
" See infra Table 2.
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they have continuous businesses. Therefore, they can resolve capital
shortage without depending on the capital market. Second, Novo Mercado
and Level 2 lessen corporate control because of their additional disclosure
requirements and, for Novo Mercado companies, the one-share-one-vote
rule. Complying with these rules may conflict with the interests of
important controlling shareholders. Third, the controlling shareholders of
these corporations are the wealthiest families in Brazil and they carry
political influence. Therefore, extracting non-pecuniary, and perhaps
pecuniary, private benefits of control may be an important reason why they
maintain control. Thus, consistent with the path dependence hypothesis, we
find that traditional firms that migrate most likely list on Level 1, which
requires the least stringent changes in their initial ownership and
governance structure.
At this point, there is insufficient data to suggest that traditional
market firms are gradually migrating to Level 1, to Level 2, and then to
Novo Mercado. Only four companies improved their corporate governance
using this kind of step-by-step approach. Eternit S.A. went from the
traditional market to Level 2 and then to Novo Mercado. Cia Hering,
Perdigdo S.A. and Weg S.A. left the traditional market for Level I and then
for Novo Mercado. Two other companies, Net Serviqos de Comunicaqfo
and Rossi Residencial S.A., had their IPOs in Level 1 before migrating to
Novo Mercado.
Together, the listing and migration patterns support three conclusions.
First, new entrants comprise the vast majority of Novo Mercado firms.
They likely utilize capital markets as an alternative for raising capital.
Therefore, they are the largely responsible for the growth in Bovespa's
IPOs market.
Second, Level 2 represents the compromise between the strongest
corporate governance practices of Novo Mercado and the weakest of Level
1. It is likely because of this gray compliance with better corporate
governance that Level 2 is the segment that has attracted the smallest
number of listings. Level 2 mostly contains new entrants, but it has a
significantly greater percentage of firms from the standard market. All
companies listed on Level 2 have non-voting preferred shares in their
structures, which explains why they have not listed on Novo Mercado.
Some of Level 2's companies suffer from regulatory restrictions because of
the type of industry in which they operate. This happens, for instance, with
companies in the business of air transportation and education. Such
regulation constrains the possibility of converting non-voting shares into
voting shares, therefore impeding companies from complying with Novo
Mercado's one share-one vote rule. 5
8
58 This is true of air transportation firms, which must have four-fifths of the voting capital
pertaining to Brazilian citizens. Lei No. 7.565 del9 de dezembro de 1986, Lex-38854616,
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Third, Level 1 is the segment that contains the largest number of firms
that migrated from the standard market. Level 1 contains very traditional
Brazilian firms with very strong reputations. These firms account for the
largest market capitalization of the special segments. Controlling
shareholders have chosen to comply with weak corporate governance
practices that permit them to continue to extract pecuniary and non-
pecuniary private benefits of control. These firms have additional financing
sources due to their strong political connections and reputations. Path
dependence also explains why most migrating traditional firms enter the
segment that requires the least demanding changes in corporate governance,
enabling them to preserve most of their initial ownership and governance
structures.
IV. CONCENTRATION OF OWNERSHIP PATTERNS
Several studies have shown that concentrated ownership characterizes
Brazilian publicly-held companies. For example, Valadares and Leal found
that, on average, one shareholder owned 74% of the voting capital in 203
companies, or 62.5% of their sample. 59 They relied on data disclosed in the
1996 IANs. Their sample comprised ownership information of 325
companies, including 26 financial institutions.60  Among 122 companies
whose control is not retained by one sole shareholder, the largest
shareholder owns, on average, 32% of the voting capital. Therefore, a
shareholder will retain a major voting block of shares even in companies
without a controlling shareholder. Considering the entire sample, the
largest shareholder owns, on average, 58% of the voting capital, the three
largest shareholders own 78%, and the five largest own 82%. Only thirty-
five companies, or 11% of the sample, have not issued non-voting shares.
Valadares and Leal find that the total capital of companies is composed, on
average, by 54% voting shares and 46% non-voting shares. So, non-voting
shares have been used as a mechanism to separate ownership from
control. 61
art. 181 II, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/leis/L7565.htm. In addition,
article 181 § 10 requires that firms' bylaws prohibit the conversion of preferred non-voting
shares into voting shares. In the case of companies that provide educational services, a law
still pending in Congress would constrain pre-IPO ownership structures: Article 7, § 4 of
Project of Law No. 7.200 de 12 de junho de 2006 mandates that 70% of the voting capital of
any institution that sponsors universities should belong to Brazilian citizens. Educational
firms that recently went public arranged their ownership structure accordingly, issuing units
comprising non-voting shares and voting shares.
59 Silvia Mourth6 Valadares & Ricardo Pereira CAmara Leal, Ownership and Control
Structure of Brazilian Companies 8 (2000) (unnumbered working paper), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=213409.
60 Id. at 7.
61 Id. at 10 ("If there is some diffusion in ownership of the firm, this occurs through non-
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Confirming these findings, Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal's study of a
sample of 225 companies based on the IANs of 2000 showed that 90% of
the sample had a shareholder owning more than 50% of the voting shares.
This shareholder retained, on average, 76% of the voting capital and 54% of
the total capital of the firm. Twenty-two companies did not have a
controlling shareholder, and the largest shareholder held, on average, 37%
of the voting capital. On average, taking the entire sample into
consideration, the largest shareholder owns 72% of the voting capital, the
three and the five largest shareholders own 85% and 87% of the voting
rights respectively.62 Thus, the total capital of the companies is composed,
on average, by 53% of voting shares and 47% of non-voting shares.63
Considering capital origin, Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal observed that
of the 203 companies which had a sole controlling shareholder, 108
companies (48% of the sample) were controlled by families, 60 companies
(27%) were controlled by foreign investors, 19 (8%) by institutional
investors, and 16 (7%) by the government. 64
Aldrighi and Oliveira analyzed ownership and control concentration,
relying on IANS dated between 1997 and 2002.5 They show that 77.3% of
listed companies have a controlling shareholder. Of those companies,
31.8% have a controlling shareholder owning more than 90% of the firm's
voting capital. The largest ultimate shareholder retains, on average, 70.7%
of the voting rights of listed companies and 46.4% of the cash-flows rights.
The discrepancy between voting rights and cash flows matches 24.3
percentage points. The largest ultimate shareholder owns more than 50% of
voting shares. Thus small shareholders normally do not have voting rights, and therefore
lack the formal power to guarantee their rights from the company managers.").
62 Andr6 Carvalhal-da-Silva & Ricardo Leal, Corporate Governance, Market Valuation
and Dividend Policy in Brazil 7 (Coppead Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 390,
2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-477302. See also Eduardo Schiehll & Igor
Oliveira dos Santos, Ownership Structure and Composition of Boards of Directors: Evidence
on Brazilian Publicly-Traded Companies, 39 REVISTA DE ADMINISTRACAO DA UNIVERSIDADE
DE SAO PAULO 373, 381 (2004) (analyzing data from 2002 and concluding that "[o]verall,
these statistics document that the ownership structure of Brazilian public firms has not
changed significantly since 1998 and remains highly concentrated.").
63 Carvalhal-da-Silva & Leal, supra note 62, at 9.
64 Id. at 8, 10-13. The authors support their hypothesis that a higher concentration of
voting rights is associated with a lower firm valuation, that the higher the voting total capital
ratio, the lower is the firm valuation, that firms with a high concentration of voting rights
have a low payout, and that firms with a high separation between voting and cash flow rights
have a low payout.
65 Dante Mendes Aldrighi & Alessandro Vinicius Marques de Oliveira, The Influence of
Ownership and Control Structures on the Firm Performance: Evidence from Brazil 6 (Mar.
15, 2007) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=-972615 (also
finding evidence on minority expropriation by controlling shareholders, mainly in the case of
pyramids and non-voting shares structures which are associated with negative impacts on the
performance of the largest firms).
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the outstanding capital in 41.8% of the companies listed on Bovespa. In
29.2% of the companies the largest ultimate shareholder holds cash-flow
rights below 25%.
In a recent study, Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva discovered a very high
concentration of voting rights leveraged by the use of indirect control
structures and non-voting shares.66 They studied ownership structures
using IANs from approximately 250 firms in 1998, 2000 and 2002. They
concluded that ownership of voting rights became more concentrated during
this period. 67 They noted that controlling shareholders owned more thanfifty68fifty percent of the voting shares in seventy-five percent of the companies.
Thus, with respect to direct ownership, the largest shareholder had a
median of seventy-one percent of the voting rights and fifty percent of the
cash-flow rights. When indirect ownership is analyzed, the largest
shareholder has sixty-eight percent of the voting rights and thirty-four
percent of the cash flow rights.69 These results demonstrate that the use of
indirect control structures and non-voting shares contribute to separation of
ownership and control.70
Leal and Carvalhal-da-Silva also studied the identities of ultimate
shareholders. Their data for 2002 showed that 75.2% of the firms had
indirect control structures, and 21.5% of the companies had shareholders'
agreements among their largest shareholders. After considering indirect
control structures and terms of shareholders' agreements, they determined
that 58.2% of the firms were ultimately owned by families, 24.9% by
foreign investors (individuals or entities), 8.9% institutional investors
(insurance companies, pension funds, foundations or investment funds), and
8% by the government.1
Voting shares typically represented around 46.3% of the total number
of shares in the market. Forty-nine percent of all shares available for
trading in the market, including voting and non-voting shares, were free-
floating shares. Non-voting shares used to be the most liquid, representing
about 90% of trading volume at the Bovespa Stock Exchange.
72
Thus, the available studies on Brazilian ownership structures conclude
66 Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva, supra note 42, at 5.
67 Id. at 7.
61 Id. at 19.
69 Id. at 20. It is important to note that the authors have already adjusted ownership
concentration results to reflect the voting blocks organized by means of shareholders'
agreements. See id. at 20 (making ownership structures look much more concentrated than
they actually are). In order to compare the effects these agreements have on ownership
concentration and control in the market, this article analyzes ownership structures both with
and without taking shareholders' agreements into account.
70 Id. at 20.
"' Id. at 20, 62.
72 Leal & Carvalhal-da-Silva, supra note 42, at 23.
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that an overwhelming majority of companies are controlled by a sole
shareholder with concentrated ownership of voting shares.
V. TOWARDS DISPERSED OWNERSHIP?
This Section analyzes whether and to what extent ownership structures
are becoming more dispersed in Brazil. This Section begins with anecdotal
evidence of Sadia S.A.'s attempted takeover of Perdigdo S.A.'s control.
This case drew enormous media attention as it was considered the first
modem hostile takeover attempt in Brazilian capital markets.73 It provided
the first evidence of three interesting developments in corporate control and
governance structures: (a) Perdigdo's significant dispersion of ownership by
Brazilian standards; (b) its main shareholders' adoption of a shareholders'
agreement to coordinate control; and (c) the current discussion on the
adoption of tactical anti-takeover defenses.
A. The Recent Takeover Attempt
Sadia S.A. and Perdigdo S.A. are the largest players in the Brazilian
food manufacturing business. They produce beef, chicken, pork, turkey and
meat derivatives, and process chilled frozen food such as pastas, poultry
and vegetables. They are both importers and exporters of meat-based
products. Sadia is listed on Bovespa's Level 1. Perdigdo is listed on Novo
Mercado.
In June 2006, Sadia attempted to expand its international business by
taking over Perdigdo. Sadia offered to pay $27.88 per share.74  Sadia's
price was the average market price of Perdigdo's shares at Bovespa in the
thirty preceding days plus a premium of 35%.75 Perdigdo's executives
found Sadia's price too far below Perdigdo's value and shareholders'
expectations. Perdigdo's board additionally believed that the offer did not
comply with procedures provided by Perdigdo's bylaws.76
The largest shareholders of Perdigdo are eight pension funds: Previ,
Petrus, Fapes, Sistel, Valia, Real Grandeza Fundos de Previdancia, Previ
73 See Cristiane Correa & Tiago Lethbridge, Por que o neg6cio do ano ndo saiu [Why the
Deal of the Year Did Not Go Through], REVISTA EXAME (Braz.), July 28, 2006 (describing
the offer of Companhia de Eletricidade de Juiz de Fora to acquire CEMIG in the 1970s and
the takeover of Cimento Aratu by Votorantim in the 1980s).
74 Sadia nega que tenha sido incibil quanto d Perdigdo [Sadia Denies That It Was Inept
Regarding Perdigdo], REVISTA EXAME (Braz.), July 27, 2006.
75 Alda do Amaral Rocha, Perdigdo reclama da forma e do valor da investidafeita pela
Sadia [Perdigdo Complains About the Form and Value of Sadia's Investiture] VALOR
ECONOMICO (Braz.), July 18, 2006.
76 Mhrcio Juliboni, Perdigdo considera oferta da Sadia "abaixo do valor" de mercado
[Perdigao Considers the Offer from Sadia Below the Market Value], REVISTA EXAME
(Braz.), July 17, 2006.
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Banerj, and PSPP. Most of these funds engaged in a shareholders'
agreement regulating voting rights in the company. 7  They jointly own
about 49% of Perdigdo's voting shares.78 The pension funds designed a
strategy to prevent the transaction by convincing Weg SA, a shareholder
owning approximately 5.88% of Perdig~o's shares, not to tender its shares.
Because the pension funds controlled a very high percentage of shares, they
simply adopted the strategy of saying "no.
' 79
Sadia then offered a new price of $29 per share.80  This price was
below the legal requirement that a second offer be priced at least 5% higher
than the first offer. 81  Grouping 55.38% of Perdigdo's capital, the funds
refused to tender their shares and easily and quickly blocked the hostile
takeover attempt.82
Many Brazilian companies currently have ownership structures similar
to Perdigdo's. In 2006, Perdigdo's ownership structure was the following:
Previ-BB (15.6%), Petrus (11.9%), Sistel (5.1%), Valia (4.1%), Fapes
(3.7%), Real Grandeza Fundo de Previdencia (2.9%), Fundo Librium
(2.2%), and Previ-Banerj (1.2%).83 Considering share ownership alone, no
shareholder held a majority of the voting shares to control corporate
decisions in the general meeting or to elect the majority of the board.
Though Previ and Petrus were the largest two shareholders, other
shareholders could still challenge their power by acting as a homogeneous
group.
Many minority shareholders have been coping with this situation
through shareholders' agreements. This was indeed the case of Perdigao,
whose shareholders were bound by a shareholders' agreement that regulated
the exercise of voting rights.
The control structure of Perdigdo is highly concentrated because of the
shareholders' agreement, which enables its management to form a quick
defense. However, Perdigdo's ownership structure is sufficiently dispersed
to make it a target for a hostile acquirer. This situation is very unusual in
77 Alda do Amaral Rocha & Vera Brandimarte, Frustrada Sadia rev seus planos de
expansdo [Disappointed, Sadia Reviews Its Expansion Plans], VALOR ECONOMIcO (Braz.),
July 24, 2006.
78 Alda do Amaral Rocha, Em unanimidade, fundos dizem "ndo" [Unanimously, Funds
Say No], VALOR ECONOMICO (Braz.), July 19, 2006, at B12.
79 id.
80 Aguinaldo Novo, Sadia aumenta oferta para comprar Perdigdo [Sadia Raises the
Offer to Acquire Perdigdo], REViSTA EXAME (Braz.), July 20, 2006.
81 CVM, Instrugdo 361, art. 13, § 20 (Mar. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingllindexing/asp.; Correa & Lethbridge, supra note 73.
82 Mara Luquet, Caso Sadia-Perdigdo 6 sinal de evoluqdo do mercado [Sadia-Perdigao
Case Is a Sign of Market Evolution], VALOR ECONOMICO (Braz.), July 24, 2006.
83 PERDIGAO, 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 54 (Dec. 31, 2006), available at
http://www.perdigao.com.br/ri/web/arquivos/Perdigao-RelatorioAnual_2006_eng.pdf.
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Brazil and provides evidence of a shift in ownership patterns.
The Sadia-Perdigdo case raises two hypotheses for this study: (1)
corporate control has become more dispersed among some shareholders;
and (2) shareholders' agreements will be prevalent in firms with dispersed
ownership, so that main shareholders can coordinate control. Analyzing a
larger sample of Brazilian companies may show whether a new trend in
ownership patterns has arisen.
B. Data on Share Ownership
The initial sample consists of the 530 firms listed on Bovespa as of
December 19, 2007. The following corporations were excluded: (1)
corporations listed on the over the counter market (ninety-one firms); (2)
corporations that have not issued equity (twenty-four firms); (3)
corporations that did not pass a "liquidity test," and did not have any
trading activity between January 1 and May 31, 2007 (thirty-eight firms);
and (4) corporations with incomplete or unavailable data (thirty-eight
firms).
The final sample consists of 339 corporations, including all the
companies listed on Novo Mercado (ninety-two companies), Level 2
(twenty companies) and Level 1 (forty-four companies) and 183 companies
from the standard market. This paper looks at information on shareholding
structures from IANs delivered to CVM in 2007, referring to year-end
2006.
IANs must be delivered annually, within five months of the end of a
company's fiscal year, disclosing information regarding the preceding
year. 84 Any changes in material facts that occur after the IAN's delivery
must be updated and resubmitted to CVM, including changes in
shareholding ownership. 85  Ninety-six companies reported changes in
ownership structures during 2007 and resubmitted ownership disclosure
information to CVM. Accordingly, our data tracks these changes and
includes up-to-date information delivered to CVM by the end of 2007.
IANs are publicly available from CVM's and Bovespa's websites.
Additionally, CVM requires that shareholders disclose direct or
indirect shareholding ownership corresponding to five percent or more of
shares of a corporation. 86 These data enable one to identify direct and
indirect shareholders. Research underlying this paper thereby identified the
average ownership of the first, third, and fifth largest shareholders for each
84 CVM, Instrugdo 202 art. 16, items IV(a) & (b) (Dec. 6, 1993), available at
http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/indexing.
85 CVM Instrugdo 202 art. 16, para. 7 (Dec. 6, 1993), available at
http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/indexing.
86 CVM Instru~do 358 art. 12 (Jan. 3, 2002), available at http://www.cvm.gov.br
/ingl/indexing.
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segment of Bovespa. 
87
The sample is split into two groups: firms with a controlling
shareholder and firms without a controlling shareholder. Control can be
exercised through different mechanisms. The most obvious, of course, is
ownership of a relevant amount of shares.8 For the purposes of this paper,
a company is considered to have a controlling shareholder when a single
shareholder (or a block of shareholders bound by shareholders' agreements)
owns more than fifty percent of the voting shares of the company. A
company will be classified as without a controlling shareholder if the
largest shareholder has less than fifty percent of the voting stock. 89  A
controlling shareholder by this definition has uncontestable decision-
making power in corporate affairs, and may elect the majority of the board
of directors (and managers) and control the agenda of the general
shareholders' meeting. When ownership decreases below the fifty percent
threshold, the power of one shareholder will depend on the ownership
structure of the other shareholders. This holds true even as ownership of
voting shares declines.
On the other hand, if ownership is considerably more diffuse (e.g., few
shareholders owning more than around five percent of the voting capital),
shareholders may coordinate control by using a non-ownership mechanism,
such as contractual devices. For example, shareholders' agreements can
guarantee control. This would occur if shareholders owning less than fifty
percent of the voting rights enter into a shareholders' agreement to regulate
their voting rights and/or exercise of control. 90 Therefore, shareholders'
agreements are powerful mechanisms to assure control without requiring
the burdensome financial commitment of having a lot of non-diversified
87 Some companies have less than five shareholders who own more than 5% of the
shares.
88 Control can also be exercised by non-ownership mechanisms such as contracts and
actual control of the proxy machinery.
89 We acknowledge that this cutoff is very stringent, and the literature has applied more
lax definitions of controlling shareholder. See generally, Claessens, Djankov & Lang, supra
note 4 (defining a controlling shareholder as holding 10 to 20 % of either direct or indirect
voting rights); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 2. Accordingly,
interpretations of the results depend on the threshold of control used to define a controlling
shareholder. If, however, 20% of voting power is deemed sufficient to characterize control,
then the vast majority of Brazilian firms would be classified as companies with
concentration of ownership, leaving very few companies with dispersed control. While this
article does not take issue with such interpretation, the objective herein is to show that
ownership patterns are changing in Brazil. Comparing the results of this analysis with
results obtained by previous studies of Brazilian corporate ownership, one finds a decrease in
ownership concentration, even if one argues that the actual ownership structures may not be
fully classified as dispersed structures.
90 This is not to say, of course, that shareholders holding more than 50% of voting rights
cannot engage in such agreements.
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capital invested in a corporation.
In order to evaluate the role of shareholders' agreements in bringing
about control structures, this paper presents the data before considering the
terms of shareholders' agreements. The data on direct ownership confirm
that dispersion is found mostly in Novo Mercado, where the one-share-one-
vote requirement promotes a broader diffusion of voting rights. As reported
in Table 8, the majority of firms (sixty-five out of ninety-two) listed on
Novo Mercado lack a controlling shareholder. In those sixty-five firms, the
largest shareholder owns, on average, 26.23% of the shares, the three
largest shareholders own 47.28% of the shares, and the five largest own
54.73% of the shares. These results show that the two or three largest
shareholders can coordinate their voting rights and control a corporation,
even when the largest shareholder alone cannot. If those two or three
largest shareholders belong to the same family, a formal shareholders'
agreement may not even be necessary. In the twenty-seven firms with a
controlling shareholder, the largest shareholder on average owns 60.87% of
the shares of the company.
One could still argue that these numbers denote that concentrated
ownership is still prevalent, especially if we accept a 20% threshold to
assess control. 9' However, these numbers greatly contrast with the usual
Brazilian pattern of ownership concentration reported in the previous
section. Considering the entire sample of firms listed on Novo Mercado
(ninety-two), the largest shareholder owns 36.39% of the shares. These
data confirm that Novo Mercado achieves considerably more dispersed
ownership in comparison to the ownership concentration found in earlier
studies.
92
Level 2 continues to be characterized by the traditional degree of
ownership concentration. In the sample of twenty companies listed on
Level 2, the largest shareholders holds, on average, 64.79% of the voting
capital. 93  Nonetheless, six companies have significantly more dispersed
ownership. The average voting shares of the largest shareholder for these
firms is approximately 38.84%.
Level 1 also has strong ownership concentration of voting shares. On
average, the forty-four firms of Level 1 have, on average, approximately
63.14% of voting shares owned by the largest shareholder (see Table 10).
91 See La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 2, at 491 (using a smaller
percentage of share ownership to characterize control).
92 Previous studies found much larger means. See, e.g., Carvalhal-da-Silva and Leal,
supra note 62 (calculating the average as 72% and finding a median of 71%); Aldrighi and
Oliveira, supra note 65 (noting an average of 70.7%.); Valadares and Leal, supra note 59
(finding that the largest shareholder controlled on average 58% of the voting rights).
Therefore, the reported drop in ownership structure concentration shows a significant change
in Brazilian ownership patterns.
93 See infra Table 9.
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Almost 71% of the Level 1 firms have controlling shareholders who, on
average, control 76.07% of the voting rights. Only thirteen firms, or 29.5%
of Level 1 companies, achieve more dispersion of ownership, with the
largest shareholder owning approximately 32.31% of voting rights, on
average.
As expected, the same pattern of ownership concentration also applies
to the standard market of Bovespa. Table 11 shows that approximately
72.67% of the companies listed on this market have controlling
shareholders. Of the entire sample of 183 companies, the largest
shareholder holds, on average, 65.50% of the voting shares, the three largest
and the five largest shareholders approximately retain, respectively, 81.64%
and 85.19% of the voting shares. These results confirm that concentration
of ownership increases when moving from Novo Mercado to all the other
segments which do not have the one-share-one-vote rule, and thus have less
stringent corporate governance requirements.
It is important to keep in mind that, until this point, the ownership data
have not been adjusted to reflect the terms of existing shareholders'
agreements on voting rights and exercise of control. Incorporating these
agreements into the analysis, the ownership structure will likely become
more concentrated because minority shareholders will likely be part of a
controlling block.
C. Divergence from Voting Capital and Total Capital
Brazilian law permits corporations to issue non-voting shares.
Companies publicly held before Law 10.303/2001 may issue up to two-
thirds non-voting shares of the total number of shares. Companies publicly
held thereafter may issue up to fifty percent non-voting shares of the total
shares. 94 Therefore, this paper also analyzes the composition of voting and
non-voting shares to evaluate the divergence between cash flow and voting
rights. Voting shares can assure cash flow rights and control rights, but
non-voting shares can only assure cash flow rights.
Total capital for a specific company is available from CVM's website.
It considers all the cash flow rights that voting shares plus non-voting
shares provide. Therefore, depending on how many non-voting shares there
are, the cash flow rights provided by voting shares can be smaller or larger.
The divergence between voting capital and total capital can potentially
determine the level of private benefits of control that can be extracted from
the corporation. The more concentrated cash-flow rights rest in the hands
of the largest shareholder, the stronger the incentives that she will have to
run the firm properly, as doing so will also raise her wealth. A controlling
94 Lei No. 10.303, de 31 de outubro de 2001, D.O.U de 1.11.2001, art. 20; Lei No. 6.404,
de 15 dezembro de 1976, D.O.U de 17.12.1976, art. 15 § 2. (Braz.).
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shareholder with fewer cash flow rights is better able to extract value to the
detriment of minority shareholders, decreasing firm valuation. The larger
the divergence between control and cash flow rights, the less restrained the
controlling shareholder will be in extracting value, as she will not bear the
costs of her actions.
Table 8 shows no voting or total capital divergence due to Novo
Mercado's one-share-one-vote requirement. Table 9 displays total capital
data for companies listed on Level 2. On average, the largest shareholder of
a Level 2 firm holds only 42.11% of the firm's total capital, even if he or
she controls 64.79% of the firm's voting rights. This results from the
issuance of non-voting shares, which expand the firm's total capital, but do
not add corresponding voting power. The largest shareholder holds, on
average, approximately 18.72% of the non-voting shares of the corporation.
This divergence is more pronounced in Level 1 firms. According to
Table 10, the largest shareholder of a Level 1 firm, on average, has invested
33.4% of the firm's total capital and controls 63.14% of the voting rights.
This largest shareholder retains, on average, only 7.12% of the
corporation's non-voting shares.
Table 11 presents data for companies listed on the standard market.
The largest shareholder, on average, owns 49.23% of the corporation's total
capital and 65.5% of the voting rights. He or she has invested a larger part
of the total capital of the company, retaining approximately 22.65% of its
non-voting shares.
Analysis of this information reveals a significant separation of
ownership and control in Brazilian firms. However, controlling
shareholders have not yet achieved the maximum amount of separation
possible. Brazilian Corporate Law 6404/76 allowed the issuance of one-
third voting shares and two-thirds non-voting shares. 95 Under this law, the
controlling shareholder would only need to hold 16.6% of the total capital
of the company. The controlling shareholder would merely need to retain
50% plus one share of the voting shares to fully exercise control, and these
shares encompass one-sixth of the total capital of the company.
The segment that achieves the largest separation of ownership and
control is Level 1. Level 1 majority shareholders have on average 33.4% of
the total capital, but they still hold two times the number of shares
necessary to exercise control (16.6%).96 The ability of firms to separate
ownership from control is considered to be a mechanism that explains why
ownership is not dispersed in certain environments. 97 In section VII, I
95 See Lei No. 6.404, de dezembro de 1976, D.O.U. de 17.12.1976 (suplemento) art. 15
§ 20, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil-03/Leis/L6404compilada.htm.
96 The old rule still applies for the companies that already adopted the one-third structure
during the reform process.
97 H6gfeldt, supra note 3, at 553-54.
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develop this theoretical argument to explain why Level 1 firms still
concentrate control through the ownership of voting rights.
D. Data on Share Ownership Accounting for Shareholders' Agreements
Section VI provides a detailed account of the most frequently used
types of shareholders' agreements and their effects. This section considers
the impact of shareholders' agreements on voting rights and control. Tables
12, 13, and 14 reveal that shareholders' agreements have a profound effect
on the concentration of voting rights and control in Brazil. Table 12 shows
that the sixty-five Novo Mercado companies without a controlling
shareholder drop to forty-five firms when considering the effects of
shareholders' agreements over control. Twenty companies (30.76%) with
diffuse ownership become companies with a clear controlling group
(owning more than fifty percent of the voting rights) when shareholders'
agreements are taken into account. Before accounting for the agreements,
the largest shareholder from these twenty companies held an average of
28.06% of the voting rights. When shareholders' agreements are
considered, the average share ownership of the group of shareholders
exercising control through such agreements increases to 65.27% for these
twenty companies. Overall, the shareholders' agreements make the average
largest stake of ownership in the total sample increase from 36.39% to
45.25%. Nevertheless, the main conclusion regarding the larger dispersion
of ownership structures in Novo Mercado persists. In contrast to previous
studies, the 45.25% average ownership of the agreement-bound group of
shareholders indicates a meaningful decrease of ownership concentration in
Brazilian firms.
Table 13 exhibits ownership patterns in Level 2 companies. Four of
the six Level 2 companies characterized as lacking controlling shareholders
have been reincorporated into the analysis as companies with a controlling
shareholder due to their shareholders' agreements. Shareholders'
agreements cause the overall average of largest ownership blocks to rise
from 64.79% to 69.6%. Thus, the impact of shareholders' agreements on
ownership of the controlling block is not as pronounced as in Novo
Mercado.
Table 14 considers the impact of shareholders' agreements on the
structure of firms in Level 1. Nine of the thirteen firms (69.23%)
previously considered to lack a controlling shareholder become companies
with a controlling shareholder group. Among these firms, agreements
cause the average of the voting rights retained by the largest shareholder
group to increase from 27% to approximately 70%. Overall, the average
ownership of voting rights for the largest shareholder changes from
approximately 63.14% to 72.75%, revealing an even higher concentration
of control in this segment.
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This analysis shows that shareholders' agreements are important
mechanisms to coordinate control in Brazilian corporations. These
agreements tend to be adopted in companies where ownership is more
dispersed. Approximately forty percent of these companies (thirty-three of
the eighty-four companies) have a determined group of shareholders that
jointly exercise control by means of shareholders' agreements. Considering
shareholders' agreements, the number of companies without controlling
shareholders drops considerably in all three special segments: from sixty-
five to forty-five in Novo Mercado, from six to two in Level 2, and from
thirteen to three in Level 1. Novo Mercado is the only listing segment that
maintains a degree of ownership dispersion, with an adjusted average
ownership under fifty percent, even though the number of companies with
controlling shareholders (forty-seven) surpasses the number of companies
without controlling shareholders (forty-five) when these agreements are
considered.
This analysis shows that shareholders' agreements have a profound
impact on Brazilian corporate ownership and control. They work as
substitute mechanisms to share ownership when shareholders have less
ownership and control is more dispersed. They provide control
concentration and coordination by regulating shared control among few
shareholders.
This analysis also demonstrates that current corporate governance
literature does not consider the impact of these agreements on international
patterns of corporate ownership. Nonetheless, as the Brazilian experience
shows, shareholders' agreements may be key instruments to organize the
interests of important block holders, making control much more
concentrated in practice than is revealed by looking solely at share
ownership.
E. Data on Indirect Ultimate Largest Shareholders
Different types of ultimate shareholders shape different market
characteristics and, therefore, different types of capitalism. Well-developed
equity markets, such as those in the United States and Britain, present
distinctive features. Most listed companies in these systems have diffused
ownership. Large shareholdings, and especially majority ownership, are
rare. In addition, very few large companies are family-controlled. In both
the United States and Britain, institutional investors, like pension and
mutual funds and insurance companies, retain significant ownership of
listed companies, even if they own minority stakes in large public
companies. 98 These particular types of ownership afford different types of
98 See Brian Cheffins, Current Trends in Corporate Governance: Going from London to
Milan via Toronto, 10 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L. L. 5, 12 (1999-2000) (quoting studies finding
that institutional investors retain ownership of approximately 50% of the equity market in
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governance practices. 99
This section analyses the use and effect of pyramiding on corporate
control structures. Pyramiding implies a discrepancy between the ultimate
owner's total capital and control rights. The total capital is given by the
product of ownership stakes along the chain. If a shareholder owns forty
percent of Firm A and Firm A owns twenty percent of Firm B, then this
shareholder owns eight percent of Firm B's cash flow rights. Control rights
are measured by the weakest link in the control chain. In the former
example, the shareholder would control Firm B with twenty percent of the
voting rights.
This section examines shareholder composition backwards to identify
the ultimate main shareholders of Brazilian corporations. 00 The ultimate
largest shareholders fall into one of the following categories: (1) individuals
or families; (2) foreign investors (individuals or institutions); (3)
government; and (4) institutional investors (banks, insurance firms, pension
funds, foundations or investment funds). When a company does not have a
controlling shareholder, this paper identifies the largest ultimate
shareholder-the shareholder who owns the largest number of voting shares
of the corporation.
In practice, one has to make several assumptions in order to calculate
indirect ownership structures. Some of these assumptions include: (a) how
one defines each defining category (for example, how one defines
"institutional investors"); and (b) how one groups different families that are
the main shareholders of one company. Regarding the first assumption,
banks are typically considered to be institutional investors.' 01 However, in
many countries, banks can be controlled by families. Therefore, classifying
banks as institutional investors may distort the measures of corporate
ownership if one does not assess the bank's main shareholders. The same
applies to investment funds. However, when participation in an investment
fund is not disclosed in CVM dataset, I treat those funds as institutional
investors. Therefore, the data for individual or family ownership may be
underestimated.
the United States and between 16% and 70% of the equity market in England).
99 Scholars propose more or less active participation for institutional investors in
corporate governance. See John C. Coffee & Bemad S. Black, Hail Britannia?: Institutional
Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 MICH. L. Rcv. 1997 (1994); Roberta
Romano, Less is More. Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valuable Mechanism of
Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174 (2001); see also Cheffins, supra note 98, at
25 (discussing proposals from the Cadbury Committee and the Hampel Committee to
improve institutional investor participation in corporate governance).
100 This analysis does not consider the existence of shareholders' agreements in order to
identify the largest ultimate shareholder from the exclusive perspective of ownership
patterns.
101 See, e.g., Valdares & Leal, supra note 59.
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Regarding the second assumption, Diagram 1 shows the ownership
structure of Klabin S.A. We can distinguish three families as the main
shareholders of Klabin S.A.: the Lafers, the Pivas and the Klabins. The
results of an indirect ownership structure will vary according to whether
these families are grouped as one big family, two joint families or three
separate families. There is some evidence that these families might
constitute one single family. For example, the name of one holding
company is Jacob Klabin Lafer Adm. e Part. S.A., which might lead us to
conclude that Klabin and Lafer have a familial relationship. The main
shareholders of this company nonetheless are Miguel Lafer and Vera Lafer.
Another example would be Sylvia Lafer Piva, Horacio Lafer Piva and
Eduardo Lafer Piva, who carry two names of the main families. Therefore,
results will change depending on how we aggregate these families. One can
consider the Klabins to be one family separate from the Lafers and the
Pivas. In this situation, the Klabins control 57.22%, while the Lafers own
45.36% of the voting capital structure, and the Pivas own 20.32% of the
voting rights. If one considers Lafers and Pivas as one family group
separate from the Klabins, then the Lafers and Pivas are the controlling
shareholders, with 57.88% of the voting rights. For purposes of Table 19,
the three families are regarded as one. The Klabins, the Lafers, and Pivas
jointly control 59.5% of the voting capital of Klabin S.A. and 20.55% of the
total capital.
Other cases, such as Medial Sailde S.A., are simpler. Medial Salde
S.A. has three main families (Kalil, Rocha Mello, and Schapira) controlling
seventy-five percent of the company's voting capital. There is no apparent
evidence that those families are related. Therefore, this study regards these
families as three separate main shareholders. However, if they actually
happen to be part of the same family, this study underestimates the
concentration of family control. Therefore, the analysis herein assumes that
different last names designate different shareholders. In contrast,
shareholders with the same last names are considered to belong to the same
family group. As Faccio and Lang pointed out, this convention may
understate family affiliation and, therefore, concentration of control. 1
02
The data show that individual and family ownership are clearly
dominant in Brazilian corporations. Of the twenty-seven firms listed on
Novo Mercado with controlling shareholders, twenty of them (74.07%) are
controlled by individuals or families. 103 The large majority (seventeen out
of twenty) of companies controlled by either individuals or families are
controlled by means of a pyramidal structure. In Novo Mercado's firms
without a controlling shareholder, individual or family ownership also
accounts for the largest stake of shares in corporations. Of sixty-five
102 Faccio & Lang, supra note 3, at 388.
103 See infra Table 15.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 29:439 (2009)
companies without a controlling shareholder, thirty-seven companies have
individuals or families as the ultimate largest shareholders. Overall, as
Table 15 shows, individual or family ownership is found in fifty-seven
firms, which amounts to 39.75% of Novo Mercado's total market
capitalization. i04 Foreign companies are the second largest shareholders.
They are the largest ultimate shareholder in twenty-four companies, 21.86%
of the entire sample of Novo Mercado's firms. Institutional shareholders
are the largest ultimate shareholders of six companies and account for
15.08% of Novo Mercado's market capitalization. '05 Only five companies
are government-owned, but government ownership amounts to 23.31 % of
the market capitalization of the segment. 06
Table 17 displays ownership data for companies listed on Level 2.
Considering companies with a controlling shareholder, individual or family
ownership (8) still predominates in relation to foreign ownership (4).
Considering companies without a controlling shareholder, individuals or
family ownership is found in five out of six companies. Individual or
family ownership is responsible for 63.62% of the market capitalization,
followed by foreign companies and the government with 21.12% and
15.26%, respectively.
107
Information on the ultimate shareholder in Level 1 is found in Table
19. Individual and family ownership is also pervasive. Twenty-one out of
thirty-one companies that have controlling shareholders are individual or
family-held. Individuals and families are also the largest ultimate
shareholder of nine out of thirteen companies without a controlling
shareholder. Table 19 also shows that individuals and families
overwhelmingly rely on pyramidal structures to exercise control. Control is
kept through indirect control structures in twenty-seven of twenty-nine
companies that have individuals and families as either the controlling or the
largest ultimate shareholders. Table 20 shows that individual or family
ownership is responsible for the second largest market capitalization
(40.57%). Institutional shareholders are responsible for the largest market
capitalization (48.16%), even though they either control or are the largest
ultimate shareholders of only six companies.
Table 21 reports ownership data for companies listed on the standard
market. Individual/family ownership is also dominant, followed by foreign
ownership. Of the 133 companies with controlling shareholders, seventy-
eight are controlled by individuals or families; seventy-one are controlled
by means of indirect mechanisms (pyramids). Individuals or families are
also the largest ultimate shareholders of thirty-seven corporations (out of
104 See infra Table 16.
105 See id.
106 See id.
107 See infra Table 18.
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fifty companies without a controlling shareholder). In terms of market
capitalization, however, individual/family ownership accounts for only
9.87%.108 This shows that most companies tend to be small, and hardly
match the concept of a true publicly-held company. The government is the
largest ultimate shareholder in terms of the standard level's market
capitalization, with 48.63% (eighteen companies). Foreign ownership
represents the second largest market capitalization. Foreign shareholders
are the largest ultimate shareholders in thirty-seven companies and achieve
39.18% of the standard market capitalization.
Table 23 provides an overview of the general use of non-voting shares
and pyramidal structures by the different types of last ultimate owners. Out
of the whole sample of companies with available information (339), 163
companies make use of both pyramidal structures and non-voting shares.
Sixty-seven companies adopt pyramidal structures and sixty-two companies
adopt non-voting shares. Therefore, approximately 86% of the firms in the
sample separate ownership and control through these mechanisms.
Approximately 69% of the sampled companies have non-voting shares, and
66% have pyramidal structures. Individuals and families are, by far, the
groups most likely to adopt these mechanisms for separation of ownership
and control. Of the sampled firms, 51.03% have individuals and families as
ultimate shareholders that make use of pyramidal structures and 43.66%
have individuals and families as ultimate shareholders that also adopt non-
voting shares.
Several studies have found that large shareholdings are usually
associated with families. 109 Family ownership increases in the segments
that are characterized by more concentrated ownership. Family firms'
heavy reliance on pyramidal structures shows that they are used to
organizing interests of the several family members.
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF GREATER DISPERSION OF OWNERSHIP
ON CORPORATE BEHAVIOR: SHAREHOLDERS' AGREEMENTS,
INDEPENDENCE OF DIRECTORS, AND POISON PILLS
This section explores the main consequences generated by the increase
of ownership dispersion in Brazilian capital markets. There are two main
developments: widespread use of shareholders' agreements as mechanisms
to coordinate joint control, and adoption of anti-takeover devices to avoid
hostile takeovers.
108 See infra Table 22.
109 Claessens, et al., supra note 6, at 2764 (finding that 70% of the block holders of their
sample are families); La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes & Shleifer, supra note 2, at 498.
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A. Types of Shareholders' Agreements
As ownership has become more dispersed in the market, shareholders'
agreements have increasingly been used to coordinate control. The
Brazilian Corporate Law provides that shareholders' agreements can
regulate the purchase and sale of shares, preference to acquire shares, the
exercise of voting rights, or the exercise of control. 1  Shareholders'
agreements may be mixed to address more than one of these subjects. The
Corporate Law also contains specific rules regarding disclosure of these
agreements. While shareholders' agreements are kept private in many
jurisdictions,"'1 in Brazil these agreements must be duly entered in the
corporation's registration books to be enforceable against third parties.
1 12
They bind the corporation provided that they are filed with the
corporation's head office. 113 Therefore, shareholders have strong incentives
to disclose these agreements. 114 If shareholders do not register the
agreements with the company, agreements will be enforceable only between
the signing parties. 115
The 2001 Corporate Law reform expanded shareholders' agreements'
ability to control corporate actions. Directors elected by shareholders who
have signed such an agreement are required to vote in accordance with the
terms of the agreement. 1 6 Votes cast in breach of the agreement will not
be considered by the president of the meeting. 117 Therefore, shareholders'
110 Lei No. 6.404, de dezembro de 1976, D.O. de 17.12.1976 (suplemento), art. 118,
available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L6404compilada.htm ("Article 118.
Shareholder agreements regulating the purchase and sale of shares, preference to acquire
shares, the exercise of voting rights, or the exercise of control must be observed by the
corporation when filed in its head office.").
" REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 75 (2004).
112 Lei No. 6.404, de dezembro de 1976, D.O. de 17.12.1976 (suplemento), art. 118 1,
available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil-03/Leis/L6404compilada.htm ("Paragraph 1.
The commitments or encumbrances resulting from such an agreement may only be enforced
against a third party after the agreement has been duly entered in the register books and on
the share certificates, if any.").
1 " See id. at art. 118.
114 See Black, de Carvalho & Gorga supra note 26 (finding that 92% of all shareholders'
agreements are registered with the company in Brazil and showing that the parties want to
enjoy stronger enforcement against third parties and the corporation itself).
1 See Lei No. 6.404, de dezembro de 1976, D.O. de 17.12.1976 (suplemento) art. 118,
1.
116 See id. at art. 118, 9 ("Failure to attend a general meeting or meetings of the
corporation's management bodies, as well as failure to vote on matters specified in the
shareholders' agreement by any party or by members of the board of directors elected under
the terms of the shareholders' agreement assures the damaged party the right to vote with the
shares belonging to the shareholder who is absent or remiss and, in case of a member of the
board of directors, by the board member elected by the votes of the damaged party.").
... Id. at art. 118, 8 ("The president of the meeting or of the decision making body of
the corporation shall not compute a vote that infringes a duly filed shareholders'
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agreements now play an even more critical role in corporate governance.
They not only can regulate the control exercise and voting rights of
shareholders, but also bind directors' votes to the terms of the agreement
and therefore diminish directors' independence.
The disclosure of shareholders' agreements to the public presents an
interesting research opportunity. Black, de Carvalho, and Gorga surveyed
corporate governance practices in Brazil in an extensive 2005 survey. They
found that thirty-six (42%) of the Brazilian private companies in their
sample have a shareholders' agreement among the members of the
controlling family or group.118 In twenty-four (67%) of these firms, the
shareholder agreement ensures joint control. 119 The authors also report that
in twenty-two firms, one or more non-independent directors were elected in
accordance with a shareholders' agreement. In twelve firms, four or more
directors are elected under a shareholders' agreement, forming a majority of
the board. 120 Thus, shareholders' agreements perform an important role in
Brazilian corporate governance.
The present paper uses data gleaned from collecting and analyzing all
shareholders' agreements provided to Comissdo de Valores Mobilidrios by
companies without a controlling shareholder. These agreements are
available along with other material information on publicly-held companies
disclosed on CVM's website. Shareholders' agreements are deemed to be
material information. 12 1 Therefore, engaging, amending or breaching these
agreements immediately triggers disclosure obligations to the market.
Using shareholders' agreements dating from September to December 2007,
research for this paper focused on agreements of companies without a
controlling shareholder because their shareholders' agreements are likely to
produce more relevant effects on corporate control. The objective of this
research is to understand whether shareholders' agreements are being used
as substitute mechanisms in order to assure control when ownership has
become more dispersed. Companies with controlling shareholders might
have shareholders' agreements not investigated in this paper. Intuitively,
these agreements are less likely to regulate control, and may instead
regulate the purchase or sale of shares, or the relationship between
controlling shareholders and strategic minority shareholders.
agreement.").
118 Black, de Carvalho & Gorga, supra note 26, at 39 (reporting that thirty-six of eighty-
six companies surveyed have shareholders' agreements).
119 Id.
120 id.
121 See CVM, Instrugio 358, art. 2, para. 1, items I-III (Jan. 3, 2002), available at
http://www.cvm.gov.br/ingl/indexing/asp (considering shareholders' agreements material
information (fato relevante) when they cause changes in the control of the company, when
they are entered in the register books of the corporation, or when the corporation is an
intervening party in the agreement).
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The sample consists of eighty-four Novo Mercado, Level 2 and Level
1 companies without a controlling shareholder. Fifty-four of these
companies have shareholders' agreements available for download on the
CVM website. Looking at the percentage of shares bound by each
agreement serves to establish whether the agreements affect the control of
the companies. A company without a controlling shareholder may have a
de facto controlling shareholder group due to the shareholders' agreement.
Nonetheless, there are many inconsistencies when attempting to establish
the percentage of shares that are bound by the shareholders' agreements.
These inconsistencies mostly emerge when comparing parties to the
agreements with the company's reported shareholding ownership structure
available on CVM. For example, consider the case of COSAN SA
Indhstria e Com~rcio. At the time of this research, there were two
shareholders' agreements available for download for this company on
CVM's website. Apparently both were valid shareholders' agreements.
However, the company's latest IAN (also available from CVM) refers only
to the existence of one agreement. Furthermore, the shareholders that
signed one agreement do not correspond to the shareholders who are
reported in the company's shareholding structure available in the IAN. In
order to resolve this contradiction, the company was contacted for
clarification. The investor relations officer stated that the shareholders'
agreement under analysis is no longer effective. Similarly, phone calls
were made to all companies with inconsistent data in order to clarify
questions on validity, contracting parties and the percentage of shares
included in shareholders' agreements.
This process revealed that forty-two (50%), of the companies have
valid shareholders' agreements. The distribution of companies that have
these agreements among the listing segments are as follows: twenty-eight
(66.67%) Novo Mercado companies, four (9.52%) Level 2 companies, and
ten (23.81%) Level 1 companies. The majority of companies without
controlling shareholders that have shareholders' agreements come from
Novo Mercado, which has the largest number of companies with more
dispersed control. Shareholders' agreements, especially voting and control
agreements, are most likely to be adopted by companies that have more
dispersion of ownership.
This paper examines the scope of these shareholders' agreements.
Table 24 shows the types of agreements that shareholders engage in.
Sixteen of the forty-two shareholders' agreements (38.1%) are mixed to
regulate preferences to acquire shares and voting rights. Twelve
shareholders' agreements (28.57%) regulate the sale and purchase of shares,
the preference to acquire shares, voting rights and exercise of control.
Three shareholders' agreements (7.14%) include clauses on preferences to
acquire shares and voting rights.
For purposes of this research, shareholders' agreements are classified
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as control agreements when they regulate control exercised by shareholders
that jointly own more than fifty percent of the corporation's voting rights.
The definition of controlling shareholder adopted earlier in this paper is
retained for this analysis. The most predominant clause found in thirty-nine
out of forty-two shareholders' agreements (92.86%) refers to the exercise of
shareholders' voting power. Of these, seven shareholders' agreements bind
shareholders that have less than fifty percent of the voting rights. 22 One
could argue that voting rights agreements could also regulate control when
a group of minority shareholders coordinate their votes, even if they do not
jointly own fifty percent of the voting shares. One example is the Inpar
S.A. agreement, which binds 41.42% of the voting shares of the
corporation. While this agreement could be considered as a control
agreement, I prefer to classify it as a voting agreement to maintain a
consistent definition of control in this paper. Any agreement that relies on
an ownership based on less than fifty percent of the voting rights requires a
case-by-case analysis to verify whether shareholders exercised control.
This could lead to arbitrary decisions. The analysis herein, therefore, may
underestimate the number of minority control agreements that can exist in
practice.
Another caveat regarding the classification of agreements is important.
Classification followed formal (literal) and qualitative analysis of the
contents of these agreements. Only agreements expressly regulating control
issues are deemed control agreements. Analysis showed that only nine
(28.13%) agreements are literal control agreements. The other twenty-three
agreements (71.87%) are classified as control agreements because they bind
more than fifty percent of the voting shares of a corporation. These
numbers show that most control agreements are not literal agreements.
Therefore, the classification might not match the literal classification
contained in the agreements themselves, but content analysis provides a
clearer idea of the effects of shareholders' agreements.
One example is Abyara S.A.'s shareholders' agreement, which binds
52.9% of the voting shares. The text of the agreement regulates the
behavior of stockholders, the exercise of voting rights, and the transfer of
the shares bound in the agreement. Nonetheless, the agreement does not
make explicit that one of its objectives is to regulate control. Instead, one
of its expressed objectives is "to provide general orientation for the business
management of the company."' 23 The agreement states that shareholders
must hold a preliminary meeting to decide voting orientation prior to any
general meeting of the company. Thus, upon analysis of its content, it is
122 These shareholders' agreements also regulate issues other than voting rights. See
infra Table 24.
123 Abyara Planejamento Imobilidrio S.A. Shareholders' Agreement Consolidation from
Apr. 16, 2007, at 3, item 6.
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clear that the agreement regulates not only voting rights, but also the joint
exercise of control. Therefore, even though shareholders might not
consider this a control agreement, it is classified herein as a control
agreement.
The same rationale applies to the case of Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com.
Bio. e Oleos Vegetais S.A., which has a shareholders' agreement binding
65.3% of the voting shares. While the agreement does not mention
explicitly that it regulates corporate control, it states that parties to the
agreement aim "to regulate their reciprocal relations, notably with respect to
stock transfers, exercise of voting rights and management of the
company." 124  Thus, the agreement is clearly a control agreement.
Agreements categorized as control agreements are also classified as voting
rights agreements because control cannot be exercised without the
coordination of voting rights-every control agreement will inevitably
encompass a voting rights agreement.
Table 24 reflects this more comprehensive qualitative classification of
control. Thirty-two out of forty-two shareholders' agreements include
regulation, among other issues, of control. Therefore, control agreements
are adopted by 76.19% of the companies that have shareholders'
agreements. On Novo Mercado, which is the segment with the largest
number of shareholders' agreements, twenty-six out of twenty-eight
shareholders' agreements are either control agreements (nineteen) or voting
agreements (seven). This result confirms this paper's hypothesis that the
majority of companies without a controlling shareholder adopt
shareholders' agreements to coordinate control or voting rights as a
substitute for share ownership.
B. Effects of Shareholders' Agreements on Directors' Votes
This section analyzes the extent to which shareholders' agreements
bind director's votes. Of the forty-two companies that have shareholders'
agreements, twenty-six (61.90%) have shareholders' agreements that bind
directors' votes. Of these twenty-six companies, sixteen (61.53%) specify
instances in which directors' votes are bound and ten do not.
Table 25 displays the detailed content of the clauses of sixteen
agreements that bind directors' votes. It shows that shareholders'
agreements of fourteen companies (87.50%) regulate votes on transactions
resulting in sale and/or actions affecting company assets. Eleven
companies' (68.75%) agreements bind directors' votes on distributions of
earnings and dividends. Ten companies (62.50%) have agreements that
control directors' votes on contracts within the value range stipulated in the
124 Brasil Ecodiesel Indiistria e Com~rcio de Biocombustiveis e 6 leos Vegetais S.A.
Shareholders' Agreement from Aug. 14, 2006, at 1.
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agreement, and budget approval. Nine companies (56.25%) have
agreements that control votes on the issuance of securities. Eight
companies' agreements (50%) regulate the election or dismissal of
managers. Six companies (37.5%) have agreements that have power over
directors' votes on merger, acquisition, incorporation, liquidation and
corporate transformation, approval or dismissal of independent auditors and
others. Four companies (25%) use shareholders' agreements to restrict
compensation policies and benefits for managers and board members,
reduction or increase in the social capital, and creation of joint ventures,
among other things.
This analysis presents a paradox. While some companies have been
complying with better standards of corporate governance, they have
shareholders' agreements that constrain directors' votes in practice,
diminishing directors' independence. As discussed previously, this
situation is, oddly, endorsed by current Brazilian legislation. This total lack
of director independence is at odds with Level 2's and Novo Mercado's
rules for good corporate governance. It is also contrary to current
international corporate governance recommendations. 1
25
Level 2's and Novo Mercado's rules require that the board of directors
have at least five members, of which at least twenty percent shall be
independent members. 26 Bovespa defines independence in Section II of
Novo Mercado's Regulation. According to this section, an "Independent
Member":
(i) has no ties to the Company except for owning an equity share of
its capital stock; (ii) is not a Controlling Shareholder, the Controlling
Shareholder's spouse or a relative to the second degree, is not or has
not been linked in the last 3 (three) years to a company or entity with
ties to the Controlling Shareholder (this restriction does not apply to
people linked to governmental institutions of education and
research); (iii) has not been a Senior Manager of the Company or
employed by or worked for the Company, the Controlling
Shareholder or any other company controlled by the Company; (iv)
is not a direct or indirect supplier or purchaser of the Company's
services or products or both, to a degree that results in loss of
independency; (v) is not an employee or manager of a company or
entity that supplies services or products or both to, or buys these
from, the Company; (vi) is not a spouse or a relative to the second
degree of any Senior Manager of the Company; (vii) does not receive
any compensation from the Company except for that related to its
activities as member of the Board of Directors (this restriction does
125 See CAL. PUB. EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYs., GLOBAL PRINCIPLES OF ACCOUNTABLE
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2008), available at http://www.calpers-governance.org
/principles/docs/2008-8-18-global-principles-accountable-corp-gov-final.pdf.
126 See infra Table 1.
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not apply to cash from equity interests in the capital stock). 12
7
This definition does not clarify whether or not directors bound by
shareholders' agreements would be considered independent. It remains
unclear how Bovespa assesses the number of independent directors of
companies listed on the special segments that require compliance with the
twenty percent of independent directors threshold. If Bovespa considers
those directors bound by shareholders' agreements as independent, it is
making a mistake. Directors bound by shareholders' agreements cannot be
deemed independent. These agreements directly interfere in decisions that
directors make because they determine ex ante how directors ought to vote
before they have analyzed a situation and reached an independent
conclusion. One may even dispute whether having independent directors is
good for corporate governance, as there is evidence that independent
directors do not contribute to improving company performance.
28
However, if Bovespa has decided that having independent directors is an
important rule for good corporate governance, it should enforce its own
rules.
Independent directors are considered important in emerging countries
which typically have boards dominated by representatives of the controlling
shareholders.' 9 In those countries, independent directors may contribute to
decreasing levels of expropriation and, as a consequence, augment the
company's wealth. Evidence supports that having more independent
directors is associated with better corporate performance in emerging
markets. A study by Black, Jang, and Kim found that requiring large firms
to have a majority of outside directors has caused a forty percent increase in
stock price in Korea. Apparently, the market valued the companies'
existing cash flow higher because of a perception that outside directors help
eliminate insider self-dealing. 
30
To conclude, this study shows that control comes in different forms.
Despite the current focus of the literature, control does not only come
through equity ownership in a direct or indirect way (pyramids). It can also
127 Novo Mercado Listing Rules, supra note 52, § 2.1.
128 Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard S. Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. LAW 231, 233 (2002) ("Firms
with more independent boards ... do not achieve improved profitability, and there are hints
in our data that they perform worse than other firms.").
129 See Black, de Carvalho & Gorga, supra note 26, at 14.
130 Bernard S. Black, Hasung Jang & Woochan Kim, Does Corporate Governance
Predict Firms' Market Values? Evidence from Korea, 22 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 366, 400 (Fall
2006) ("Korean firms with 50% outside directors have significantly higher share prices than
firms with fewer outside directors. This effect appears to be causal. This is the first strong
evidence that greater board independence predicts higher share prices in emerging
markets.").
Changing the Paradigm of Stock Ownership
29:439 (2009)
take contractual forms. This section presents evidence concerning the
effects of shareholders' agreements on corporate governance.
Shareholders' agreements work as substitute control mechanisms when
ownership is more dispersed. As the Brazilian experience shows, when
shareholders do not have enough ownership to assure control, they can rely
on shareholders' agreements to coordinate joint control. This is the case
mainly in Novo Mercado, which concentrates the vast majority of the
companies that adopt control or voting agreements. Furthermore, Brazilian
shareholders' agreements also bind votes of directors in certain matters,
lessening director independence. Thus, under certain circumstances, board
decisions may not be based on the best interests of the corporation or
minority shareholders.
C. Changes in Bylaws: Anti-Takeover Clauses
Takeovers have been extremely rare in Brazilian capital markets due to
the ownership structure of Brazilian corporations discussed in Part Il1."'
Control transactions have usually been conducted by private agreements, in
which a large control premium is paid to the seller of control. In 2001, a
reform to Corporations Law 6404/76 reintroduced a mandatory rule for tag-
along rights in sales of control. This rule, Article 254-A, provides that
minority voting shareholders must receive eighty percent of the price paid
for a controlling shareholder's voting shares in a sale of control.
Additionally, Bovespa burdened private sales of corporate control. It
introduced a "super" tag-along right in the listing requirements of Novo
Mercado and Level 2. Under this rule, the acquirer of control in a private
sale must indemnify all other shareholders from whom the acquirer
purchased shares six months before the control transaction. The acquirer
will be required to pay the same price paid to the shares of the controlling
shareholder. Indemnification should take place on top of the usual tender
offer to acquire all minority shares as required by Corporate Law 6404/76.
Table 26 shows that companies from Novo Mercado and Level 2 and a few
companies from Level 1 have also voluntarily adopted the "super tag-
along" clause.
As ownership structures have been changing, one may think that
potential acquirers may be able to acquire control more easily in the market.
However, anti-takeover defenses have begun to appear in companies'
bylaws as ownership has become increasingly dispersed. While the media
has already pointed out this phenomenon, 132 there has been no attempt to
analyze the effects of their use in a systematic way.
131 Commentators report that so far there have been two successful hostile takeovers in
Brazil. See Correa & Lethbridge, supra note 73.
132 See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
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To fill this gap and examine the evolution of Brazilian capital markets
and corporate governance, this paper empirically analyzes how many
companies have adopted defenses and which defenses are most common.
The sample includes the bylaws of eighty-four companies (each listed on
either Novo Mercado, Level 2, or Level 1) that do not have a controlling
shareholder.' 33 These companies make up the sample because they are the
most likely to have anti-takeover defenses because of their larger degree of
ownership dispersion. 134 The bylaws were collected between September
and December of 2007 from IANs delivered to CVM at the end of April of
2007, referring to year-end 2006. Changes in bylaws during the year of
2007 must be disclosed and updated on CVM's website: therefore the
research relied on the most recent updates.
Brazil has developed defenses other than the poison pill, which is the
most common anti-takeover defense in the United States. A poison pill is a
shareholders' rights plan whereby a target issues rights to its existing
shareholders to acquire a large number of new stocks. Holders can buy
more stocks under market value when anyone acquires a pre-determined
amount of the target's stock (typically ten to twenty percent) in a possible
control acquisition. This strategy dilutes the percentage of the target's
common shares that the bidder owns, making it more expensive to acquire
control of the company. In Brazil, the predominant takeover defense is a
provision in the company's charter that allows current shareholders to sell
their shares to an acquirer who attains a critical limit of target's shares. In
this sense it resembles the mandatory tender offer required by law but is
triggered by a lower threshold of shares' acquisition. While the media calls
this defense a poison pill, this type of takeover defense might not
completely stop a determined acquirer. Instead, it ensures minority
shareholders the right to tender their shares at a fair price if they think this
is a good time to sell. This strategy also makes the target acquisition much
more expensive to the bidder.
The use of anti-takeover clauses is widespread. Forty-seven out of
eighty-four companies, or approximately fifty-six percent of the sample
companies, have included anti-takeover protections in their bylaws. There
appear to be two prevalent types of defenses. A "Type A" anti-takeover
defense provides that once a determined threshold of ownership is met, the
acquiring shareholder must make a tender offer to acquire all outstanding
shares. This threshold of acquisition generally ranges from ten to thirty-
five percent of the shares. Brazilian Corporate Law does not require an
133 This Part retains the same control definition: a controlling shareholder is considered to
have more than 50% of the voting stock.
134 The underlying idea is that the controlling shareholder of a company does not need to
be concerned with including anti-takeover clauses in the bylaws because control cannot be
sold without his or her consent.
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acquirer to offer minority shareholders to tender their stock for sale if the
acquirer has purchased the control in the market. The mandatory tag-along
right requires a tender offer only for a sale of a controlling block by the
controlling shareholder.1 35 This clause, on the other hand, requires a tender
offer of shares even if control was acquired in the market, making hostile
takeovers as burdensome as private sales of control.
A "Type B" anti-takeover defense, in contrast, is triggered when a
shareholder who has acquired a pre-determined threshold of ownership
wishes to purchase more shares. In that situation, the shareholder has to
communicate his or her intention to the Investor Relations Manager of the
company and the Manager of Trading Activity of the stock exchange. This
threshold of acquisition generally ranges from five to thirty percent of the
shares. The Manager of Trading Activity can then arrange a tender offer
conducted by an open auction in the exchange market. This provision aims
to promote competition between bidders interested in acquiring the
company's control.
Table 26 categorizes the types of anti takeover clauses adopted by each
company listed in Bovespa's special segments. It shows that 36.9% of the
companies adopt exclusively Type A clauses. Approximately 14.28% of
the companies adopt Type A and Type B clauses. Only four firms (4.76%)
exclusively use Type B clauses. Table 26 also provides the thresholds of
Type A and B clauses that will trigger the acquirer's obligation.
Approximately 53.5% of Type A companies adopt a 20% threshold. For
Type B companies, 43.75% adopt a 10% threshold.
The widespread adoption of anti-takeover defenses implies that
lawyers acted faster than Brazilian regulators. Brazilian law does not
regulate the use of these clauses. The preceding analysis has covered only
bylaws of firms without a controlling shareholder. However, available
information shows that companies controlled by a controlling shareholder
who holds more than fifty-one percent of the voting capital have also
adopted defenses. 136 This demonstrates that lawyers have been eager to
avoid future changes in control, even if a hostile takeover were factually
impossible at that time. It is worth noting that it is unclear why a company
with a controlling shareholder would include anti-takeover defenses clauses
in its bylaws. In that situation, the clause would constrain the sale of the
controlling shareholder's control block, which would be contrary to the
wealth-maximizing behavior of a rational economic agent. This situation
appears to show that controlling shareholders do not understand the effect
135 See Lei No. 6.404, de dezembro de 1976, D.O. de 17.12.1976 (suplemento), art. 254-
A, available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/Leis/L6404compilada.htm.
136 This is indeed the case with three such companies: Banco Daycoval, which adopted a
defense Type A, Spring Participag6es, which adopted poison pill Types A and B, and
SulAmerica S.A., which adopted defense Type B.
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of the clauses and that lawyers fail to explain to their clients the full
implications of anti-takeover clauses. Arguably, the controlling shareholder
could call a meeting and amend the bylaws to exclude the clauses. In that
case, the anti-takeover defense would generate additional transaction costs
in connection with a sale of control.
Nonetheless, Brazilian players seem to be celebrating the adoption of
anti-takeover defenses. Dispersed ownership is usually associated with
more mature capital markets. Players may want companies' bylaws to
provide anti-takeover mechanisms because takeovers would again
concentrate control. According to this rationale, anti-takeover defenses are
considered to be useful devices to promote and stabilize diffused
ownership. They are devices companies use to signal that their ownership
structure will continue to be dispersed.
In other environments, anti-takeover defenses are generally considered
wealth-decreasing mechanisms that safeguard control from outside
monitoring. They are typically designed by managers. Because managers
typically seek to entrench themselves, defenses are usually thought to
increase agency costs between the management and shareholders.
Takeovers are widely believed to be wealth maximizing because they
replace inefficient management with a more efficient one, promoting
allocation of resources to a higher use value. The threat of a hostile
takeover is considered to be a way to discipline incumbent management. 1 37
If managers do not run the company properly, the company will lose its
value and become a potential target for a hostile takeover.
In Brazil, if the current situation persists, poor managers may not face
this type of market discipline. Many bylaws go even further than providing
mandatory tender offer clauses, establishing penalty clauses that are
triggered if the tender offers clauses are breached. The adoption of penalty
clauses is pervasive. Of the forty-seven companies that adopt anti-takeover
defenses, 100% adopt at least one penalty clause. There are two types of
penalty clauses.
Penalty clause "Type 1" provides that if the acquirer does not comply
with the tender offer clause, the board of directors will call an extraordinary
shareholder meeting during which the board may decide to suspend the
rights appurtenant to shares that were acquired in disregard of the tender
offer clause. The shareholder that has acquired the control will not be able
to cast votes in this meeting. He or she may also be liable for damages
suffered by the other shareholders in connection with the breach of the
tender offer. This penalty clause is therefore applied against the acquirer of
137 Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value?
Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 88-91 (2001) (surveying the
literature that supports the "management entrenchment hypothesis," which suggests that
anti-takeover protections entrench management at shareholders' expense).
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blockholdings.
Penalty clause "Type 2" provides that any future change in the bylaws
that restricts shareholders' rights to tender their shares according to the
tender offer clause will obligate shareholders who approved the change to
make a tender offer to acquire the shares of the other shareholders.
Basically, this prevents anti-takeover clauses from being excluded from
bylaws, even if the majority of shareholders want to deliberate their
exclusion in a shareholder meeting. This happens because of the huge costs
imposed on shareholders that approve this exclusion. Brazilian anti-
takeover clauses of this type seem to rise to the level of fundamental rights
that cannot be contracted around. These penalty clauses are applied against
shareholders who want to ban the tender offer clause, regardless of whether
they want to take this action to protect the welfare of the corporation.
The data displayed in Table 26 show that of the forty-seven companies
that adopt penalty clauses, twenty-five (53.19%) companies exclusively use
penalty clause Type 1. Twenty-two (46.81%) companies adopt both Types
1 and 2. None adopt Type 2 only. Only eight companies (10.81%) have
bylaws that explicitly state that the tender offer clause can be removed. Of
these eight, only three companies establish a qualified quorum for the
approval of changes concerning the clause. 138 Six of the eight companies
confer authority power to the shareholders to remove the tender offer
clause. The remaining two companies confer this authority to the board of
directors.
This analysis shows that changes in ownership patterns towards more
dispersed ownership have produced important effects in companies'
bylaws, prompting shareholders to adopt takeover defenses. However,
these defenses may not correspond to an actual threat, as there still is a
significant degree of concentrated ownership in most companies that could
preclude takeover threats. As illustrated by Sadia's attempted takeover of
Pedigdo 3 9 and confirmed by our data, most Brazilian companies are still
controlled by a small group of block holders who could easily coordinate
defenses against outside attacks.140  Nonetheless, Brazilian anti-takeover
clauses demonstrate the interesting effect of ownership structure changes on
corporate governance practices.
138 These companies are Bematech Ind. Com. Equip. Eletr6nicos S.A., Bylaws of the
Company, Art. 10 § 10 (on file with author) (establishing a quorum of 50% plus one of the
common shares); Companhia Hering, Bylaws of the Company § 11 (on file with author)
(establishing a quorum of shareholders that represent two-thirds of the shares of the
company); Even Construtura e Incorporadora S.A., Bylaws of the Company, Art. 43 § 9 (on
file with author) (establishing approval with a quorum of 70% of the total shares of the
company).
139 Correa & Lethbridge, supra note 73.
140 See infra Table 8 (showing that even companies without a controlling shareholder on
Novo Mercado are controlled by their five largest shareholders).
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VII. THE DETERMINANTS OF CHANGES IN OWNERSHIP
STRUCTURES
This Section builds on empirical evidence from Brazil to advance
theoretical hypotheses explaining changes in corporate ownership.
Ownership structures are key distinguishing features underlying different
forms of capitalism. 141  Yet we still know remarkably little about the
motives that drive changes in ownership structures.
Scholars argue that initial patterns of stock ownership tend to create
structures and set rules that contribute to the maintenance of these
ownership structures. 142 According to this thesis, path dependence would
prevent changes from occurring. There could be a critical moment when
the costs of adhering to the same structure would surpass the benefits of
adopting a new structure. At this point, the path could be broken, and
dispersed ownership would then develop.143 Ownership structure is then
dependent on prevailing institutions existing in an environment. As we
have seen, the persistence of traditional Brazilian firms in segments of poor
corporate governance supports the path-dependence hypothesis. On the
other hand, the significant change towards more significant levels of
ownership dispersion begs the question what the reasons are that prompted
this evolution.
Scholars have recently discussed the preconditions necessary for
developing strong capital markets. 144 They have analyzed how institutions
affect corporate ownership and focused their research on legal, social and
political institutions. La Porta et al. have analyzed the factors that may
bring about critical change towards dispersed ownership.145  They argued
that protective legal rules would be a key factor in diffusing ownership,
pointing out that common law countries tend to protect more investors and
stockholders, and therefore have achieved more significant levels of
ownership dispersion. 146 Other scholars contend that private regulation by
stock exchanges is more important, 147 along with a country's social norms
141 Randall K. Morck & Lloyd Steier, The Global History of Corporate Governance: An
Introduction, in A HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AROUND THE WORLD 4 (Randall K.
Morck, ed., 2005).
142 Bebchuk & Roe, supra note 9, at 131.
143 Id. at 166.
144 See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities
Markets, 48 UCLA L. REv. 781 (2001).
145 See generally La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 8.
146 See generally id (claiming that corporate governance is better understood through its
legal determinants). But see Fohlin, supra note 13 (arguing that no temporal correlations
exist between changes in shareholder protection and ownership diffusion in Germany
because the German stock market has ebbed and risen at various points while German's legal
system has changed very little).
147 See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 10.
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regarding business behavior.148 Still others have argued that a nation's
politics must foster dispersed ownership. 1
49
Understanding the determinants of changes in corporate ownership in
Brazil requires detailed investigation of several variables. Some of these
may include macro variables such as the level of financial development, tax
and competition policy, labor rights, shareholder and debt holder rights,
industrial and trade policy, merger activity, cultural beliefs, political
relationships between dominant families and the power structure, private
initiative development, and listing in outside markets. Some variables may
be attributed to micro-related firm-specific characteristics such as company
size, age, capital structure, finance needs, level of private benefits of control
extraction, industry segment, and others. While this paper does not attempt
to test empirically the broad range of theories explaining ownership
structure changes, it does explore some potential explanations that are
supported by the data raised by this paper.
A. Merger Activity
Intense merger activity may be related to profound changes in
corporate structure. For instance, scholars attribute the increase of widely
held companies to the corporate reorganization that was necessary after
merger waves in the United States. For example, the paradigmatic merger
of eight steel companies brought about the creation of a large steel
conglomerate with a high level of dispersed shares, meaning that no single
investor could own large stakes of ownership in such a large company.) 5
In the late 1930s, few corporations had families with controlling stakes,
though many still had families dominating the board of directors.' Frank,
Mayers, and Rossi point out that, in the United Kingdom, mergers played a
more important role in ownership dilution. 152 In Britain, family ownership
shrunk when their holdings were diluted in the process of issuing shares to
acquire other companies. 53 Therefore dispersed ownership in Britain was
mainly a product of takeover activity during the twentieth century.
Families retained control through disproportional representation on boards
of directors in relation to their equity in the first half of the century. In the
second half of the century, institutional ownership replaced families and
148 See, e.g., Coffee, Jr., supra note 8.
149 MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 13-15 (Oxford
University Press 2003).
150 Coffee, Jr., supra note 10, at 33.
151 Becht & DeLong, supra note 12, at 617.
152 Julian Franks, Colin Mayer & Stefano Rossi, Ownership: Evolution and Regulation
(March 25, 2005) (unnumbered working paper), available at http://cepr.org.uk/meets/wkcn/5
/5528/papers/Mayer._3OwnershipEvolution-and_- Regulation.pdf.
153 Franks, Mayer & Rossi, supra note 15, at 583.
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rapidly extinguished their control. 
154
Although merger waves can quickly change ownership structures, no
clear connection between present changes in Brazilian ownership structures
and an extraordinary upheaval in merger activity exists. Interestingly, a
new merger wave is currently occurring. Over the past two years,
companies turned to the capital markets to raise financing. In 2008, fewer
companies have gone public on Bovespa due to the international financial
crisis and the following decrease of stock prices in the New York Stock
Exchange and Bovespa 1 55 On the other hand, many firms have recently
announced merger plans. 156
B. Cross-Listing
Another potential explanation for the upsurge of firms listing on Novo
Mercado could be cross-listing in other jurisdictions. According to this
hypothesis, firms listing in foreign exchanges and offering equity in other
markets would have to comply with better corporate governance because of
legal and listing requirements of other markets, so the costs of listing on
Novo Mercado would be much smaller to these firms. Therefore,
companies listing on Novo Mercado would also comply with good
corporate governance in the national market because they have decided to
comply with stricter models of regulation abroad. According to this
argument, the upsurge of firms listing on Novo Mercado would be a
response to international pressure towards better corporate governance.
However, the data do not support this hypothesis. Table 27 provides
information on cross-listing of firms listed on Bovespa's special segments
(Level 1, Level 2, and Novo Mercado). Of eighty-nine IPOs made on any
of the special listing segments, 157 twenty-seven from Novo Mercado, nine
from Level 2 and nineteen from Level 1 were accompanied by cross-listings
154 Id. at 593.
155 See Empresas cancelam IPO diz consultoria [Companies Cancel IPOs, Says
Consultants] GAZETA MERCANTIL (Braz.), Apr. 16 2008; Luciano Feltrin, Volume levantado
em IPOs no Pais recua 67% no ano [The IPOs' Volume in Brazil Drives Back 67% in the
Current Year], GAZETA MERCANTIL (Braz.), Jul. 04 2008; IPOs no mundo tdm queda de
58,37% [IPOs Have Worldwidely Fallen 58.37%], GAZETA MERCANTIL (Braz.), Dec. 30
2008; Vinicius Pinheiro, Mercado ainda estd aberto a novas ofertas [The Market Is Still
Open for New Offerings], GAZETA MERCANTIL (Braz.), Sept. 8 2008; Vinicius Pinheiro,
Empresas novatas sdo as que mais sentem a queda da bolsa [The New Listed Companies Are
More Affected by Stock Exchange Fall] GAZETA MERCANTIL (Braz.), Sept. 8 2008.
156 See Maria Luiza Filgueiras, Aperto financeiro estimula fusies e aquisiq&es no Pals
[Financial Constraints Stimulates Mergers and Acquisitions in Brazil] GAZETA MERCANTIL
(Braz.), Feb. 04 2009; Maria Luiza Filgueiras, Coin volume recorde, Brasil dobra
participaqdo global [Brazil Doubles Its Global Share with a Record Volume] GAZETA
MERCANTIL (Braz.), Jan. 06 2009.
157 Data gathered from Table 5, excluding offerings from BDRs (Brazilian Depositary
Receipts).
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in other jurisdictions. Of those twenty-seven from Novo Mercado, twenty-
three were not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC). These offerings were designed for accredited foreign investors
under Rule 144-A and Regulation S. Therefore, these offerings did not
require any special effort to comply with international standards, and cross-
listing cannot be deemed a motive to justify the adherence of the large
majority of companies from Novo Mercado to its strictest standards of
corporate governance. Cross-listing appears to play a more important role
for companies listed at Level 2. Of the fifteen IPOs conducted by
companies from Level 2, eight were accompanied by cross-listings abroad.
However, six of these were not registered with the SEC, which further
damages the cross-listing hypothesis.
Level 1 is the only segment in which the number of firms cross-listed
is higher than the number of IPOs in the segment. Of the nineteen cross-
listings conducted by companies listed at Level 1, eleven companies did
register their offerings with the SEC. Interestingly, these data show that the
very companies that are cross-listed in the U.S. market and registered with
the SEC (those supposedly adhering to stricter rules of the New York Stock
Exchange's Level 2 or Level 3 listings) are the ones that are not listed on
Bovespa's stricter special segments. These companies are listed on
Bovespa's Level 1, which shows that there are still reasons for them not to
comply with stricter rules. The main reason may be to avoid the one-share-
one-vote rule. Indeed, all of these companies, with the exception of Brasil
Telecom S.A., have offered preferred shares (non-voting) to foreign
investors, which explains why they continue adhering to Level I and not to
Novo Mercado.
C. Life Cycle
The life-cycle theory holds that young corporations are more likely to
present concentrated ownership, while older companies are more likely to
be widely held. 58  It assumes that large corporations started as family
businesses and evolved into widely held businesses in a few countries with
a reasonably long industrial history. 159 Implicit in this assumption is the
fact that during the life cycle of the firm, it will grow and need increasing
levels of capital to perform its activities. Thus, more shareholders will be
needed and the ownership of the firm will increasingly disperse. Asjeet
158 See Claessens, Djankov & Lang, supra note 4, at 104-05 (discussing the life-cycle
theory, but finding that the older corporations in a sample of East Asian companies were less
likely to be widely held).
159 See Morck & Steier, supra note 141, at 8. According to this view, Brazilian industrial
history, which developed mainly after the second half of the twentieth century, may still be
considered a short one, providing insufficient time for the development of forces that could
drastically change corporate ownership.
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Lamba and Geof Stapledon posit that the longer a company has been listed
on the stock exchange, the more likely the company is to have a widely held
ownership structure.160
Nonetheless, the analysis of Brazilian ownership data does not seem to
be consistent with the life-cycle theory. As we have seen, most companies
with dispersed ownership are new entrants on Novo Mercado. The oldest
and the most traditional Brazilian firms are concentrated on Bovespa's
Level I and the standard market. These firms present very concentrated
patterns of corporate control. Brazilian data also corroborate the findings of
Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, who pointed out that in East Asia, especially
in Indonesia, Malaysia and Taiwan, older firms tend to have more
concentrated corporate control. 16' This result begs the question of why old
firms have only migrated to Level 1 and not to the most stringent segments.
In a sense, this shows institutional adaptation and stability towards
concentration of control. One explanation could be that these firms have
other sources of finance like government credit through the Brazilian Bank
for Social and Economics Development (BNDES). They may also have a
history of retained earnings so that they can finance themselves, and
therefore do not need to comply with stricter Novo Mercado rules to get
cheaper capital in secondary offerings, as new firms have been doing. The
underlying story also shows the preceding role of the government in
providing capital to captains of industry.
D. Size
The size theory provides that smaller corporations tend to remain
familyL businesses while larger corporations are more likely to be widely
held. Several studies have identified a negative effect of the firm's size
on the level of concentration of shareholding control: the larger the firm, the
greater dispersion of shareholding control it will have. 163 Demsetz and
Lehn, examining a sample of American firms, found greater diffusion of
ownership in larger firms and noted that the size of the firm, as measured by
the market value of equity, is negatively correlated to ownership
concentration.164 Claessens, Djankov, and Lang found that the incidence of
160 Asjeet Lamba & Geof Stapledon, The Determinants of Corporate Ownership
Structure: Australian Evidence 15-16 (The University of Melbourne Faculty of Law Public
Law Research Paper No. 20, 2001), available at http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/ccg/PDFs
/2002Conference/OwnerStr-Submit-DartmouthConference.pdf.
161 Claessens, Djankov & Lang, supra note 4, at 105.
162 Id. at 105. Cf Morck & Steier, supra note 141, at 8.
163 Cf Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes
and Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155, 1158 (1985); Harold Demsetz & B. Villalonga,
Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 209 (2001).
164 See Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 163, at 1158.
Changing the Paradigm of Stock Ownership
29:439 (2009)
family ownership inversely correlates to firm size in East Asian countries,
especially Japan. 165 Faccio and Land demonstrated this inverse correlation
in Western European countries, particularly in the United Kingdom and
Sweden; the large firms in their sample were more likely to be widely held
than the smaller firms. 166 Asjeet Lamba and Geof Stapledon show that
larger firms are less likely to have a controlling shareholder in Australia, as
they are expected to have issued more shares than smaller companies., 
67
This study, on the contrary, finds a positive correlation between
company size and control concentration. Brazilian data show that the
largest Brazilian industrial conglomerates are still controlled by families.
This includes companies such as Klabin SA, Votorantim SA and Gerdau
SA, which are listed on Level 1. Smaller firms tend to need more capital
and therefore have greater incentives to comply with Novo Mercado's more
stringent corporate governance rules in order to raise capital.
E. Public or Private Initiative?
At least three conditions are necessary to separate ownership from
control. First, the controlling shareholders must decide to exit. This can be
done either by a one-time liquidation of their stake in a merger transaction
a public offering, or by selling their stakes in stages onto market.16
Second, there must be demand for the shares. Investors must expect to
receive sufficient financial return in exchange for the risk they are
assuming. 169 Third, the buyers of the shares must not be inclined to gain
control, or otherwise, concentrated ownership would persist. 170  This can
happen in two ways: either the purchaser of the control block is a widely
held company itself, or the shares are acquired by dispersed shareholders in
the market.
This process can suffer from State intervention or be privately driven.
A brief historical overview on the development of Brazilian markets helps
reveal which incentives mattered more in promoting ownership dispersion.
Brazil has experienced two very different phases, each characterized by
market players' advocacy in promoting the country's development. The
165 Claessens, Djankov & Lang, supra note 4, at 105.
166 See generally Faccio & Lang, supra note 3, at 381 (pointing out Austria, Norway, and
Portugal as exceptions).
167 Lamba & Stapledon, supra note 160.
168 See Brian R. Cheffins & Steven A. Bank, Corporate Ownership and Control in the
UK. The Tax Dimension, 70 MOD. L. REv. 778, 783 (2007).
169 Id.
170 Id. at 784 ("The three questions one needs to address to explain why the widely held
company might move to the forefront in a particularly country are: Firstly, why would those
owning large blocks want to exit? Second, were investors willing to buy the shares
potentially available for sale? Third, why did the new investors fail to exercise control
themselves?").
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first phase was characterized by government initiative beginning in the
1960s, when the Brazilian government engaged in many efforts to
encourage the growth of the stock markets. '71 The main strategy was based
on tax incentives. Scholars have already pointed out that tax policy can
impact corporate ownership and governance. 172 In the Brazilian situation,
tax breaks help explain why companies went public and why there was
demand for shares among investors. The Brazilian government provided a
variety of tax incentives to market players in order to stimulate the offering
and demand of publicly traded securities. Two major sets of tax incentives
were enacted. One was the "open capital companies program," which
provided corporations and their shareholders substantial tax benefits if the
corporation distributed shares to the public. The second was the Decree
Law 157 Fiscal Investment Funds program, "under which taxpayers [could]
purchase shares in special government approved mutual funds in lieu of
paying taxes due; the special mutual funds, in turn, use[d] the tax receipts to
purchase new and outstanding issues." 173
Through these programs, taxpayers could deduct a percentage of
resources spent for the acquisition of securities from their gross incomes.
Trubek explained that Decree Law 157 provided "forced saving
incentives." 1 The taxpayer would make a deposit in special mutual
investment funds that relieved the taxpayer of her tax liabilities. 175 The tax
deposit would then be employed to acquire securities, and the deposit
holder would be entitled to a tax credit. 76 After holding shares of the
mutual investment funds for a specified time, the taxpayer could redeem the
fund shares for cash. 177 The government "had expected that the primary
equities market would develop as an alternative source of funds for hard-
pressed firms., 178 However, even with the tax incentives, the market did
not experience sustainable development, apart from occasional activity
brought by Decree Law 157 funds.179
171 Trubek, supra note 21, at 7.
172 Cheffins & Bank, supra note 168, at 783 (arguing that taxes imposed on corporate
profits, taxation of managerial and investment income, and inheritance taxes help to explain
why ownership separated from control in the UK). See also Randall Morck, How to
Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups-the Double Taxation of Inter-corporate Dividends
and Other Incisive Uses of Tax Policy (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No.
10944, 2004) available at www.nber.org/papers/w 10944.
173 Trubek, supra note 21, at 8.
114 Id. at 35.
115 Id. at 56.
176 Id.
177 Id. at 57.
178 Id. at 47.
179 Trubek, supra note 21, at 47. One issue was that the government wanted to assist
companies having financial difficulty and develop equity markets at the same time, without
realizing that these objectives conflicted. Id. at 49 ("Firms in need of emergency assistance
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The government then engaged in efforts to pass legal reforms that
would provide the regulatory framework for market development. 80 These
reforms included the Capital Markets Law (Law 6385/76)181 and the
Corporations Law (Law 6404/76).'82 Musacchio analyzed the resulting
outcome of these regulatory systems and concluded that shareholder
protections did not correlate with stock market development. 
83
At the end of the 1990s, Brazilian capital markets experienced a severe
crisis. 184 The trading activity of Bovespa dropped by 47%,185 and there was
a strong trend toward privatization. At the same time, the few placements
of shares that occurred were conducted mostly by companies that were
listing in the U.S. market. The trading volume of ADRs increased from
0.3% in 1996 to 33% of the trading volume of Bovespa in 2000.186
Therefore, by the end of the 1990s, one-third of Bovespa's trading activity
had moved to the U.S. markets. With the failure of the market to provide
financing for firms, the BNDES has become the main source for long-term
would hardly seem to be the best available investments. If tax incentives were used to
channel investors' funds to such firms, there was a great risk that the investors, who would
eventually receive securities of such companies, would become disillusioned about the
attractiveness of share ownership. The working group failed to see this because it believed
that the shaky firms were in fact very sound ventures which were experiencing short run
problems due 'artificial' situations created by inflation and the stabilization program.").
180 Id. at 7.
181 Lei No. 6.385, de 07 de dezembro de 1976, D.O.U. de 9.12.1976 (suplemento),
available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/L6385.htm.
82 Lei No. 6.404, de 15 dezembro de 1976, D.O.U de 17.12.1976. (suplemento),
available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/Leis/L6404compilada.
183 Aldo Musacchio, Laws vs. Contracts: Legal Origins, Shareholder Protections, and
Ownership Concentration in Brazil, 1890-1950 11-12 (Jan. 22, 2008) (unnumbered working
paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-1086450 ("Even with few shareholder
protections on paper, Brazil enjoyed its first peak in stock market activity between the late
1880s and 1915. In fact, there seems to be a tenuous relation between shareholder
protections in national laws and stock market development in that, by the time additional
protections for minority shareholders were written into law in 1940, stock markets were
already in decline. Moreover, if the literature that relates equity market size to shareholder
rights on paper holds, Brazil's equity markets should have prospered between 1940 and the
1990s, when investor protections were strong.., and jumped significantly in size after 2001
(after laws provided even more protections). But this is clearly not the evolution
observed .... Some correlation between the level of stock market development and investor
protections on paper is observed, but between 1940 and 1976 there is no correlation at all.
Moreover, the period of relatively strong shareholder rights after 1976... is precisely the
period during which Brazil has been portrayed as one of the worst countries in which to be a
small investor.").
184 See generally Gorga, supra note 20 (describing the context of the Brazilian capital
markets crisis that led legislators to propose a new reform in the Corporations and Capital
Markets Laws in 2001).
185 Santana, supra note 21, at 2.
186 Id. at 6.
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business finance in Brazil. 187
This situation threatened Bovespa's existence and caused it to look for
alternatives that could promote the market. Private efforts had to overcome
the failures of the market. First, the listing requirements of Bovespa were
changed. The rationale behind this change was that investors' risk
perception had to be reduced. Enhancing the confidence of investors in the
market would cause share values and liquidity to increase and encourage
companies to issue new shares and go public. 181
Bovespa's special listing segments were originally inspired by the
German Neuer Markt. 189  Bovespa's listing levels provide rights to
shareholders in addition to those given by law. These incentives are largely
based on voluntary adhesion to stronger corporate governance that would
produce changes in the internal structure of corporations. In turn, the value
of these companies was expected to rise. This rationale therefore contrasts
with the previous approach, because now companies were expected to
improve corporate governance voluntarily.
In its first years, Bovespa's new listing levels did not show significant
new additions. Some macroeconomic factors, such as the crisis in
Argentina, the domestic energy crisis that required months of electricity
rationing, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and the uncertainty
brought about by the 2002 domestic Presidential election, are considered
the main factors that generated instability. 190 These events produced an
increase in the risk measured by investors, inhibiting companies' decisions
to go public.' 
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Nonetheless, Bovespa's strategy was not limited to the new listing
segments, as one may think. Bovespa also engaged in a series of efforts
and alliances with both private and public agents in order to promote
market development.192 This networking was critical to the success of the
new listing segments, which depended on the support of other important
market players. 193
187 See Ernani Teixeira Torres Filho, 0 papel anticiclico do BNDES sobre o cridito [The
BNDES Anticyclical Role on Credit], 7 VIsko DO DESENVOLVIMENTO 1 (Braz.), Aug. 03
2006, available at http://www.bndes.gov.br/conhecimento/visao/visao_07.pdf.
188 Santana, supra note 21, at 8.
189 This market later failed after experiencing a technological bubble. See Ren6 Daniel
Decol, 0 revoluciondrio da Bolsa [The Stock Exchange Revolutionary], EPOCA, (Braz.), July
26, 2007.
190 Santana, supra note 21, at 17.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 18.
'9' Id. at 21 ("The Novo Mercado is based on a market mechanism and so... its viability
depended on the existence of a market. Since adherence by companies to its rules is
voluntary, the Novo Mercado could only become a reality if that adherence was demanded
by investors and other suppliers of capital and if companies considered corporate governance
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In 2002 Bovespa passed Resolution 282/02-CA, which established that
any new listings of public offerings must be conducted at least on Level
1. 94  Bovespa then heavily publicized Novo Mercado's advantages to
businessmen, underwriters, domestic and foreign institutional investors, and
investors in private equity and venture capital. 195
Bovespa sought support from important private players, public
institutions and international organizations to promote its new listing
segments. For example, Bovespa gained support from the Brazilian
Institute of Corporate Governance (Instituto Brasileiro de Governanqa
Corporativa or IBGC), which offered many courses and lectures on
Bovespa's Novo Mercado. 196 Bovespa also sought the support of public
institutions like the Brazilian Securities Commission (CVM) and the agency
responsible for overseeing Brazilian pension funds (Secretaria de
Previddncia Complementar).197 These two institutions changed regulations
on investment of pension funds. 198 The changes authorized a higher ceiling
on stock investments provided that the issuing company was listed in Novo
Mercado or Level 2.99  The National Association of Investment Banks
(Associaqdo Nacional dos Bancos de Investimento or ANBID), the
Brazilian equivalent to the NASD, also provided a key rule establishing that
its members could only lead offers whose issuers were registered at least on
Bovespa's Level 1.200 The practical effect of this rule was that underwriters
would be virtually non-existent for offers in the traditional market.2 °1
In addition, Bovespa gained support from BNDES, which "started
granting specific incentives for companies to join the Novo Mercado and, in
some cases, made such membership one of the conditions for financing. 20 2
Bovespa also relied on the support of the World Bank and the Organisation
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).2 °3 Public support
from the World Bank's Private Sector Advisory Group on Corporate
obligations to be advantageous.").
194 Regulamento de Registro de Emissores e de Valores Mobilidirios, art. 20, § 1V,
available at http://www.bovespa.com.br/pdf/InfoEmpresasResolucao282.pdf.
195 Santana, supra note 21, at 18.
196 Id.
' Id. at 20.
198 Id.
199 Id. ("Those pension investment provisions had no practical effect, though, since those
investors had then-and still do-an exposure to equities that was well below the established
limits. Even so, those rules were extremely important because they helped institutionalize
and give official recognition to the existence of the Novo Mercado and both Level 1 and
Level 2.").
200 Id. at 21.
201 This rule has been liberalized in practice, as underwriters ended up coordinating the
issuance of BDRs (Brazilian Depository Receipts) in the standard market.
202 Santana, supra note 21, at 20.
203 Id.
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Governance (SAG) lent "enormous prestige and clout" to Novo Mercado.2 °4
This brief description of the Brazilian experience shows that self-
regulation by stock exchanges, allied with strong support of key market
players, was a driving force of corporate governance and capital markets
enhancement. The creation of special listing segments has provided the
first impulse towards an important change in the market.
F. IPO Market
Scholars have argued that the absence of an active IPO market may be
a reason why ownership does not widely diffuse in certain countries.2 °5
Strong capital markets are associated with the entry of new firms.
According to this view, having developed secondary markets is not enough
to promote overall market development. Secondary market development
may be associated with the trading of dual-class shares, which generate
liquidity but do not allow ownership to separate from control. Therefore,
countries with less-developed primary markets will be characterized by
concentrated ownership.
Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz investigated how firms evolved in the
United States from 1970 to 2001 to understand why they became widely
held.206 Firms generally do not become widely held shortly after their
IPO. 20 7 They found that about ten years after the IPO, insiders owning less
than twenty percent of the cash flow rights controlled half of the firms.
They also found that firms with greater financing needs are more likely to
become widely held. 208 For primary markets to be strong there should be
corporations that need to access financing through public security offerings.
Established companies may have other financing sources. If financing is
supplied by retained earnings, by bank borrowing or by infusion of private
capital, firms will not have the need to go through equity offers.20 9
Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz attribute the changing dynamics of
insider ownership to stock market variables. 210 Firms become more widely
held when the market of their shares is liquid and they can be sold without
significant discount.21' Demsetz and Lehn also argued that a greater price
for a fraction of the firm reduces the degree to which ownership is
204 Id.
205 H6gfeldt, supra note 3, at 558.
206 Jean Helwege, Christo Pirinsky & Rene M. Stulz, Why do Firms Become Widely
Held? An Analysis of the Dynamics of Corporate Ownership, 52 J. FIN. 995 (2007).
207 Id. at 1007.
208 Id. at 1000.
209 H6gfeldt, supra note 3, at 553.
210 Helwege et al., supra note 206, at 999.
211 Id.
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concentrated in their sample of American firms.2 12
Indeed Novo Mercado's developments seem to support these
arguments. Studies show that the rise in the number of Novo Mercado
listings is associated with the increase in the prices of securities obtained in
this segment of the Brazilian securities market.213 New corporations
requiring capital infusions can find advantageous conditions for accessing
financing in the Novo Mercado segment, as Novo Mercado is now a
legitimate and attractive alternative to the traditional form of raising capital
by borrowing funds at high interest rates.
The data presented in this paper show that most companies from Novo
Mercado used to be closely held companies. Novo Mercado is, for the most
part, comprised of newly public companies that aim to raise significant
capital through their IPOs, widely offering securities to the public and
thereby shirking the tradition of concentrated ownership structures. As we
have seen, few companies from the traditional market have chosen to
migrate to Novo Mercado, and many older companies maintain high levels
of ownership concentration. Therefore, one can deduce that a more highly-
dispersed ownership structure is associated with an increase in IPO activity
in the Novo Mercado segment.
G. Decreasing Levels of Private Benefits of Control and Firm Value
Private benefits of control are considered an important determinant of
214ownership structures. Studies have shown that larger levels of private
benefits of control are associated with the presence of controlling
shareholders.215 The Brazilian experience with different listing segments
allows testing of the relationship between private benefits of control and
ownership structures. If controlling ownership structures are decreasing in
the Novo Mercado, one might expect that private benefits of control are
diminishing as well. Although such analysis is not conducted here, an
interesting undertaking would be to compare the amount of private benefits
extraction in all the different listing levels to assess whether they correlate
with the concentration of ownership of companies listed on these segments.
The evidence so far appears to suggest that private benefits extraction has
diminished as shareholders derive more protection in the most stringent
listing segments.
212 Demsetz & Lehn, supra note 163, at 1158.
213 See, e.g., de Carvalho & Pennacchi, supra note 56, at 18; Miceli da Silveira & Ayres
B. de C. Barros, supra note 56, at 22-23.
214 See Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 1.
215 Lamba & Stapledon, supra note 160, at 23.
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H. One Share-One Vote
The possibility that the one-share-one-vote rule may become a
mandatory European Law rule has reopened a very intense debate. This
debate brings to the European context a series of questions and arguments
that were made in the United States a few decades ago about the desirability
and effects of the one-share-one-vote rule. Several scholars have presented
critiques. 216  For instance, it was argued that a mandatory rule could
produce such undesired effects as pyramidal structures or derivative
instruments that could circumvent the rule.2 17
On the other hand, many scholars have pointed out that deviations
from one-share-one-vote may be efficient. Grossman and Hart have shown
that because the one-share-one-vote protects shareholders' property rights,
value reducing bids are impossible under this rule. 218 They have also
argued that changes that restrict voting power may harm security-holders.219
Nonetheless, this literature still admits that in specific situations, such
deviations can be wealth-enhancing.22 ° One example is the initial public
offering of dual-class shares, in which the newly-issued shares would
reduce the value of the outstanding shares so that the company's existing
shareholders would bear the cost of the issuance.
Defendants of the one-share-one-vote rule argue that the development
of capital markets requires this arrangement so as to avoid the discounted
share values found in regulatory regimes that allow for a divergence in
voting rights. The difference between control rights and cash-flow rights of
the controlling shareholder is usually associated with a discount on the
value of the shares. Claessens et al. have shown that this discount increases
when "the wedge between control rights and cash-flow rights" is larger.22'
They show that "[p]yramid schemes, cross-holdings among firms, and the
issuance of dual-class shares are all associated with lower corporate
valu[e] .... " although none of these associations is statistically
216 See, e.g., Ren6e Adams & Daniel Ferreira, One Share, One Vote: The Empirical
Evidence (Euro. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 177/2007, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract--987488; Guido Ferrarini, One Share-One Vote: A
European Rule? (Euro. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 58/2006, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=875620 (discussing the prospect of the adoption of the
one share-one vote rule in Europe); Arman Khachaturyan, The One-Share-One-Vote
Controversy in the EU (Euro. Cap. Markets Inst., ECMI Paper No. 1/2006, 2006), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=-908215.
217 Khachaturyan, supra note 216, at 13.
218 Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, One Share-One Vote and the Market for
Corporate Control, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 175, 179-180 (1988).
219 Id. at 200-01.
220 Id. at 180.
221 Claessens, et al., supra note 6, at 2743.
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significant.22 2  Nenova focuses her analysis on the effect of dual-class
shares on private benefits of control, and finds that the existence of non-
voting shares is associated with value extraction.23
An increasing number of firms in continental Europe have unified
dual-class shares into a single class. Anete Pajuste presents evidence, based
on data from seven European countries that rely heavily on dual-class share
structures, that firm value increases more for companies that "unify" dual-
class shares than for companies that retain their dual-class shares.224
Pedersen and Thomsen have found that the use of dual-class shares
positively correlates with family ownership 225 and with ownership
concentration.22 6
Others have shown that the impact of the one share-one vote depends
on the underlying ownership structure. In widely-held companies, the
adoption of the one-share-one-vote rule may ensure efficient outcomes in
bidding contests, but "[i]n the absence of bidding competition, non-voting
shares mitigate the free-rider problem, thereby promoting takeover
activity.' 227  In companies with concentrated ownership, adoption
"promote[s] value-increasing control transfers" but may exacerbate
conflicts of interests between the controlling shareholders and the minority
shareholders.228
These arguments show that the one-share-one-vote rule could "both
discourage and promote ownership concentration', 229 Because it ties votes
to cash flow rights, the rule increases the financial burden of the
shareholder seeking to keep control. This can bring about two opposite
effects: the shareholder may relinquish control because it is too expensive;
or he or she may be wary of losing control, an attitude that may impede thefloati g • • 230
floating of shares and perhaps induce a going-private transaction.
Bovespa's special segment listing requirements seem to support the
argument that the one-share-one-vote rule helps to promote the dispersion
of ownership. The rule requires that controlling shareholders reduce their
222 Id. at 2743-44.
223 Nenova, supra note 21, at 10-11.
224 Anete Pajuste, Determinants and Consequences of the Unification of Dual-Classes
Shares 6 (Euro. Cent. Bank, Working Paper Series No. 465, 2005) (concluding, however,
that dual-class shares should not be forbidden, and stating that "firms that depend on equity
capital will sooner or later be forced by the markets to unify their shares.").
225 Pedersen & Thomsen, supra note 163, at 772.
226 Id. at 764.
227 Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, The One Share-One Vote Debate: A Theoretical
Perspective 43 (Euro. Corp. Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 176/2007, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=987486.
228 Id.
229 Id. at 3 1.
230 Id.
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voting power if they want to raise a significant amount of capital on the
Novo Mercado. In the other listing segments, which do not require
compliance with the one-share-one-vote rule, block holders tend to retain
their controlling position and are reluctant to float shares.23'
I. Controlling Shareholders' Preferences and Incentives
Controlling shareholders bear significant costs maintaining
concentration of ownership and voting rights. They incur the opportunity
cost of holding a non-diversified portfolio, costs associated with the lack of
liquidity of their investment, and costs of monitoring the operation of the
company so as to assure that they will derive profits from their
investment.232 Controlling shareholders benefit by extracting private
benefits from the corporation in exchange for incurring these costs. 233
Some level of benefits extraction by controlling shareholders may be
efficient for the corporation and the non-controlling shareholders as well.
The controlling shareholders may do a better job in policing the
management of public corporations than what market-oriented techniques
would achieve in firms with dispersed ownership.234 The controlling
shareholders have lower information costs and have incentives to watch
closely what is happening in the corporation, and therefore may be best-
situated to recognize problems that could impair corporate results.235  In
light of this, controlling shareholders could serve as an efficient solution to
the agency problems that arise in widely-held companies.236  The
controlling shareholders would increase productivity, generating gains to
23 1 This is also consistent with Musacchio's analysis that the concentration of control in
Brazilian companies increased after the introduction of non-voting shares in 1932. See
Musacchio, supra note 183, at 5 and 20. Musacchio concludes:
Brazil's traded corporations had lower concentration of control rights, on average,
in the past than today. Before 1910, the three largest shareholders controlled, on
average, between 50% of shares and around 50% of total votes. By 2004, the three
largest shareholders of the largest 20 companies in Brazil held 51.2% of the shares
and 76.6% of the votes. Most of this increase in the concentration of control rights
should be attributed to the introduction of nonvoting preferred shares in 1932,
which reduced the cost of controlling a corporation and enabled controlling
investors to obtain equity finance without sacrificing their control rights.
Id. at 30.
232 See Gilson, supra note 1, at 1652.
233 See generally Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1 (stating that the "costs associated with
holding a concentrated position" may result in the need for "private benefits of control" in
order "to induce a party to play that role."); Gilson, supra note 1, at 1651-52.
234 Gilson, supra note 1, at 1651-1652.
235 Id.
236 Id.
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non-controlling shareholders as well. 237  Therefore, non-controlling
shareholders should prefer having controlling shareholders manage the
corporation, provided that the gains from the "reduction in managerial
agency costs" justify the private benefits that controlling shareholders
extract.238 This balancing is what Professors Gilson and Gordon have
called "the controlling shareholder trade off.
2139
Using this framework, it appears that a corporate governance system
should achieve a positive trade off from controlling shareholder structures.
To put it differently, the problem is transforming a structure featuring
inefficient controlling shareholders accustomed to extracting many private
benefits of control, into a structure featuring efficient controlling
shareholders whose monitoring generates benefits exceed the costs of
private benefits extraction.2 40 This would cause minority shareholders to be
better off under the controlling shareholders' management, raising the
overall level of confidence in the capital markets.241
Gilson hypothesizes that "an efficient controlling shareholder system
supports a diversity of shareholder distribution[]" structures among
242
companies. He gives examples from Sweden and Italy, showing that
Sweden (a "good law" nation)243 has considerably more widely-held
ownership than Italy (a "bad law" nation), despite the fact that both systems
244
are considered dominated by controlling shareholders. According to
Gilson's hypothesis, inefficient controlling shareholders systems show less
diversity of shareholding distribution.
245
Likewise, the fact that there is more diversity in the ownership
structures of Brazilian corporations today than in the recent past appears to
support the hypothesis that controlling shareholders structures have moved
to more efficient patterns because of relevant changes in the level of
shareholder protection and the consequent reduction of private benefits of
control. Investors pay more for shares listed on Novo Mercado because of
the reduced level of expected pecuniary expropriation.
Gilson also distinguishes between pecuniary and non-pecuniary private
benefits of control to explain differences between controlling shareholders
237 id.
238 Id. at 1650.
239 Id. at 1651; Gilson & Gordon, supra note 1, at 785-86.
240 Gilson, supra note 1, at 1652.
241 id.
242 Id. at 1657.
243 Id. at 1653 (defining "good law" as that which "limits private benefits of control to
amounts that are smaller than the increased productivity from more focused monitoring.")..
244 Id. at 1659-60.
245 Id. at 1659.
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in certain countries with "good law." 246 Non-pecuniary benefits such as
social status play an important role in Brazil. High levels of non-pecuniary
private benefits of control should decrease the rate at which controlling
shareholders and their heirs dissipate control.24 7 This may help explain why
Level 1 companies still persist with very concentrated structures of
ownership. In general, the companies listing on Level I's are very
traditional Brazilian companies, whose controlling shareholders enjoy
social status and exert political influence.
Even if there is evidence that listing on Novo Mercado diminishes the
cost of capital to companies, pecuniary incentives may not be enough to
alter the behavior of traditional controlling shareholders who still enjoy the
non-pecuniary advantages of their positions. It is important to note,
however, that even if social status and political relations are considered
non-pecuniary private benefits, such advantages may result in gains that can
be easily translated into pecuniary benefits. The concentration of corporate
control and assets in the hands of few families creates the opportunity for
these families to lobby government agencies for special treatment,
demanding preferential public contracts and non-market-based financing
from state banks as a substitute for equity financing. 248 Ultimately, families
may have significant influence in determining governmental economic
policy. This motivation for "crony capitalism" can also explain why many
companies, particularly those listing on Level 1, still continue to have
families as their major controlling shareholders. 249  Controlling
shareholders' preferences may therefore be difficult to change if these
shareholders are not constrained by the need to raise more capital at lower
costs. In this framework, changes in ownership structure may be more
difficult to achieve and require more time to succeed.
VIII. THE CHALLENGES THAT THE MARKET WILL FACE
Over the last eight years, Novo Mercado has grown, and companies
listed there now make up twenty percent of the total market capitalization of
Bovespa. This represents a very significant change over a short period of
time. In order for Novo Mercado to grow further, regulators and market
participants will have to surmount many challenges. It is still unclear
whether or not Bovespa's legal rules will be properly enforced.250 Bovespa
has established an arbitration panel to hear disputes in order to avoid the
delay and uncertainty of Brazilian courts. However, at this time, the
246 Gilson, supra note 1, at 1665.
247 Id. at 1666.
248 Claessens, Djankov & Lang, supra note 4, at 109.
249 See id. at 108-09 (discussing data on concentration of corporate assets that are
indicative of crony capitalism in East Asia).
250 See supra Part VI.A.
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arbitration panel has yet to be installed and its efficacy is untested.
The Brazilian Corporate Law was designed with the traditional
controlling shareholder in mind.25' Brazilian law imposes more
responsibilities on controlling shareholders than on managers. However,
this legal model is being challenged as ownership structures change. Many
problems that may emerge in companies without clear controlling
shareholders will present significant difficulties for the current law. For
instance, the Brazilian Law affords tag along rights to minority shareholders
in the case of control transactions, which usually involve the sale of more
than fifty percent of the voting shares of a corporation. With the increasing
level of ownership dispersion, it will be more difficult to determine when a
control transaction is taking place. Is a sale of thirty percent of the voting
shares still a control sale? What about a sale of ten percent of the voting
shares? What about a sale of ten percent of voting shares by a shareholder
who has entered into a control shareholder agreement? 253 There are still no
clear guidelines for answering these questions. There is a lot of room for
opposing arguments. The definition of independent directors, the adoption
of shareholders' agreements that bind directors, and the use and
enforcement of anti-takeover clauses2 54 raise important questions for
regulators and market players.
Finally, one must keep in mind that many activities are poorly
regulated. One recent example that gained media attention involved the
251 See Exposigo de Motivos No. 196, de 24 de junho de 1976, do Minist~rio da
Fazenda, available at www.cvm.gov.br/port/atos/leis/6404_Exposicao.asp.
252 Lei No. 6.404, de 15 dezembro de 1976, D.O.U de 17.12.1976, (suplemento), art. 116,
available at http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil 03/Leis/L6404compilada.
253 The recent Votarantim Celulose e Papel (VCP) case involved VCP, a shareholder
from Cia Aracruz, offering to buy all of Erling Lorentzen's shares in Cia Aracruz. VCP and
Lorentzen were parties to the shareholders agreement to exercise control of Aracruz. The
question arose as to whether the transaction would encompass a change of control that would
require a mandatory offer to the other minority shareholders according to article 254-A of
Law 6404. The conclusion will depend on whether the control of Aracruz would change if
Lorentzen acquired control of Aracruz, considering that it was a previous participant in the
agreement for exercize of control. See Daniele Camba, Mercado aprova oferta pela Aracruz
[The Market Approves the Bid Offer to Aracruz], VALOR ECONOMICO (Braz.), Aug. 7 2008;
Andr6 Vieira, Oferta da Votorantim deve criar gigante da celulose [Votorantim's Bid Shall
Create a Cellulose Giant], VALOR ECONOMICO (Braz.), Aug. 7, 2008.
254 Two recent cases involving the companies Even and Cremer call into question the
enforcement of an anti-takeover clause when the board of directors or a strategic minority
shareholder demands the exclusion of anti-takeover devices to make an investment by a
prospective shareholder possible. See Fundo quer retirar pilula de veneno do estatuto da
Cremer [Investment Fund Wants to Exclude Poison Pill from Cremer Bylaws], VALOR
ECONOMICO ONLINE (Braz.), Sept. 4, 2008; Vinicius Pinheiro & Regiane de Oliveira, Even
eleva capital e elimina "'poison pill" [Even Raises its Capital and Eliminates its "Poison
Pill"], GAZETA MERCANTIL (Braz.), Sept. 22, 2008.
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practices of underwriters in issuing securities. 255  The most notable
concerns were the lending of capital by underwriters to issuers and the
receipt of issuers' warrants by underwriters as compensation.
IX. CONCLUSION
Using a unique vantage point, this paper has tried to draw general
conclusions about changing patterns of corporate ownership from the
Brazilian experience. Designing special listing segments with higher
standards of corporate governance appears to be an important part of
fostering markets stuck in low-level equilibrium due to poor protection of
minority shareholders and poor corporate governance. The Bovespa
experiment has shown that many new companies have chosen to list on
special segments that require more stringent corporate governance practices
than the standard market. These companies are looking for financing in the
capital markets instead of using their usual alternatives (e.g., debt). Thus,
private financing by stock exchanges may succeed where public regulation
has failed to foster market development.
Nonetheless, this paper cautions that the majority of traditional
companies have not yet migrated to Bovespa's new listing segments in
large numbers. This shows that path dependence still applies: firms tend to
persist in their patterns of initial ownership, so any changes in corporate
governance practices that depend on changes in ownership structures may
remain elusive.
Brazilian capital markets are going through an important change. The
"new entrants" have caused the level of ownership concentration to
significantly diminish in Novo Mercado. However, this change is marred
by the persistence of traditional concentration of ownership in Level 2,
Level 1, and the standard market. In short, new practices of corporate
governance coexist with old practices. While institutions strive for
improved governance patterns, family ownership is still dominant and
entrenched.
This paper also identifies an important challenge for the corporate
governance literature in general. Corporate governance scholars have
restricted their research to companies' charters and bylaws. The analysis of
shareholders' agreements in Brazil points out that the contractual relations
that affect corporate governance may be more complex than expected. An
analysis of Brazilian corporate governance that does not take shareholders'
agreements into consideration is certainly incomplete. Shareholders'
agreements are central in assessing the concentration of corporate control in
255 See rica Gorga, 0 que o underwriter pode ou ndo fazer [What the Underwriter May
and May Not Do], GAZETA MERCANTIL (Braz.), July 5, 2007; Graziella Valenti & Ana Paula
Ragazzi, Escdndalo da Agrenco testard mercado [Agrenco 's Scandal Will Test the Market],
VALOR ECONOMICO (Braz.), June 23, 2008.
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Brazil. Whether this also applies to assessing corporate governance in other
countries is still an open question that deserves more attention from
researchers.
Shareholders' agreements are used by companies with a larger degree
of ownership dispersion to coordinate joint control and voting rights. In
this sense, shareholders' agreements serve as substitutes for share
ownership. Furthermore, this analysis makes it clear that control comes in
forms other than direct or indirect equity ownership (e.g., pyramids).
Alternative forms of control may arise from contract and, in the case of
shareholders' agreements, can determine how directors can vote, binding
them to shareholders' interests and undermining their independence.
Anti-takeover defenses have been cropping up in companies' bylaws,
which is a remarkable development accompanying increased ownership
dispersion in the Brazilian capital markets. It remains to be seen how these
defenses will withstand takeover attempts or control transactions, and
whether public regulation will evolve to tackle this phenomenon. Private
actors seem to have not yet realized that by increasing management
entrenchment, anti-takeover defenses may hinder capital markets'
development.
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TABLE 1: Main Aspects of Bovespa's Listing Rules
Main Aspects of the Listing Rules Standard Level I Level 2 Novo
Mercado
Disclosure
Disclosure of conditions of related not required required required
party transactions, required
Monthly disclosure of transactions not required required required
with shares of the company by required
employees, administrators and
Fiscal Counselors.
Disclosure of quantity and not required required required
characteristics of securities issued required
by the company held by controlling
shareholders members of the
Board, officers and members of the
Fiscal Counsel.
Improvements in quarterly not required required required
financial statements, including required
consolidated financial statements
and report of the Independent
Auditor.
The Company's quarterly and year- not required required required
end financial statements will required
include a Cash Flow Statement.
Quarterly Statements should be not not required required
presented in English or prepared in required required
accordance with the US GAAP or
IFRS.
Disclosure of annual balance sheet not not required required
according to standards of US required required
GAAP or IFRS.
Free-float
Maintenance of afree-float of at not required required required
least 25% of the capital, required
Capital Dispersion
Public offerings have to use not required required required
mechanisms that favor capital required
dispersion.
Board of Directors
Establishment of a two-year unified not not required required
mandate for the entire Board of required required
Directors, which must have five
members at least, at least 20% of
which shall be Independent
Members.
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TABLE 1: (Continued)
Main Aspects of the Listing Rules Standard Level 1 Level 2 NovoMercado
Corporate Rules
Voting rights granted to preferred not not required not applic-
shares in circumstances such as required required able
incorporation, spin-off and merger
and approval of contracts between
the company and other firms of the
same holding group.
Obligation to hold a tender offer not not required required
for acquisition of the shares held by required required
the other shareholders at the
economic value of the shares.
In a sale of control, same not not not required
conditions provided to majority required required required
shareholders will have to be
extended to all shareholders (Tag
Along).
In case majority shareholders sell not not required not applic-
their stake, same conditions of required required able
price granted must be extended to
common shareholders, while
preferred shareholders must get, at
least, 80% of the price (Tag Along).
Corporate Rules
The company should have a public not required required required
shareholder meeting with analysts required
and investors, at least once a year.
Arbitration
Admission to the Market not not required required
Arbitration Panel for resolution of required required
corporate disputes.
Annual Calendar
Disclosure of an annual calendar not required required required
of corporate events. re uired
One Share--One Vote
The capital stock must be solely not not not required
represented by common (voting) required required required
shares.
Sources: Standard segment listing rules are contained in Lei No. 6.404, de 15 dezembro de 1976 D.O.U.
de 17.12.1976 (Braz.). Level I Listing Rules, supra note 50; Level 2 Listing Rules, supra note 51;
Novo Mercado Listing Rules, supra note 52.
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TABLE 2: Number of Public Companies Listed on Bovespa
Number of Brazilian public companies listed on the indicated Bovespa levels. Data is
provided by Bovespa, and is at year-end except for 2007.
Boves a Listing Segments
Year Standard Level 1 Level 2 NovoTotal
Mercado
1995 577 577
1996 589 589
1997 595 these levels were created in 2000 595
1998 599 599
1999 534 534
2000 495 0 0 0 495
2001 450 18 0 0 468
2002 407 24 3 2 436
2003 374 31 3 2 410
2004 343 33 7 7 390
2005 316 37 10 18 381
2006 300 36 14 44 394
2007 293 44 20 92 449
Source: Bovespa, http://www.bovespa.com.br/indexi.asp.
TABLE 3: Primary Stock Offerings
STOCKS
YEAR Number of Volume
Issuances R$ millions US$ millions
1995 31 1,935.25 2,111.10
1996 22 9,142.96 9,168.27
1997 23 3,599.21 3,655.44
1998 20 4,112.10 3,494.52
1999 10 2,749.45 1,467.83
2000 6 1,410.17 628.24
2001 6 1,353.30 625.24
2002 4 1,050.44 370.12
2003 2 230.00 73.76
2004 9 4,469.90 1,552.03
2005 13 4,364.63 1,860.86
2006 29 13,745.58 6,565.67
2007 59 33,135.84 17,253.01
Source: ComissAo de Valores Mobilidrios, http://www.cvm.gov.br.
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TABLE 4: Secondary Stock Offerings
Secondary Distributions(Stocks)
YEAR No. of registered Volume
distributions R$ millions US$ millions
1995 0 0 0
1996 2 37.9 37.2
1997 0 0 0
1998 14 1,856.30 1,618.00
1999 14 1,866.60 1,065.50
2000 14 12,127.30 6,726.00
2001 7 4,308.70 1,768.20
2002 2 5,096.80 2,158.60
2003 6 1,856.30 614.40
2004 12 4,682.30 1,611.60
2005 15 6,634.60 2,792.20
2006 30 12,760.80 5,878.70
2007 44 34,121.3 18,211.40
Source: Comiss~o de Valores Mobili~rios, http://www.cvm.gov.br.
TABLE 5: Recent IPOs
Statistics of Going Public Transactions in BOVESPA
Year Company's Listing Segment Offer Type Volume R$ No. of
Name millions brokers No. of investors
Tempo Part Novo Mercado Primary 394 57 N/D
MPX Energia Novo Mercado Primary 1,916 58 N/D
BMF Novo Mercado Secondary 5,984 70 255,001
Pan-americano Level I Primary 680 61 N/D
Laep BDR Primary 508 52 563
Helbor Novo Mercado Primary 252 60 723
2007
Amil Novo Mercado Mixed 1,401 69 4,398
BR Brokers Novo Mercado Mixed 699 55 13
Bovespa Hid Novo Mercado Secondary 6,626 69 64,775
Agrenco BDR Primary 666 55 805
Marisa Novo Mercado Primary 506 67 13.177
SEB Level 2 Mixed 413 61 3,709
Tenda Novo Mercado Primary 603 60 10,172
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
Statistics of Going Public Transactions in BOVESPA
Year Company's Listing Segment Offer Type Volume R$ No. of investorsName millions brokersN
Trisul Novo Mercado_ _Primary_ [330 62 22,444
BicBanco Level I Mixed 822 62 5,197
Sul America Level 2 Primay 775 67 19,261
Satipel Novo Mercado Mixed 398 59
ICosan Ltd BDR Primary 275 59 1,572
Estacio Part Level 2 Mixed 447 64 10,890
,Generalshopp Novo Mercado _Primary 287 59 4,999
Multiplan_... Level 2 Mixed 925 66 24,419
Providencia Novo Mercado Primary 469 64 11,135
Springs ... Novo Mercado Mixed 656 69 7,383
ABC Brasil Level 2 Mixed 609 49 6,050
Triunfo Part Novo Mercado Mixed 513 59 7,139
Guarani Novo Mercado Primary 666 63 12,388
Kroton Level 2 Mixed 479 60 11,297
MRV Novo Mercado Mixed 1,193 60 15,657
Patagonia BDR Mixed 539 56 2,846
Minerva Novo Mercado Mixed 444 62 11,660
Invest Tur Novo Mercado Primary 945 53 17
Redecard Novo Mercado Mixed 4,643 67 29,766
Indusval Level 1 Mixed 253 59 290
Tegma Novo Mercado Mixed 604 64 6,776
,Marfrig Novo Mercado Primary 1,021 62 4,933
Daycoval Level 1 Mixed 1,092 62 7,585
Cruzeiro Sul Level 1 Mixed 574 61 4,221
EZTec Novo Mercado Primary 542 62 5,553
'Lg-In Novo Mercado Mixed 848 67 26,898
SLC Agricola Novo Mercado Mixed 490 64 9,750
Parana .......Level 1 Primary 529 50 8,586
2007
Inpar S/A Novo Mercado IPrimary 1756 9,614
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
Statistics of Going Public Transactions in BOVESPA
Compay's] 0ff Volume R$ INo. of
Year NCm Listing Segment ffer Type Vme Ro.ersiNo. of investorsNam ___ Je millions brokers _ _
Tarpon BDR Primary _444 110,714
Sofisa Level 1 Mixed 439 61 7,269
Wilson Sons BDR Secondary 706 57 11,915
Cremer Novo Mercado Mixed 508 58 9,419
Agra Incorp Novo Mercado Mixed 786 62 5,375
CR2 Novo Mercado Primary 308 58 2,810
Bematech Novo Mercado Mixed 407 60 8,718
Metalfrio Novo Mercado _Mixed 453 65 9,672
JIISF Part Novo Mercado Primary 432 .... 66 4,561
Fer Heringer Novo Mercado Mixed 304......... 64 9,275
BR Malls Par Novo Mercado Mixed 657 66 13,909
Even Novo Mercado Primary 460 65 11,366
Pine Level 1 Mixed 517 55 .. 20,251
JBS Novo Mercado Mixed 1617 61 22,984
Anhanguera Level 2 Mixed 512 60 13,742
GVT Holding Novo Mercado Primary 1,076 59 14,597
Sao Martinho Novo Mercado Mixed 424 64 24,686
Iguatemi Novo Mercado Primary 549 64 16,889
Tecnisa Novo Mercado Mixed 791 66 17,436
CC Des Imob Novo Mercado Mixed 522 63 22,294
Rodoben-
simob ....... Novo Mercado ]Primary 449 62 14,181
PDG Realt . Novo Mercado Mixed 1648 12,018
Dufrybras BDR Secondary 880 60 10,177
Lopes Brasil Novo Mercado Secondary
- 
_475 _59 9,930
Positivo Inf Novo Mercado Mixed 604 61 18,814
2006
Odontoprev Novo Mercado Mixed 522 55 8,860
Ecodiesel Novo Mercado Primary 379 58 9,446
Tema Part Level 2 Mixed 627 52 6,509
2007
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
Statistics of Going Public Transactions in BOVESPA
Year Company's Listing Segment Offer Type1 Volume R$ No. of No of investorsName m . .. . ..illions brokersj .
Profarma Novo-Mercado, -I.Mixed 1401 4,609
Brascan Res Novo Mercado Mixed 1,188 54 4,319
M.Dias-branco Novo Mercado Secondary 411 56 3,460
Santos Bras Level 2 Mixed 933 54 4,209
Klabinsegall_ Novo Mercado Mixed 527 53 4,720
Medial Saude Novo Mercado Mixed 742 53 3,131
Abyara Novo Mercado Primary 164 41 6
MMX Miner Novo Mercado Primary 1,119 35 18
Datasul Novo Mercado Mixed 317 52 5,514
GP Invest BDR Primary 706 49 2,373
NLupatech ovoM rcado Mixed 453 55 11,453
BrasilAgro Novo Mercado Primary 583 35 3
CSU Cardys t Novo Mercado Mixed 341 57 14,637
ABnote . Novo Mercado Secondary 480 55 15,453
Equatoaial Level 2 Mixed 540 56 7,521
Totvs Novo Mercado Mixed 460 57 16,322
Company Novo Mercado Mixed 282 55 13,166
Gafisa Novo Mercado Mixed 927 57 14,028
Copasa Novo Mercado Primary 813 60 15,802
Vivax Level 2 Mixed 1529 7,916
UOL Level 2 Mixed 625 56 13,234
Cosan Novo Mercado Primary_ 886 52 9,079
Nossa Caixa Novo Mercado Secondary 954 54 7,666
OHL Brasil Novo Mercado Mixed 496 42 1,084
2005 Energias BR -Novo Mercado Mixed 11,185 44 468
TAM S/A Level 2 Mixed 548 48 1,212
Localiza Novo Mercado Secondary 265 48 809
Submarino Novo Mercado Mixed 473 52 4,022
Renar Novo Mercado Primary 16 42 1,698
2006
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
Statistics of Going Public Transactions in BOVESPA
Year Company's Listing Segment Offer Type Volume R$ No. ofName millions brokersNo of investors
Porto Seguro Novo Mercado Mixed 377 51 5,919
DASA ..... Novo-Mercado Mixed
_ __ 
437 44 _ 2,892
Grendene Novo Mercado Secondary 617 56 17,905
2004 CPFLEnergia NovoMercado Mixed 821 47 2,750
ALL Amer Lat Level 2 Mixed 588 33 3,425
Gol Level 2 Mixed 878 40 11,397
Natura Novo Mercado Secondary 768 32 4,445
Source: BM&FBovespa - For Investors - Recent Listings, http://www.bovespa.com.br/Empresas/Inst
lnfoEmpresas/AberturalPOsRecentes.asp?tit=5 (last visited March 5, 2009).
TABLE 6: Bovespa's Segments Market Capitalization
Market Capitalization ($ in millions) of Bovespa's standard market, Level 1, Level 2 and
Novo Mercado. Companies with a majority shareholder have a shareholder that owns more
than 50% of the voting capital.
Market Capitalization
Companies with Companies without a Total Sample
majority shareholder majority shareholder
LEVEL No. of Market No. of Market No. of Market
firms Capitaliz- firms Capitaliz- firms Capitalization
ation in R$ I ation in R$ I in R$
Novo 27 189,048,042, 65 240,244,243,7 92 429,292,286,5
Mercado 839.36 54.94 94.30
Level 2 14 54,079,710,0 6 23,798,197,68 20 77,877,907,72
40.99 8.22 9.21
Level 1 31 631,755,247, 13 246,945,774,5 44 878,701,021,8
320.61 07.31 27.92
Standard 133 793,629,042, 50 129,693,328,9 183 923,322,371,6
667,36 35.93 03.29
TOTAL 205 1,668,512,04 134 640,681,544,8 339 2,309,193,587,
1 2,868.32 86.40 754.72
Source: Author's calculations are based on Bovespa data on market capitalization dated Dec. 19, 2007.
Bovespa, http://www.bovespa.com.br/indexi.asp.
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TABLE 7: Listing History of Companies Listed on Novo Mercado, Level 2, and Level 1
Date of Initial Date Previous
CVM in the Listing
Register Special Standard
Company's name Sector Classification (d /m /y) Segment Market
NEW MARKET
ABYARA
PLANEJAMENTO Construction; Real Estate
IMOBILIARIO S.A. Construction 24/7/2006 27/7/2006 NO
A(CUCAR Food Manufacturing;
GUARANI S.A. Sugar Manufacturing 20/7/2007 23/7/2007 NO
AGRA EMPREEN-
DIMENTOS IMOB- Construction; Real Estate
ILIARIOS S.A. Construction 19/4/2007 26/4/2007 NO
AMERICAN Finance and Insurance;
BANKNOTE S.A. Credit Card Issuing 12/4/2006 27/4/2006 NO
AMIL PARTICI- Health; Medical and
PACOES S.A. Diagnostics Services 24/10/2007 29/10/2007 NO
B2W-COMP-
ANHIA GLOBAL Retail trade;
DO VAREJO Miscellaneous products 26/7/2007 8/8/2007 NO
Finance and Insurance YESST
BCO BRASIL S.A. Commercial Banking 20/7/1977 28/6/2006 AND
BCO NOSSA Finance and Insurance
CAIXA S.A. Commercial Banking 14/10/2005 28/10/2005 NO
Manufacturing;
Computer and Computer
BEMATECH IND E Peripheral Equipment
COM EQUIP. and Software Merchant
ELETRONIC S.A. Wholesalers 17/4/2007 19/4/2007 NO
Financial Activities;
Development and
BOLSA DE Management of Trading
MERCA-DORIAS E Systems; Clearing House
FUTUROS-BMF Services for Securities
S.A. and Derivative Products 28/11/2007 30/11/2007 NO
Financial Activities;
Holding Company;
Processing, Reserve and
BOVESPA Clearing House
HOLDING S.A. Activities 23/10/2007 26/10/2007 NO
BR MALLS Real Estate and Rental
PARTICIPACOES and Leasing; Holding
S.A. Company 4/1/2006 5/4/2007 NO
BRASCAN Construction; Offices of
RESIDENTIAL Other Holding
PROPERTIES S.A. Companies 11/9/2006 23/10/2006 NO
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Date of Initial Date Previous
CVM in the Listing
Register Special Standard
Company's name Sector Classification (d /im/y) Segment Market
NEW MARKET
Construction; Real Estate
BRASIL BROKERS Construction; Real Estate
PARTICIPACOES Agents and Brokers;
S.A. Real Estate Holdings 26/10/2007 29/10/2007 NO
BRASIL ECO-
DIESEL IND COM Grain and Oilseed
BIO.OL.VEG. S.A. Milling 9/11/2006 22/11/2006 NO
BRASILAGRO - Real Estate and Rental
CIA BRAS DE and Leasing; Agriculture
PROP AGRICOLAS Business 25/4/2006 2/5/2006 NO
CAMARGO
CORREA DESENV. Construction; Real Estate
IMOBILIARIO S.A. Construction 29/1/2007 31/1/2007 NO
CIA BRAS
DESENV. Insurance and Finance;
IMOBILIARIO Real Estate and Rental
TURISTICO and Leasing 12/7/2007 16/07/2007 NO
Highway, Street, and
CIA CONCESSOES Bridge Construction;
RODOVIARIAS Holding Company 19/12/2000 01/02/2002 NO
Textile Mills; Clothing & 20/07/1977 YESST
CIA. HERING Apparel Manufacturing 26/1/2005 16/5/2007 AND
Plastics Pipe, Pipe
Fitting, and Unlaminated
CIA. Profile Shape
PROVIDtNCIA Manufacturing;
INDI:JSTRIA E Commercial and
COMPERCIO Manufacturing 25/7/2007 27/7/2007 NO
Administration of Air
and Water Resource and
Solid Waste
Management Programs;
CIA SANEAMENTO Water and Sewer Line
BASICO EST SAO and Related Structures YESST
PAULO Construction 27/6/1994 24/4/2002 AND
Administration of Air
and Water Resource and
Solid Waste
CIA SANEAMENTO Management Programs;
DE MINAS Water and Sewer Line
GERAISCOPASA and Related Structures
MG Construction 17/9/2003 8/2/2006 NO
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Date of Initial Date Previous
CVM in the Listing
Register Special Standard
Company's name Sector Classification (d /m /y) Segment Market
NEW MARKET
Construction
COMPANY S.A. Real Estate Construction 3/9/2001 2/3/2006 NO
Construction; Real Estate
Construction; Inc-
CONSTR UTORA orporation, Management,
TENDA S.A. Real Estate Trading 11/10/2007 15/10/2007 NO
COSAN S.A.
INDUSTRIA E Food Manufacturing
COMERCIO Sugar Manufacturing 26/10/2005 18/11/2005 NO
Power and
Communication Line and
CPFL ENERGIA Related Structures YESST
S.A. Construction; Holdings 18/5/2000 29/9/2004 AND
CR2 EMPREEN-
DIMENTOS IMO- Construction; Real Estate
BILIARIOS S.A. Construction 16/4/2007 23/4/2007 NO
Medical, and Hospital
CREMER S.A. Supplies Manufacturing 30/6/2006 30/4/2007 NO
CSU Finance and Insurance
CARDSYSTEM S.A. Credit Card Issuing 25/4/2006 2/5/2006 NO
CYRELA Commercial and
COMMERCIAL Industrial Buildings
PROPERT S.A. Rental; Shopping
EMPR PART Centers, Warehouses 1/8/2007 9/8/2007 NO
CYRELA BRAZIL
REALTY S.A. EMP- Construction; Real Estate
REEND E PART Construction 7/7/1994 21/9/2005 NO
Computer and Computer
Peripheral Equipment
and Software Merchant
DATASUL S.A. Wholesalers 30/5/2006 2/6/2006 NO
DIAGNOSTICOS Medical and Diagnostic
DA AMERICA S.A. Laboratories 5/11/2004 19/11/2004 NO
Power and
Communication Line and
EDP - ENERGIAS Related Structures
DO BRASIL S.A. Construction; Holdings 5/7/2005 13/7/2005 NO
EMBRAER- Aircraft Manufacturing;
EMPRESA BRAS Aircraft Engine and
DE AERO- Engine Parts
NAUTICA S.A. Manufacturing 23/5/2006 6/6/2006 NO
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Date of Initial Date Previous
CVM in the Listing
Register Special Standard
Company's name Sector Classification (d/m /y) Segment Market
NEW MARKET
Cement and Concrete
Product Manufacturing 17/11/ YESST
ETERNIT S.A. and Wholesaler 1970* 17/8/2006 AND
EVEN CONSTRU-
TORA E INCORP- Construction; Real Estate
ORADORA S.A. Construction 2/3/2007 2/4/2007 NO
EZ TEC
EMPREEND. E
PARTICIPACOES
S.A. Construction 15/6/2007 22/6/2007 NO
FERTILIZANTES Fertilizer Manufacturing
HERINGER S.A. and Wholesaler 10/4/2007 12/4/2007 NO
Real Estate Property
Managers; Residential
GAFISA S.A. Properties 21/2/1997 17/2/2006 NO
Management of
GENERAL Companies and
SHOPPING BRASIL Enterprises; Management
S.A. of Shopping Centers 26/7/2007 30/7/2007 NO
Footwear Manufacturing;
Rubber and Plastics
GRENDENE S.A. Footwear Manufacturing 26/10/2004 29/10/2004 NO
Telecommunications;
GVT (HOLDING) Wired Telecommunic-
S.A. ations Carriers; Holdings 9/6/2006 15/2/2007 NO
Real Estate
Incorporation,
Management, & Trading;
HELBOR Activities Related to Real
EMPREEN- Estate; Real Estate
DIMENTOS S.A. Agents and Brokers. 9/7/2007 29/10/2007 NO
IGUATEMI
EMPRESA DE Property Managers;
SHOPPING Management Shopping
CENTERS S.A Centers 2/2/2007 7/2/2007 NO
INDUSTRIAS Industrial Machinery YESST
ROMI S.A. Manufacturing 19/4/1938* 23/3/2007 AND
Construction; Real Estate
INPAR S.A. Construction 23/5/2007 6/6/2007 NO
Meat and Meat Product
Merchant Wholesalers;
Livestock Merchant
JBS S.A. Wholesalers 27/3/2007 29/3/2007 NO
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Date of Initial Date Previous
CVM in the Listing
Register Special Standard
Company's name Sector Classification (dim /y) Segment Market
NEW MARKET
JHSF PARTICI- Construction; Real Estate
PACOES S.A. Construction 4/4/2007 12/4/2007 NO
KLABIN SEGALL Construction; Real Estate
S.A. Construction 14/8/2006 9/10/2006 NO
Power and
Communication Line and
Related Structures 25/11/ YESST
LIGHT S.A. Construction; Holdings 1968* 22/02/2006 AND
LOCALIZA RENT
A CAR S.A. Passenger Car Rental 6/5/2005 23/5/2005 NO
LOG-IN
LOGISTICA
INTERMODAL S.A. Water Transportation 4/6/2007 21/6/2007 NO
LOJAS RENNER YESST
S.A. Department Stores 20/7/1977 1/7/2005 AND
LPS BRASIL -
CONSULTORIA DE Construction
IMOVEIS S.A. Real Estate Construction 12/12/2006 18/12/2006 NO
Industrial Machinery and
LUPATECH S.A. Equipment 8/5/2006 15/5/2006 NO
M.DIAS BRANCO
S.A. IND COM DE
ALIMENTOS Food Manufacturing 11/10/2006 18/10/2006 NO
MARFRIG
FRIGORIFICOS E
COM DE ALIM S.A. Meat and Meat Product 18/6/2007 29/6/2007 NO
Textile, Apparel and
Footwear; Holding
MARISA S.A. Company 13/06/2007 22/10/2007 NO
MRV ENGEN-
HARIA E PARTICI-
PACOES S.A. Engineering Services 13/7/2007 23/7/2007 NO
MEDIAL SAUDE Medical and Diagnostic
S.A. Services 19/6/2006 28/9/2006 NO
Household Refrigerator
METALFRIO and Home Freezer
SOLUTIONS S.A. Manufacturing 10/4/2007 13/4/2007 NO
Meat and Meat Product
MINERVA S.A. Merchant Wholesalers 18/7/2007 20/7/2007 NO
MMX
MINERACAO E Mining (except Oil and
METALICOS S.A. Gas); Holdings 10/11/1998 24/7/2006 NO
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Date of Initial Date Previous
CVM in the Listing
Register Special Standard
Company's name Sector Classification (d /m /y) Segment Market
NEW MARKET
MPX ENERGIA Electric Power
S.A. Holding Company 07/12/2007 14/12/2007 NO
Cosmetics, Beauty
NATURA Supplies, and Perfume
COSMETICOS S.A. Wholesalers 21/5/2004 26/5/2004 NO
OBRASCON Construction;
HUARTE LAIN Management Public
BRASIL S.A. Service 6/7/2005 15/7/2005 NO
ODONTOPREV Health Care Plans;
S.A. Dental Services 13/6/2006 1/12/2006 NO
PDG REALTY S.A.
EMPREEND E Construction; Real Estate
PARTICIPACOES Construction 23/1/2007 26/1/2007 NO
YESST
PERDIGAO S.A. Meat and Meat Product 24/6/1997* 12/4/2006 AND
PORTO SEGURO Insurance; Health and
S.A. Welfare Funds; Holdings 28/11/1997 22/11/2004 NO
POSITIVO
INFORMATICA Computer and Electronic
S.A. Product Manufacturing 6/12/2006 11/12/2006 NO
PROFARMA
DISTRIB PROD Drugs and Druggists'
FARMACEUTICOS Sundries Merchant
S.A. Wholesalers 24/10/2006 26/10/2006 NO
Financial Transactions
Processing, Reserve, and
REDECARD S.A. Clearinghouse Activities 11/7/2007 13/7/2007 NO
RENAR MACAS
S.A. Apple Orchards 28/12/2004 28/2/2005 NO
RODOBENS NEG-
OCIOS IMO- Construction; Real Estate
BILIARIOS S.A. Construction 18/1/2007 31/1/2007 NO
ROSSI Construction; Real Estate YES_ST
RESIDENCIAL S.A. Construction 1/7/1997 27/1/2006 AND
SAO CARLOS
EMPREEND E Management, Rental,
PARTICIPACOES Selling and Purchase of YESST
S.A. Commercial Property 25/3/1991 14/12/2006 AND
SAO MARTINHO Sugar and Ethanol
S.A. (Alcohol) Manufacturing 7/2/2007 12/2/2007 NO
SATIPEL Paper and Paper Product
INDUSTRIAL S.A. Merchant Wholesalers 10/9/2007 21/09/2007 NO
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Date of Initial Date Previous
CVM in the Listing
Register Special Standard
Company's name Sector Classification (d /m /y) Segment Market
NEW MARKET
Corn, Cotton Manu-
SLC AGRICOLA facturing and Soybeans
S.A. and Coffee Processing 12/6/2007 15/6/2007 NO
SPRINGS GLOBAL
PARTICIPACOES Textile and Fabric
S.A. Finishing Mills 25/7/2007 27/7/2007 NO
TECNISA S.A. Construction; Holding 9/1/2007 1/2/2007 NO
TEGMA GESTAO Highway, Street, and
LOGISTICA S.A. Bridge Construction 28/6/2007 3/7/2007 NO
Healthcare; Hospital,
TEMPO PARTICIP- Medical and Diagnostics
ACOES S.A. Services; Holding Co. 4/1/2006 18/12/2007 NO
TPI - TRIUNFO Other Support Activities
PARTICIP. E for Road Transportation;
INVEST. S.A. Management 5/12/2002 23/7/2007 NO
Computer Systems
Design and Related
TOTVS S.A. Services 7/3/2006 9/3/2006 NO
TRACTEBEL Electric Power YESST
ENERGIA S.A. Generation 28/5/1998 16/11/2005 AND
Construction; Real Estate
Construction; Electric
Power Generation and
TRISUL S.A. Distribution 10/10/2007 15/10/2007 NO
Motor Manufacturing; YESST
WEG S.A. Holding 9/2/1982 22/7/2007 AND
LEVEL 2
ALL AMERICA Construction and
LATINA Transports; Management YESST
LOGISTICA S.A. and Holdings 2/7/1998 25/6/2004 AND
ANHANGUERA
EDUCACIONAL
PARTICIPACOS Educational Services;
S.A Holdings 8/6/2001 12/3/2007 NO
BCO ABC BRASIL
S.A. Banking Services 23/7/2007 25/7/2007 NO
Power and
CENTRAIS ELET Communication Line and
DE SANTA Related Structures YESST
CATARINA S.A. Construction; Holdings 26/3/1973* 26/6/2002 AND
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Date of Initial Date Previous
CVM in the Listing
Register Special Standard
Company's name Sector Classification (d/m/y) Segment Market
LEVEL 2
Power and
Communication Line and
ELETROPAULO Related Structures
METROP. ELET. Construction; Public YESST
SAO PAULO S.A. Service Facilities 19/8/1993 13/12/2004 AND
Power and
Communication Line and
EQUATORIAL Related Structures
ENERGIA S.A. Construction; Holdings 30/3/2006 3/4/2006 NO
ESTACIO
PARTICIP-ACOES Educational Services;
S.A. Holdings 26/7/2007 30/7/2007 NO
GOL L1NHAS Scheduled Passenger Air
AEREAS INTEL- Transportation; Manage-
IGENTES S.A. ment and Holdings 9/6/2004 24/6/2004 NO
KROTON EDUCA- Educational Services;
CIONAL S.A. Holdings 1/12/1998 23/07/2007 NO
Bus and Other Motor YESST
MARCOPOLO S.A. Vehicle Transit Systems 20/7/1977 03/09/2002 AND
MULTIPLAN - Real Estate and
EMPREEND IMOB- Management of
ILIARIOS S.A. Shopping Centers 25/7/2007 27/7/2007 NO
NET SERVICOS DE Television Broadcasting;
COMUNICACAO Cable and Other Sub- YESST
S.A. scription Programming 22/11/1994 27/06/2002 AND
SANTOS BRASIL
PARTICIPAQOES Metal Container
S.A. Logistics Seaport 16/9/1997 13/10/2006 NO
SARAIVA S.A.
LIVREIROS Books Printing; Books YESST
EDITORES Seller 20/7/1977 7/4/2006 AND
SEB - SISTEMA
EDUCACIONAL Educational Services;
BRASILEIRO S.A Holdings 9/11/1998 18/10/2007 NO
Insurance; Offices of
SUL AMERICA Other Holding
S.A. Companies 3/10/2007 5/10/2007 NO
SUZANO PETRO- Petrochemical YESST
QUIMICA S.A. Manufacturing 25/3/2002 25/11/2004 AND
Passenger Air
Transportation; Goods YESST
TAM S.A. Air Transportation 8/8/1997 14/6/2005 AND
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Date of Initial Date Previous
CVM in the Listing
Register Special Standard
Company's name Sector Classification (d /m /y) Segment Market
LEVEL 2
Power and
TERNA Communication Line and
PARTICIPACOES Related Structures
S.A. Construction; Holdings 6/9/2006 27/10/2006 NO
UNIVERSO Broadcasting Internet;
ONLINE S.A. I Internet Providers 14/12/2005 16/12/2005 NO
LEVEL 1
ARACRUZ Pulp, Paper, and YESST
CELULOSE S.A. Paperboard Mills 5/2/1980 16/4/2002 AND
BCO BRADESCO YESST
S.A. Commercial Banking 20/7/1977 26/6/2001 AND
BCO CRUZEIRO
DO SUL S.A. Banking Services 13/6/2007 26/6/2007 NO
BCO DAYCOVAL Finance Activities;
S.A. Banking Services 27/6/2007 29/6/2007 NO
BCO ESTADO DO
RIO GRANDE DO YESST
SUL S.A. Banking Services 20/7/1977 31/7/2007 AND
BCO INDUSTRIAL
E COMERCIAL Banking Services;
S.A. Investment Bank 17/09/2007 15/10/2007 NO
BCO INDUSVAL
S.A. Finance Activities 10/7/2007 12/7/2007 NO
BCO ITAU
HOLDING YESST
FINANCEIRA S.A. Banking Services No date 26/6/2001 AND
Banking Services;
BCO PANAMERI- Investment and
CANO S.A. Commercial Bank 12/11/2007 19/11/2007 NO
Primary Metal
PARANAPANEMA Manufacturing Cooper YESST
S.A. Goods; Holding 20/07/1977 03/12/2007 AND
BCO PINE S.A. Investment Bank 27/3/2007 2/4/2007 NO
BCO SOFISA S.A. Commercial Credit 26/4/2007 2/5/2007 NO
BRADESPAR S.A. Investments; Holding 7/8/2000 26/6/2001 NO
BRASIL TELECOM Telecommunications;
PARTICIPACOES Wired Telecomm- YESST
S.A. unications Carriers 19/8/1998 9/5/2002 AND
Telecommunications;
BRASIL TELECOM Wired Telecomm- YESST
S.A. unications Carriers 27/3/1980 9/5/2002 AND
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Date of Initial Date Previous
CVM in the Listing
Register Special Standard
Company's name Sector Classification (d/m /y) Segment Market
LEVEL 1
Petrochemical Manu-
facturing; Basic YESST
BRASKEM S.A. Chemical Manufacturing 18/12/1978 13/2/2003 AND
Power and
CENTRAIS ELET Communication Line and
BRAS S.A. - Related Structures YESST
ELETROBRAS Construction 28/1/1971 29/9/2006 AND
Power and
Communication Line and
CESP - CIA Related Structures
ENERGETICA DE Construction; YESST
SAO PAULO . Commercial 27/9/1971 28/7/2006 AND
CIA BRASILEIRA YESST
DE DISTRIBUICAO Food Retailer 4/4/1995 23/4/2003 AND
Power and
CIA ENERGETICA Communication Line and
DE MINAS GERAIS Related Structures YESST
- CEMIG Construction 30/6/1971 17/10/2001 AND
CIA FIACAO
TECIDOS CEDRO Textile and Fabric YES_ST
CACHOEIRA Finishing Mills 11/8/1969 2/10/2003 AND
CIA
TRANSMISSAO
ENERGIA ELET Power Generation; YESST
PAULISTA Power Transmission 14/7/1999 18/9/2002 AND
CIA VALE DO RIO Iron Ore Mining; Iron YESST
DOCE Processing 2/1/1970 12/12/2003 AND
CONFAB Primary Metal YESST
INDUSTRIAL S.A. Manufacturing 21/8/1980 19/12/2003 AND
Wood Product YESST
DURATEX S.A. Manufacturing 26/4/1966 05/05/2005 AND
Vehicle Parts YESST
FRAS-LE S.A. Manufacturing 20/7/1977 11/11/2004 AND
Primary Metal YESST
GERDAU S.A. Manufacturing 3/9/1980 26/6/2001 AND
Vehicle Parts Manu-
IOCHPE MAXION facturing; Rail Trailer YESST
S.A. Parts Manufacturing 17/7/1984 10/11/2005 AND
ITAUSA INVESTI-
MENTOS ITAU Finances; Banking YESST
S.A. Services and Holdings 20/7/1977 26/6/2001 AND
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TABLE 7 (Continued)
Date of Initial Date Previous
CVM in the Listing
Register Special Standard
Company's name Sector Classification (d/m /y) Segment Market
LEVEL 1
Wood Product
Manufacturing; Forestry YESST
KLABIN S.A. and Logging 6/8/1997 10/12/2002 AND
MANGELS Primary Metal YESST
INDUSTRIAL S.A. Manufacturing 28/12/1971 21/3/2003 AND
Primary Metal Manu-
METALURGICA facturing; Management YESST
GERDAU S.A. and Holdings 17/5/1968 25/6/2003 AND
Finance; Banking
PARANA BCO S.A. Services 11/6/2007 14/6/2007 NO
RANDON S.A.
IMPLEMENTOS E Vehicle Parts YESST
PARTICIP-ACOES Manufacturing 5/2/1993 26/6/2001 AND
S.A. FABRICA DE
PRODS ALIMEN- Food Manufacturing; YESST
TICIOS VIGOR Dairy Products 21/2/1984 4/10/2001 AND
Meat and Meat Product YESST
SADIA S.A. Merchant Wholesalers 27/12/2000 26/6/2003 AND
SAO PAULO Rubber and Plastics YESST
ALPARGATAS S.A. Footwear Manufacturing 20/7/1977 15/7/2003 AND
SUZANO PAPEL E Paper and Paper Product; YES ST
CELULOSE S.A. Woods; Paper Mills 15/4/1992 8/5/2003 AND
ULTRAPAR PART- Commercial and YESST
ICIPACOES S.A. Industrial Holdings 27/9/1999 27/10/2005 AND
UNIBANCO Finances; Banking YESST
HOLDINGS S.A. Services; Holdings 24/1/1995 26/6/2001 AND
UNIBANCO
UNIAO DE BCOS Finances; Investment YESST
BRASILEIROS S.A. Bank 20/7/1977 26/6/2001 AND
UNIPAR UNIAO
DE IND PETROQ Petrochemical YESST
S.A. Manufacturing 8/12/1971 24/11/2004 AND
USINAS SID DE Primary Metal
MINAS GERAIS Manufacturing; YESST
S.A.-USIMINAS Laminated Plans 11/04/1994 11/10/2007 AND
VOTORANTIM
CELULOSE E Paper and Paper Product; YESST
PAPEL S.A. Woods; Paper Mills 2/6/1986 14/11/2001 AND
Source: Author's elaboration is based on information available on the CVM and Bovespa's websites.
Comiss~o de Valores Mobilifrios, http://www.cvm.gov.br; Bovespa, http:
//www.bovespa.com.br/indexi.asp.
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Note for TABLES 8-11: Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms
For these four tables, the definition of a company with a majority shareholder is one in
which a single shareholder has more than fifty percent of the voting capital. Some of the
companies may present fewer than three or five largest shareholders, and in these cases they
are dropped from this classification.
TABLE 8: Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Novo Mercado
NOVO MERCADO
Companies with controlling shareholder (27)*
Shareholder voting capital (mean) non-voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Largest 60.87% 0.00 60.87%
3 Largest 70.40% 0.00 70.40%
5 Largest 70.91% 0.00 70.91%
Companies without a controlling shareholder (65)
Shareholder voting capital (mean) non-voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Largest 26.23% 0.00 26.23%
3 Largest 47.28% 0.00 47.28%
5 Largest 54.73% 0.00 54.73%
Total Sample (92)
Shareholder voting capital (mean) non-voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Largest 36.39% 0.00 36.39%
3 Largest 52.38% 0.00 52.38%
5 Largest 56.16% 0.00 56.16%
Source: Author's calculations are based on ownership information available on the CVM website and
Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 and updated in 2007, except for company MPX
whose ownership data come from its IPO prospectus (on Dec. 12th. 2007). Comiss~o de Valores
Mobilidrios, http://www.cvm.gov.br; PROSPECTO DEFINITIVO DE DISTRIBUICAO PUBLICA
PRIMARIA DE ACOES ORDINARIAS DE EMISSO DA MPX ENERGIA S.A. (Dec. 12, 2007).
TABLE 9: Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Level 2
LEVEL 2
Companies with controlling shareholder (14)
Shareholder voting capital (mean) non-voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Largest 75.91% 19.93% 48.83%
3 Largest 96.08% 24.21% 52.28%
5 Largest 97.93% 33.20% 59.21%
Companies without a controlling shareholder (6)
Shareholder voting capital (mean) non-voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Largest 38.84% 15.88% 26.45%
3 Largest 65.56% 18.52% 39.52%
5 Largest 82.10% 30.08% 52.12%
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TABLE 9 (Continued)
LEVEL 2
Total Sample (20)
Shareholder voting capital (mean) non-voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Largest 64.79% 18.72% 42.11%
3 Largest 83.87% 21.93% 47.18%
5 Largest 91.60% 31.95% 56.37%
Source: Author's calculations are based on ownership information available on the CVM website and
Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 and updated in 2007. Comiss~o de Valores
Mobilidrios, http://www.cvm.gov.br.
TABLE 10: Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Level 1
LEVEL 1
Companies with controlling shareholder (31)
Shareholder voting capital (mean) non-voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Largest 76.07% 8.13% 39.33%
3 Largest 89.27% 20.76% 53.35%
5 Lar est 92.75% 34.16% 63.15%
Companies without a controlling shareholder (13)
Shareholder voting capital (mean) non-voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Largest 32.31% 4.72% 19.27%
3 Largest 64.20% 6.36% 35.42%
5 Largest 76.83% 16.01% 47.60%
Total Sample (44)
Shareholder voting capital (mean) _.non-voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Largest 63.14% 7.12% 33.40%
3 Largest 81.14% 16.09% 47.54%
5 Largest 84.79% 25.08% 55.37%
Source: Author's calculations are based on ownership information available on the CVM website and
Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 and updated in 2007. Comissao de Valores
Mobiliirios, http://www.cvm.gov.br.
TABLE 11: Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on the Standard Market
STANDARD
Companies with controlling shareholder (133)
Shareholder voting capital (mean) non-voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Largest 77.48% 27.00% 58.58%
3 Largest 89.72% 43.31% 69.78%
5 Largest 92.22% 47.20% 71.25%
Companies without a controlling shareholder (50
Shareholder voting capital (mean) non-voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Largest 33.62% 11.15% 24.42%
3 Largest 67.64% 26.51% 51.57%
5 Largest 78.80% 37.42% 66.18%
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TABLE 11 (Continued)
STANDARD
Total Sample (183)
Shareholder voting capital (mean) non-voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Largest 65.50% 22.65% 49.23%
3 Largest 81.64% 37.30% 63.06%
5 Largest 85.19% 42.31% 68.64%
Source: Author's calculations are based on ownership information available on the CVM website.
Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 and updated in 2007. Comissdo de Valores
Mobilidrios, http://www.cvm.gov.br.
Note for TABLES 12-14: Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms
(Accounting for Shareholders' Agreement)
For these tables, a company with a majority shareholder is defined as one in which a single
shareholder has more than fifty percent of the voting capital.
TABLE 12: Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed at Novo Mercado
(Accounting for Shareholders' Agreement)
NEW MARKET
Companies with a Companies without a Total Sample (92)
controlling shareholder (27) controlling shareholder (65)
Share- voting capital voting capital Share- voting capital
holder (mean) - Shareholder (mean) holder (mean)
Lar est 60.87 Lar est 26.23 Lar est 36.39
Companies with a Companies without a
controlling shareholder controlling shareholder taking Total Sample taking into
taking into account share- into account shareholders' account shareholders'
holders' agreements (47) agreements (45) a reements (92)
Share- voting capital voting capital Share- voting capital
holder (mean) Shareholder (mean) holder (mean)
Largest Largest Largest
Bc 62.74 Block 26.98 Block 45.25
Companies that ended up with a controlling shareholder taking into account shareholders'
agreements
voting capital not taking into voting capital taking into
Share- No. of account shareholder account shareholder
holder firms agreements (mean) agreements (mean)
Largest
Block 20 28.06 65.27
Source: Author's calculation based on shareholders' agreements available on the CVM website.
Comissdo de Valores Mobilirios, http://www.cvm.gov.br.
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TABLE 13: Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Level 2
(Accounting for Shareholders' Agreement)
LEVEL 2
Companies with a Companies without a Total Sample (20)
controlling shareholder (14) controlling shareholder (6)
Share- voting capital voting capital Share- voting capital
holder (mean) Shareholder (mean) holder (mean)
Largest 75.91 Largest 38.84 Largest 64.79
Companies with a Companies without a Total Sample taking into
controlling shareholder controlling shareholder taking account shareholders'
taking into account share- into account shareholders' agreements (20)
holders' agreements 1 8) agreements (2)
Share- voting capital voting capital Share- voting capital
holder (mean) Shareholder (mean) holder (mean)
Largest Largest Largest
Block 72.19 Block 46.29 Block 69.60
Companies that ended up with a controlling shareholder taking into account shareholder
agreements
voting capital not taking into voting capital taking into
Share- No. of account shareholder account shareholder
holder firms agreements (mean) agreements (mean)
Largest
Block 4 35.11 55.86
Source: Author's calculation based on shareholders' agreements available on the CVM website.
Comiss~o de Valores Mobili~rios, http://www.cvm.gov.br.
TABLE 14: Direct Shareholding Composition of Firms Listed on Level 1
(Accounting for Shareholders' Agreement)
LEVEL 1
Companies with a Companies without a Total Sample (44)
controlling shareholder (3 1) controlling shareholder (13)
Share- voting capital voting capital Share- voting capital
holder (mean) Shareholder mean holder (mean)
Largest 76.07 Largest 31.26 FLarest 63.14
Companies with a Companies without a Total Sample taking into
controlling shareholder controlling shareholder taking account shareholders'
taking into account share- into account shareholders' agreements (43)*
holders' agreements (40) agreements (3 *
Share- voting capital voting capital Share- voting capital
holder mean) Shareholder (mean) holder (mean)
Largest Largest Largest
Block 74.99 Block 42.94 Block 72.75
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TABLE 14 (Continued)
LEVEL 1
Companies that ended up with a controlling shareholder taking into account shareholders'
agreements (9)
voting capital not taking into voting capital taking into
Share- No. of account shareholder account shareholder
holder firms agreements (mean) agreements (mean)
Largest
Block 9 27.00 70.09
Source: Author's calculation based on shareholders' agreements available
Comiss~o de Valores Mobili.rios, http://www.cvm.gov.br.
on the CVM website.
TABLE 15: Composition of Controlling Groups and Largest Shareholders in Novo
Mercado
NEW MARKET (92)
Companies with controlling shareholders (27)
Shareholder Direct Structure (8)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 0 0 0
Foreign 1 52.06 52.06
Individual or family 3 62.82 62.82
Government 4 60.83 60.83
Shareholder Indirect Structure '19)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 0 0.00 0.00
Foreign 2 64.29 64.29
Individual or family 17 61.89 54.37
Government 0 0 0
Shareholder Total Sample (27)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 0 0.00 0.00
Foreign 3 60.21 60.21
Individual or family 20 62.03 55.64
Government 4 60.83 60.83
Companies without controlling shareholders (65)
Shareholder Direct Structure (31)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 4 9.95 9.95
Foreign 17 22.40 22.40
Individual or family 9 23.01 23.01
Government 1 49.50 49.50
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TABLE 15 (Continued)
NEW MARKET (92)
Companies without controlling shareholders (65)
Shareholder Indirect Structure 34)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 2 37.52 18.09
Foreign 4 22.45 22.45
Individual or family 28 37.07 33.29
Government 0 0 0
Shareholder Total Sample (65)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 6 19.14 12.66
Foreign 21 22.41 22.41
Individual or family 37 33.65 30.79
Government 1 49.50 49.50
Companies with and without controlling shareholders (92)
Shareholder Direct Structure (39)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 4 9.95 9.95
Foreign 18 24.05 24.05
Individual or family 12 32.96 32.96
Government 5 58.56 58.56
Shareholder Indirect Structure 53)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 2 37.52 18.09
Foreign 6 36.40 36.40
Individual or family 45 46.44 41.26
Government 0 0 0
Shareholder Total Sample (92)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 6 19.14 12.66
Foreign 24 27.14 27.14
Individual or family 57 43.61 39.51
Government 5 58.56 58.56
Source: Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 available in CVM website. Comissao
de Valores Mobilidrios, http://www.cvm.gov.br.
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TABLE 16: Composition of Controlling Groups, Largest Shareholders and Market
Capitalization in the Novo Mercado
Novo Mercado
Companies with controlling shareholders (27)
Shareholder No. of Firms Market Capitalization in R$ %
Institutional 0 0.00 0,00
Foreign 3 17,096,422,523.52 9.04
Individual or family 20 77,545,682,907.49 41.02
Government 4 94,405,937,408.35 49.94
TOTAL 27 189,048,042,839.36 100
Companies without controlling shareholders (65)
Shareholder No. of Firms Market Capitalization in R$ %
Institutional 6 64,746,363,054.48 26.95
Foreign 21 76,726,010,803.99 31.94
Individual or family 37 93,115,605,752.27 38.76
Government 1 5,656,264,144.20 2.35
TOTAL 65 240,244,243,754.94 100
Total Sample (92)
Shareholder No. of Firms Market Capitalization in R$ %
Institutional 6 64,746,363,054.48 15.08
Foreign 24 93,822,433,327.51 21.86
Individual or family 57 170,661,288,659.76 39.75
Government 5 100,062,201,552.55 23.31
TOTAL 92 429,292,286,594.30 100
Source: Author's calculation based on market capitalization provided by Bovespa for Dec. 19th, 2007.
Bovespa, http://www.bovespa.com.br.
TABLE 17: Composition of Controlling Groups and Largest Shareholders in Level 2
LEVEL 2 (20)
Companies with controlling shareholders (14)
Shareholder TDirect Structure (6)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 0 0.00 0.00
Foreign 3 75.39 50.79
Individual or family 2 92.48 71.10
Government 1 50.18 20.20
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TABLE 17 (Continued)
LEVEL 2 (20)
Comanies with controlling shareholders (14)
Shareholder Indirect Structure (8)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 0 0.00 0.00
Foreign 1 61.34 6.34
Individual or family 6 80.02 48.60
Government 1 70.02 16.38
Shareholder Total Sample (20)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 0 0 0
Foreign 4 71.88 39.68
Individual or family 8 83.13 54.22
Government 2 60.10 16.38
Companies without controlling shareholders (6)
Shareholder Direct Structure (3
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 0 0.00 0.00
Foreign 1 32.78 26.98
Individual or family 2 44.20 15.79
Government 0 0.00 0.00
Shareholder Indirect Structure 3)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 0 0.00 0.00
Foreign 0 0.00 0.00
Individual or family 3 45.80 25.59
Government 0 0.00 0.00
Shareholder Total Sample (6)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 0 0.00 0.00
Foreign 1 32.78 26.98
Individual or family 5 45.16 21.67
Government 0 0.00 0.00
Com Panies with and without controlling shareholders (20)
Shareholder Direct Structure (91
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 0 0.00 0.00
Foreign 4 64.74 44.84
Individual or family 4 68.34 43.44
Government 1 50.18 20.20
530
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TABLE 17 (Continued)
LEVEL 2 (20)
Com anies with and without controlling shareholders (20)
Shareholder Indirect Structure (11)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 0 0.00 0.00
Foreign 1 61.34 6.34
Individual or family 9 68.61 40.93
Government 1 70.02 16.38
Shareholder Total Sample (20)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 0 0.00 0.00
Foreign 5 64.06 37.14
Individual or family 13 68.53 41.70
Government 2 60.10 18.29
Source: Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 available in CVM website. Comissdo
de Valores Mobilidrios, http://www.cvm.gov.br.
TABLE 18: Composition of Controlling Groups, Largest Shareholders and Market
Capitalization in the Level 2
LEVEL 2
Companies with controlling shareholders (14)
Shareholder No. of Firms Market Capitalization in R$ %
Institutional 0 0.00 0.00
Foreign 4 13,164,547,105.35 24.34
Individual or family 8 29,029,333,846.20 53.68
Government 2 11,885,829,089.44 21.98
TOTAL 14 54,079,710,040.99 100
Companies without controlling shareholders (6)
Shareholder No. of Firms Market Capitalization in R$ %
Institutional 0 0.00 0.00
Foreign 1 3,281,505,350.79 13.79
Individual or family 5 20,516,692,337.43 86.21
Government 0 0.00 0.00
TOTAL 6 23,798,197,688.22 100
Total Sample (20)
Shareholder No. of Firms Market Capitalization in R$ %
Institutional 0 0.00 0.00
Foreign 5 16,446,052,456.14 21.12
Individual or family 13 49,546,026,183.63 63.62
Government 2 11,885,829,089.44 15.26
TOTAL 20 77,877,907,729.21 100
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Source: Author's calculation based on market capitalization provided by Bovespa for Dec. 19th, 2007.
Bovespa, http://www.bovespa.com.br.
TABLE 19: Composition of Controlling Groups and Largest Shareholders in Level 1
LEVEL 1 (44)
Companies with controlling shareholders (31)
Shareholder Direct Structure (7)
No. of Firns Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 0 0.00 0.00
Foreign 1 99.22 38.99
Individual or family 2 76.64 54.69
Government 4 74.56 1 29.04
Shareholder Indirect Structure 24)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 3 48.01 13.89
Foreign 2 75.36 36.85
Individual or family 19 75.60 34.49
Government 0 0 0
Shareholder Total Sample (31)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 3 48.01 13.89
Foreign 3 83.31 37.56
Individual or family 21 75.70 36.41
Government 4 74.56 29.04
Companies without controlling shareholders (13)
Shareholder Direct Structure (2)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 1 49.77 49.08
Foreign 0 0 0
Individual or family 1 30.78 18.95
Government 0 0 0
Shareholder Indirect Structure (11)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 2 65.02 22.27
Foreign 1 21.57 11.03
Individual or family 8 51.96 30.81
Government 0 0 0
Shareholder Total Sample (13)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 3 59.93 31.20
Foreign 1 21.57 11.03
Individual or family 9 49.61 29.49
Government 0 0 0
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TABLE 19 (Continued)
LEVEL 1 (44)
Companies with and without controlling shareholders (44)
Shareholder Direct Structure (9 )
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 1 49.77 49.08
Foreign 1 99.22 38.99
Individual or family 3 61.35 42.78
Government 4 74.56 29.04
Shareholder Indirect Structure (35)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 5 58.40 17.24
Foreign 3 57.43 28.24
Individual or family 27 68.60 33.40
Government 0 0 1 0
Shareholder Total Sample (44)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 6 53.97 22.55
Foreign 4 67.88 30.93
Individual or family 30 67.87 34.34
Government 4 74.56 29.04
Source: Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 available in CVM website. Comissio
de Valores Mobilidrios, http://www.cvm.gov.br.
TABLE 20: Composition of Controlling Groups, Largest Shareholders and Market
Capitalization in the Level 1
LEVEL 1
Companieswith controlling shareholders (31)
Shareholder No. of Firms Market Capitalization in R$ %
Institutional 3 293,689,552,246.58 46.49
Foreign 3 15,675,512,187.34 2.48
Individual or family 21 265,475,374,283.31 42.02
Government 4 56,914,808,603.38 9.01
TOTAL 31 631,755,247,320.61 100
Companies without controlling shareholders (13)
Shareholder No. of Firms Market Capitalization in R$ %
Institutional 3 129,480,474,380.80 52.43
Foreign 1 26,432,048,308.20 10.70
Individual or family 9 91,033,251,818.31 36.86
Government 0 0.00 0.00
TOTAL 13 246,945,774,507.31 100
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TABLE 20 (Continued)
LEVEL 1
Total Sample (20)
Shareholder No. of Firms Market Capitalization in R$ %
Institutional 6 423,170,026,627.38 48.16
Foreign 4 42,107,560,495.54 4.79
Individual or family 30 356,508,626,101.62 40.57
Government 4 56,914,808,603.38 6.48
TOTAL 44 878,701,021,827.92 100
Source: Author's calculation based on market capitalization provided by Bovespa for Dec. 19th, 2007.
Bovespa, http://www.bovespa.com.br/indexi.asp.
TABLE 21: Composition of Controlling Groups and Largest Shareholders in the
Standard Market
STANDARD COMPANIES (183)
Companies with controlling shareholders 133)
Shareholder Direct Structure (29)No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 2 95.60 63.25
Foreign 9 76.13 63.30
Individual or family 7 75.55 44.79
Government 11 75.19 63.45
Shareholder Indirect Structure 104)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 8 49.91 34.46
Foreign 18 81.97 69.44
Individual or family 71 71.50 45.97
Government 7 68.54 44.79
Shareholder Total Sample (133)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 10 59.05 40.22
Forein 27 80.03 67.39
Individual or family 78 71.87 45.86
Government 18 72.61 58.07
Companies without controlling shareholders (50)
Shareholder Direct Structure (23)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 3 19.66 18.14
Foreign 4 40.35 30.07
Individual or family 16 28.78 19.84
Government 0 0 0
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TABLE 21 (Continued)
STANDARD COMPANIES (183)
Companies without controlling shareholders (50)
Shareholder Indirect Structure (27)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 0 0 0
Foreign 6 71.79 62.72
Individual or family 21 56.83 37.61
Government 0 0 0
Shareholder Total Sample (50)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 3 19.66 18.14
Foreign 10 59.22 49.66
Individual or family 37 44.70 29.93
Government 0 0 0
Comp nies with and without controlling shareholders (183)
Shareholder Direct Structure (52)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 5 50.04 36.18
Foreign 13 65.13 53.08
Individual or family 23 43.02 27.43
Government 11 75.19 63.45
Shareholder Indirect Structure 131)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 8 49.91 34.46
Foreign 24 79.42 67.76
Individual or family 92 68.15 44.06
Government 7 68.54 44.79
Cor anies with and without controlling shareholders (183)
Shareholder Total Sample (183)
No. of Firms Voting capital (mean) Total capital (mean)
Institutional 13 49.96 35.12
Foreign 37 74.40 62.60
Individual or family 115 63.13 40.74
Government 18 72.61 38.07
Source: Annual Information Reports referring to year-end 2006 available in CVM website. Comissdo
de Valores Mobiliirios, http://www.cvm.gov.br.
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TABLE 22: Composition of Controlling Groups, Largest Shareholders and Market
Capitalization in the Standard Market
STANDARD
Companies with controlling shareholders (133)
Shareholder No. of Firms Market Capitalization in R$ %
Institutional 10 19,571,494,252.55 2.47
Foreign 27 287,885,347,991.44 36.27
Individual or family 78 37,182,969,910.46 4.69
Government 18 448,989,230,512.91 56.57
TOTAL 133 793,629,042,667.36 100
Companies without controlling shareholders (50)
Shareholder No. of Firms Market Capitalization in R$ %
Institutional 3 1,921,836,112.68 1.48
Foreign 10 73,849,331,727.51 56.94
Individual or family 37 53,922,161,095.74 41.58
Government 0 0.00 0.00
TOTAL 50 129,693,328,935.93 100
Total Sample (183)
Shareholder No. of Firms Market Capitalization in R$ %
Institutional 13 21,493,330,365.23 2.33
Foreign 37 361,734,679,718.95 39.18
Individual or family 115 91,105,131,006.20 9.87
Government 18 448,989,230,512.91 48.63
TOTAL 183 923,322,371,603.29 100
Source: Author's calculation based on market capitalization provided by Bovespa for Dec. 19th, 2007.
Bovespa, http://www.bovespa.com.br/indexi.asp.
TABLE 23: Mechanisms of Separation Between Control and Ownership in Brazil
ALL COMPANIES (339)
Shareholders Finns with pyramidal structure voting capital/total capital
No of firms percentage No of firms percentage
Institutional 15 4.42 18 5.31
Foreign 34 10.03 39 11.50
Individual or family 173 51.03 148 43.66
Government 8 2.36 20 5.90
Total Sample 230 68.84 225 66.37
Source: Author's calculations are based on information available on the CVM website. Comissio de
Valores Mobilidrios, http://www.cvm.gov.br.
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TABLE 24: Types of Shareholders' Agreements
Type of Shareholders' Agreements
No. of Name of companies Purchase Preference Voting Control
comp- sale of to purchase rights Exercise
anies shares shares
Abyara Planejamento
Imobilidrio S.A. (NM)
16 Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. Bio. X X X
01. Veg. S.A. (NM)
Cia. Concessbes Rodovidrias
(NM)
CPFL Energia S.A. (NM)
CSU Cardsystem (NM)
EZ TEC Empreendimentos e
Participaq6es S.A. (NM)
Positivo Informdtica S.A. (NM)
Redecard S.A. (NM)
Rodobens Neg6cios Imobilidrios
S.A. (NM)
ALL Am6rica Latina Logistica
S.A. (L 2)
Marcopolo S.A. (L 2)
Multiplan Empreendimentos
Imobilidrios S.A. (L 2)
Aracruz Celulose S.A. (L 1)
Banco Industrial e Comercial
S.A. (L 1)
BRADESPAR S.A. (L 1)
Sadia S.A. (L 1)
A96car Guarani S.A. (NM)
12 Brasil Brokers Participag6es X X X X
S.A. (NM)
Cia. Provid~ncia Indiastria e
Com6rcio (NM)
Cyrela Brazil Realty S.A.
Empreendimentos e
Participaqes (NM)
Even Construtora e
Incorporadora S.A. (NM)
Light S.A. (NM)
Natura Cosm6ticos S.A. (NM)
Tempo Participaqves S.A. (NM)
Santos-Brasil S.A. (L 2)
Cia. Fiaq~o Tecidos Cedro
Cachoeira (L 1)
Iochpe-Maxion S.A. (L 1)
I Usiminas S.A. (L 1)
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TABLE 24 (Continued)
Type of Shareholders' Agreements
No. of Name of companies Purchase Preference Voting Control
comp- sale of to purchase rights Exercise
anies shares shares
Agra Empreendimentos
03 Imobilidtrios S.A. (NM) X X
Odontoprev S.A. (NM)
Perdig~o S.A. (NM)
Brasilagro - Cia. Brasileira de
03 Propriedades Agricolas (NM) X X X
Inpar S.A. (NM)
Medial Saide S.A. (NM)
02 Indfistrias Romi S.A. (NM) X X
Banco Bradesco S.A. (L 1)
02 Grendene S.A. (NM) X X
Banco Indusval (L 1)
EDP - Energias do Brasil S.A.
02 (NM) X X X
Itafisa Investimentos Ita6i S.A.
(L 1)
01 Bolsa de Mercadorias & Futuros X
- BM&F S.A. (NM)
01 LPS Brasil - Consultoria de X X
Im6veis S.A. (NM)
Source: Author's elaboration is based on Shareholders' Agreements available on the CVM
website, visited between Sept. and Dec. 2007. Comiss~o de Valores Mobilidrios,
http://www.cvm.gov.br. NM - Novo Mercado; L 2 - Level 2; L I - Level 1.
TABLE 25: Types of Clauses in Shareholders' Agreements that Bind Directors' Votes
Subjects that Bind No. of Name of Companies Listing
Directors' Votes In Com- Segment
Shareholders Agreements panies
Brasil Brokers ParticipaV3es S.A. NM
Alienation, leasing, Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. NM
disposal, placement of 14 Agricolas S.A.
financial burden over (cont. Cia. Providgncia Ind. Com. NM
goods and rights of the below) CPFL Energia S.A NM
company- related to its
assets CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
(cont. below) Inpar S.A. NM
light S.A. NM
Medial Sadde S.A. NM
Tempo Participaq6es S.A. NM
ALL America Latina Logistica S.A. L 2
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TABLE 25 (Continued)
Subjects that Bind No. of Name of Companies Listing
Directors' Votes In Com- Segment
Shareholders Agreements panies
Alienation, leasing, 14 Multiplan Empreendimentos L 2
disposal, placement of (cont. Imobilidrios S.A.
financial burden over from Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2
goods and rights of the above) Iochpe-Maxion S.A. L I
company- related to its
assets Usiminas S.A. L 1
(cont. from above)
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. 01. Veg. NM
Distribution of earnings, 11 S.A.
dividends, interest rates Brasil Brokers Participaq8es S.A. NM
over own capital Brasilagro-Cia. Brasileira Prop. NM
Agricolas S.A.
CPFL Energia S.A NM
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
Inpar S.A. NM
Light S.A. NM
Perdigdo S.A. NM
Tempo Participaq6es S.A. NM
Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2
Usiminas S.A. L 1
Entering into general Brasil Brokers Participaqbes S.A. NM
contracts within value 10 Cia. Providencia Ind. Com. NM
range/maximum term
stipulated in the CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
shareholders' agreements Light S.A. NM
Medial Saide S.A. NM
Tempo Participaqi6es S.A. NM
Multiplan Empreendimentos L 2
Imobili6rios S.A.
Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2
Iochpe-Maxion S.A. L 1
Usiminas S.A. L 1
Brasil Brokers Participaq6es S.A. NM
Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. NM
Approval of annual, semi 10 Agricolas S.A.
annual and pluriannual (cont. Cia. Providncia Ind. Com. NM
budgets / Business plans below) CPFL Energia S.A
(cont. below) NM
Light S.A. NM
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TABLE 25 (Continued)
Subjects that Bind No. of Name of Companies Listing
Directors' Votes In Com- Segment
Shareholders Agreements panies
Approval of annual, semi 10 (cont. Tempo Participaqtes S.A. NM
annual and pluriannual from Multiplan Empreendimentos L 2
budgets / Business plans above) mobiliErios S.A.
(cont. from above) Santos-Brasil S.A. L I
Iochpe-Maxion S.A. L 1
Usiminas S.A. L 1
Brasil Brokers Participaq3es S.A. NM
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. OL Veg. NM
Issuance of securities 09 S.A.
Cia. Providdncia Ind. Com. NM
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
Light S.A. NM
Medial Sade S.A. NM
Tempo Participagdes S.A. NM
Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2
Usiminas S.A. L 1
Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. NM
Election or dismissal of 08 Agricolas S.A.
managers Cia. Providgncia Ind. Com. NM
CPFL Energia S.A. NM
Light S.A. NM
Medial Saide S.A. NM
Perdigdo S.A. NM
Tempo Participag6es S.A. NM
Iochpe-Maxion S.A. L 1
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. 01. Veg. NM
Liquidation, dissolution, 06 S.A.
merger, incorporation, and CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
transformation of the Light S.A. NM
company Perdigdo S.A. NM
ALL America Latina Logistica S.A. L 2
Usiminas S.A. L 1
Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. NM
Nomination or dismissal of 06 Agricolas S.A.
independent auditors (cont. Cia. Providdncia Ind. Com. NM
(cont. below) below) CPFL Energia S.A NM
CSU Cardsystern S.A. NM
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TABLE 25 (Continued)
Subjects that Bind No. of Name of Companies Listing
Directors' Votes In Com- Segment
Shareholders Agreements paries
Nomination or dismissal of 06 (cont. Light S.A. NM
independent auditors from Multiplan Empreendimentos L 2
(cont. from above) above) Imobilirios S.A.
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. 01. Veg. NM
Plans of judicial or extra 06 S.A.
judicial reorganization, or Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. NM
bankruptcy Agricolas S.A.
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
Light S.A. NM
ALL America Latina Logistica S.A. L 2
Usiminas S.A. L 1
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. 01. Veg. NM
Amortization, redemption 06 S.A.
or acquisition of shares to CPFL Energia S.A NM
be held by corporate CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
treasury or to be cancelled Light S.A. NM
Perdigdo S.A. NM
Tempo Participaq3es S.A. NM
Acquisition of sharehold- 06 Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. 0. Veg. NM
ing participation in other S.A.
companies CPFL Energia S.A NM
Inpar S.A. NM
Light S.A. NM
Perdigdo S.A. NM
Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2
Brasil Brokers Participagdes S.A. NM
Establishing/providing 05 CPFL Energia S.A. NM
warranties by the company CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2
Iochpe-Maxion S.A. L 1
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. 01. Veg. NM
Changes in the Bylaws 05 S.A.
Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. NM
Agricolas S.A.
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
Light S.A. NM
Usiminas S.A. L 1
Transactions between the 05 Brasil Brokers Participaq8es S.A. NM
company and shareholders (cont. Light S.A. NM
or their related parties below) Medial Satide S.A. NM
(cont. below)
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TABLE 25 (Continued)
Subjects that Bind No. of Name of Companies Listing
Directors' Votes In Corn- Segment
Shareholders Agreements panies
Transactions between the 05 (cont. Multiplan Empreendimentos L 2
company and shareholders from Imobilidrios S.A.
or their related parties above) Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2
(cont. from above)
Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. NM
Creation of corporate 04 Agricolas S.A.
groups (joint ventures, or Cia. Providncia Ind. Com. NM
strategic alliances) Light S.A. NM
Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2
Cia. Providdncia Ind. Com. NM
Purchase of new shares by 04 CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
the company Multiplan Empreendimentos L 2
Imobilitirios S.A.
CPFL Energia S.A. NM
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
Compensation policy and 04 Cia. Providdncia Ind. Com. NM
benefits for managers and Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. OL Veg. NM
board members S.A.
Multiplan Empreendimentos L 2
Imobili6rios S.A.
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. 01. Veg. NM
Determination of the 04 S.A.
criteria for establishing Cia. Providdncia Ind. Com. NM
managers' remuneration Tempo Participaqyes S.A. NM
Iochpe-Maxion S.A. L 1
CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
Changes in the 04 Light S.A. NM
corporation's business Perdigdo S.A. NM
Usiminas S.A. L 1
Issuance of new classes of 04 Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. 01. Veg. NM
shares S.A.
Light S.A. NM
Perdigdo S.A. NM
Usiminas S.A. L 1
Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. 01. Veg. NM
Reduction of/raising social 04 S.A.
capital CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
Light S.A. NM
Usiminas S.A. L I
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TABLE 25 (Continued)
Subjects that Bind No. of Name of Companies Listing
Directors' Votes In Com- Segment
Shareholders Agreements panies
Entering into transactions Cia. Provid~ncia Ind. Com. NM
between the company, its 04 CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
controlling, affiliated or Inpar S.A. NM
controlled companies Tempo Participaqdes S.A. NM
Increase of capital within 04 Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. NM
the limits of the authorized Agricolas S.A.
capital CPFL Energia S.A. NM
Inpar S.A. NM
Iochpe-Maxion S.A. L 1
Cia. Providgncia Ind. Com. NM
Changes in accounting 03 Light S.A. NM
policies Tempo Participaq&es S.A. NM
Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. NM
Creation/ extinction of 03 Agricolas S.A.
controlling companies Cia. Providdncia Ind. Com. NM
CPFL Energia S.A. NM
Inpar S.A. NM
Making other businesses 03
than those related to the ALL Ambrica Latina Logistica S.A. L 2
corporate purpose Multiplan Empreendimentos L 2
Imobilidrios S.A.
Initiating suits/ arbitration CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
procedures in which the 02
company is a party Multiplan Empreendimentos L 2
Imobilirios S.A.
Alienation of shares by the ALL America Latina Logistica S.A. L 2
Company or their 02
subsidiaries Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2
Creation/liquidation, Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. NM
acquisition and alienation 02 Agricolas S.A.
of subsidiaries Iochpe-Maxion S.A. L 1
Proxy authorization Brasilagro -Cia. Brasileira Prop. NM
conferred to any person in 02 Agricolas S.A.
order to decide about any
subject that requires
shareholders' votes or Tempo Participaq3es S.A. NM
alienation of assets
Installation/ election of 02 Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. 01. Veg. NM
members of the fiscal S.A.
board Perdigio S.A. NM
Election of board members 02 Medial Satide S.A. NM
Perdigdo S.A. NM
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TABLE 25 (Continued)
Subjects that Bind No. of Name of Companies Listing
Directors' Votes In Com- Segment
Shareholders Agreements panies
Remuneration of board 02 Tempo Participaq6es S.A. NM
members Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. 01. Veg. NM
S.A.
Decision of omitted cases 02 Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2
Tempo Participaq6es S.A. NM
Offering call options or Brasil Brokers Participaq6es S.A. NM
subscription of shares to 02
managers, board members, Tempo Participaq6es S.A. NM
and employees of the
company
Changes in the number of 01 Brasil Ecodiesel Ind. Com. OL Veg. NM
managers and board S.A.
members
Issuance of non-voting
shares or increase in the 01 Perdigdo S.A. NM
number of classes of
existing non-voting shares
Issuance of subscription 01 CPFL Energia S.A. NM
bonuses
Changes in the terms of 01 CPFL Energia S.A NM
contracts on permission of
public services
Detailing matters for 01 CPFL Energia S.A. NM
committee analysis
Remuneration of 01 CPFL Energia S.A. NM
committee members
Entering/ altering contracts
of personal insurance of the 01 CSU Cardsystem S.A. NM
CEO or other key manager
of the company
Hiring consulting service 01 Multiplan Empreendimentos L 2
of third parties not Imobilidrios S.A.
expressed in the company's
plans
Creation of Founder's
shares (shares with special 01 Perdigdo S.A. NM
rights)
Creation of committees and 01 Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2
technical or advisory
commissions
Contracting, altering, 01 Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2
breaching shareholders'
agreements or any
fiduciary business
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TABLE 25 (Continued)
Subjects that Bind No. of Name of Companies Listing
Directors' Votes In Com- Segment
Shareholders Agreements panies
Rules for issuance and 01 Santos-Brasil S.A. L 2
cancellation of Units
Creation of capital reserve
for contingencies or any 01 Light S.A. NM
kind of operation which
may result in a reduction of
the profits that shall be
distributed among the
shareholders
Register of securities 01 Light S.A. NM
offerings or going private
transactions I
Source: Author's elaboration is based on. shareholders agreements available on the CVM Website.
Comiss~o de Valores Mobilidrios, http://www.cvm.gov.br. NM - New Market; L 2- Level 2;L 1
Level 1.
TABLE 26: Adoption (and Types) of Poison Pills Clauses (Pills) by Companies Listed
on Novo Mercado, Level 2 and Level 1
Companies Listed Super [ Types Of Threshold Of Pills Types Of
Tag- Pills Penalty
Along Type A Type B Clauses
NOVO MERCADO
Abyara Planejamento Yes -
Imobilidrio S.A.
Aqfcar Guarani S.A. Yes - -
Agra Empreendimentos Yes A 20% - 1 and 2
Imobilitrios S.A.
American Banknote S.A. Yes A and B 20% 10% 1 and 2
Bematech Ind-istria e Yes A 25% - 1
Com~rcio de
Equipamentos Eletr6nicos
S.A.
Bolsa de Mercadorias & Yes
Futuros S.A.
Bovespa Holding S.A. Yes A 20% 1
BR Mall Participag6es Yes
S.A.
Brasil Brokers Yes A 20% - 1
Participag6es S.A.
Brasil Ecodiesel Indtistria Yes A and B 30% 10% 1 and 2
e Com~rcio de Biocom-
bustiveis e Oleos Vegetais
S.A.
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TABLE 26 (Continued)
Companies Listed Super Types Of Threshold Of Pills Types Of
Tag- Pills Penalty
Along Type A Type B Clauses
NOVO MERCADO
Brasilagro - Companhia Yes A 20% - 1 and 2
Brasileira de Propriedades
Agricolas
Companhia Brasileira Yes A 35% - 1
Desenvolvimento
Imobilidrio e Turistico
Companhia Concess6es Yes
Rodoviirias
Companhia Hering Yes A 20% -
Companhia Providencia Yes
Indfistria e Com~cio
Company S.A. Yes A 20% - 1
Construtora Tenda S.A. Yes A 20% - 1
COSAN S.A. Indistria e Yes
Com6rcio
CPFL Energia S.A. Yes
CR2 Empreendimentos Yes
Imobilidrios S.A.
Cremer S.A. Yes A 20%
CSU Cardsystem S.A. Yes - -
Cyrela Brazil Realty S.A. Yes - -
Empreendimentos e
Participag6es
Cyrela Commercial Yes A 15% - 1 and 2
Property S.A. Empre-
endimentos e Participag6es
Datasul S.A. Yes A and B 15% 5% 1 and 2
Diagn6sticos da Am6rica Yes A 15% - 1 and 2
S.A.
Drogasil S.A. Yes
EDP - Energias do Brasil Yes
S.A.
Embraer - Empresa Yes A 35%
Brasileira de Aerondiutica
S.A.
Eternit S.A. Yes
Even Construtora e Yes A 20% 1
Incorporadora S.A.
EZ TEC Empreendimentos Yes A and B 15% 8% 1 and 2
e Participaq5es S.A.
Gafisa S.A. Yes - -
Grendene S.A. Yes
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TABLE 26 (Continued)
Companies Listed Super Types Of Threshold Of Pills Types Of
Tag- Pills Penalty
Along Type A Type B Clauses
NOVO MERCADO
GVT Holding S.A. Yes A and B 15% 9.9% 1
Helbor Empreendimentos Yes A 20% - 1 and 2
S.A.
Indfistrias Romi S.A. Yes A 15% - 1 and 2
Inpar S.A. Yes A and B 20% 10% 1 and 2
Klabin Segall S.A. Yes A and B 15% 5% 1 and 2
Light S.A. Yes
Localiza Rent a Car S.A. Yes B - 10% 1
Log-In Logistica Yes A 35% - 1 and 2
Intermodal S.A.
Lojas Renner S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 and 2
LPS Consultoria de Yes A and B 20% 8% 1 and 2
Im6veis S.A.
Lupatech S.A. Yes A 20% 1
Medial Saiide S.A. Yes A 20% 1
Metalfrio Solutions S.A. Yes -
MRV Engenharia S.A. Yes B - 10% 1
Natura Cosm~ticos S.A. Yes A and B 15% 30% 1
Odontoprev S.A. Yes A 15% - 1 and 2
PDG Realty Yes
Empreendimentos e
Participaq6es S.A.
Perdig~o S.A. Yes A 20% - 1 and 2
Porto Seguro S.A. Yes B - 10% 1
Positivo Informtica S.A. Yes A 10% - 1 and 2
Profarma Distribuidora de Yes A and B 20% 10% 1 and 2
Produtos Farmacuticos
S.A.
Redecard S.A. Yes A 26% - 1
Renar Maqas S.A. Yes
Rodobens Neg6cios Yes A and B 15% 5% 1 and 2
Imobilidirios S.A.
Rossi Residencial S.A. Yes B - 15% 1
Sio Carlos Yes A 25% - 1
Empreendimentos e
Participaq6es S.A.
Sio Martinho S.A. Yes A 10% - 1
SLC Agricola S.A. Yes A 20% - 1
Tegma Gestio Logistica Yes
S.A.
Tempo Participaq~es S.A. Yes A 20%
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TABLE 26 (Continued)
Companies Listed Super Types Of Threshold Of Pills Types Of
Tag- Pills Penalty
Along Type A Type B Clauses
NOVO MERCADO
Totvs S.A. Yes A and B 20% 8% 1 and 2
LEVEL 2
ALL Am6rica Latina
Logistica S.A.
Kroton Educacional S.A. Yes A 15% 1
Marcopolo S.A. Yes
Multiplan S.A. Yes A 20% 1 and 2
Santos-Brasil S.A. Yes A 20% 1
Saraiva S.A. Yes
LEVEL 1
Aracruz Celulose S.A.
Banco Bradesco S.A.
Banco Industrial e Yes -
Comercial S.A.
Banco Indusval S.A. Yes -
Banco Panamericano S.A. Yes -
BRADESPAR S.A. -
Companhia de Fiaqao e -
Tecidos Cedro e Cachoeira
Iochpe-Maxion S.A. -
Itatisa Investimentos Itat -
S.A.
Metaliirgica Gerdau S.A. -
Paranapanema S.A. Yes
Sadia S.A.
Usinas Sidert-rgicas de
Minas Gerais S.A.
'Types of Penalty Clauses' are the penalties for breaching a poison pill clause.
Source: Author's elaboration based on the bylaws of eighty-four companies available on the CVM
website. Comissio de Valores Mobili~rios, http://www.cvm.gov.br. Bylaws available in the Annual
Information Reports referring to year-end 2006, visited between Sept. 2007 and Dec. 2007.
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TABLE 27 Cross-Listing in Other Jurisdictions
We consider a cross-listing to be in the same time period as the IPO on Bovespa's special
segments if it occurred concomitantly/before/or within three months after the IPO.
HUARTE LAIN X July 13, YES
BRASIL S.A. Reg S 2005
BRASIL 144A Nov. 22,YE
ECODIESEL Reg S ____ 2006 ___
COPASA S.A 144A X Feb. 6, YES
Reg S __ 2006 ____
CSU CARD- 144A Apr. 27,
SYSTEM S.A. Reg S __ __ 2006
SAO CARLOSEMPREEND- 144A
IMENTOS E XDec. 18, YESPARTICI- Reg S 2006
PACOES SA.
AGRA EMPRE-ENDIMENTOS 144A X Apr. 30, YES
IMOBILIARIOS Reg S 2007
S.A.
B2W -
2 COMPANHIA 144A x Aug. 13, YES
GLOBAL DO Reg S 2007
o VAREJO __
ZBR MALLS 144A ~ p.1,PARTICIP- X Apr. 21 YES
ACOES SA Reg S 2007
CAMARGO
CORREA DES-ENVOLV- 144A Feb. 2, YES
IMENTO IMOB- Reg S 2007
ILIARIO SA
CMESA 1 44A XMay 2,YE
CEESA Reg S ___ _2007YE
INPAR SA 144A X June13, YES
Reg S ____ 2007 ____
JHSF PARTIC- 144A x Apr. 16, YES
IPACOES SA Reg S 2007
REEC_ASA 144A x July 17, YES
REDCARD Reg S 2007
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TABLE 27 ontinued
.-
EW co.C
- z n
TECNISA SA 144A X Feb. 5, YES
Reg S 2007
TRIUNFO
PARTICIPA- 44A
COESE Rg July 25, YES
INVEST- Reg S 2007
IMENTOS SA
SPRINGS
GLOBAL 144A x July31, YES
PARTICI- Reg S 2007
PACOES SA
CYRELA I /
COMMERCIAL OTC Aug. 14, YES
PROPERTIES 144A/ 2007
S.A. Reg S 
_1
I/
CYRELA IT
O BRAZIL OTC May 5,YES
U REALTY S.A. Reg44A X May 5
TRACTEBEL I / June 27,X, YES
ENERGIA SA OTC 2002
o DIAGNOST-SICOS DA144A/ Nov. 23,
Z AMERICA SA Reg 5 2004
MEDIAL 144A/ Sept. 26, YES
SAUDE S.A. Reg S 2006
I/
MMX T 
F
MINERACAO E OTC XFeb. 5,METALICOS SA 144A/ 2007 NOReg S
ROSSI RESID- I / Apr. 21, YES
ENCIAL S.A. OTC 2000
TEMPO PART- 144A/ Dec. 21, YES
ICIPACOES S.A. Reg S 2007
EMPRESA
BRASILEIRA III/ July 21, YES
DE AERO- NYSE 2000
NAUTICA SA
PERDIGAO SA II Oct. 20, YES
___________NYSE g __ 2000 
________
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TABLE 27 Continued)
BAE C DO NSE20
2~c MQ- 0'-
< C
CIA DE
OSANEAMENTO
< BASICO DO NYS / May02 YES
ESTADO DE NYE20
u SAO PAULO
o CPFL ENERGIA III / Sept. 28, ES
* SA NYSE 2004
z GAFISA S.A. III/ X Mar. 21, NO
NYSE 2007
ALL-AMERICA
LATINA
LOGISTICA
144A/
Reg S
June 29,
2004 &
Mar. 29,
2005
SANTOS- 144A/ Dec. 11, YES
BRASIL SA Reg S 2007
ANHANGUERA
EDUCACIONAL 144A/ Mar. 14, YES
PARTICIP- Reg S 2007
ACOES SA
NET SERVICOS III /
DE COMUN- Nasda X Dec. 17, x July 7, YESICCOA2001 2000ICACAO SA q
CELESC-
CENTRALS
ELECTRICAS I / June 12, YES
DA SANTA OTC 2002
CATARINA,
S.A.
I/ X Sept. 20,SARAIVA SA OTC X X 2000 & YES
LIVREIROS 144A/ Apr. 11,
EDITORES Rg5206___Reg S 2006
GOL LINHAS
AEREAS INT- III / June 29, YES
ELIGENTES AS NYSE 2004
TAM S.A. III/ Mar. 15, NONYSE X 2006
SEB - SISTEMA
EDUCACIONAL
BRASILEIRO
S.A.
144A/
Reg S X Oct. 22,2007
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TABLE 27 Continued)
E• U U X
BRADESPAR
S/A
I/
OTC
May 21,
2001
COMPANHIA June 1,
ENERGETICA I / 1994 & YES
DE SAO PAULO OTC X Sept. 24,
(CESP) 1999
ELETROBRAS:
CENTRAIS I/ Dec. 1, Sept.
ELETRICAS OTC X 1994 X 14, YES
BRASILEIRAS 2000
S.A.
Sept. 1,
1994;
USINAS I I Sept. 25, July 5,
SIDERUR- OTC 2001; X 2005 YES
GICAS DE 144A/ May 2, May 3
MINAS GERAIS Reg S 2007; 2007
Nov. 20,
2007
SUZANO DE I / Oct. 1, YES
PAPEL E OTC X 1993
CELULOSE _ __1199
IOCHPE I / Apr. 1, YES
MAXION SA OTC 1994
I/ X Dec. 1, YES
KLABIN SA OTC 1994
PARANAP- I / X Dec. 21, YES
ANEMA SA OTC 2000
ARACRUZ III / X May 25, X Dec. 1, YES
CELULOSE SA NYSE 1992 1999
CIA BRASIL-
EIRA DE
DISTRIBUICAO
GRUPO PAO DE
ACUCAR
III /
NYSE
May 28,
1997
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TABLE 27 ontinued)
II / X Mar. 10, XDec. 2, YES
GERDAU SA NYSE 1999 2002
ULTRAPAR III / X Oct. 6, YES
PARTICIP- NYSE 1999
ACOES S.A. ___
II / X June 20, Feb. YES
NYSE 2000 & 10,
III/ Mar. 27, X2000
NYSE 2002 Mar.
CIA VALE DO 21,
RIO DOCE ___ ___ 2002 ___
BANCO
BRADESCO SA
II /
NYSE
Nov. 21,
2001
II/ X Nov. 16, YES
NYSE 2001 &
BRASIL Aug. 1,
TELECOM SA 2002
Nov. 16,BRASIL TELE- II!/ XI 2001 &YE
COM PART- g ,YES
ICIPACOES SA NYSE 2002
CEMIG - II / X Sept. 19, YES
COMPANHIA NYSE 2001 & July
ENERGETICA June 12, X 12,
DE MINAS 2007 2002
GERAIS
UNIAO DE III / X Mar. 27, YES
BANCOS BRAS- NYSE 2001
ILEIROS SA _1
BANCOITAU II/ X1 Feb. 21, NO
HOLDING FIN- NYSE 2002
ANCEIRA S/A
II / X Dec. 30, Nov. YES
NYSE 2002 X 15,
SADIA SA 1 1 2004
VOTORANTIM III / X May 17, NO
CELULOSE E NYSE 
2002
PAPEL SA I I I II
BRASKEM SA
III/ X
NYSE
Sept. 17,
2003
Aug.
10,
2003
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TABLE 27 (Continued)
Sources: Author's elaboration based on information available on the CVM website, the JP Morgan ADR
website, the Bank of New York ADR website, and the Latibex website, visited between September 2008
and February 2009. Comiss~o de Valores Mobilidrios, http://www.cvm.gov.br; JP Morgan-Welcome
to adr.eom, http://www.adr.com/; ADRs (Depositary Receipts): Global Investing and Personal Finance
with the Bank of New York Mellon, http://www.adrbny.com; Latibex-Mercado de valores
latinoamericanos en Euros, http://www.latibex.com. Information on cross-listing exchanges, levels, and
dates comes from the Bank of New York ADR website, the Citibank ADR website, the CVM website,
the Deutsche Bank ADR website, and the JP Morgan ADR website. ADRs (Depositary Receipts):
Global Investing and Personal Finance with the Bank of New York Mellon, http://www.adrbny.com;
Citi-Depositary Receipt Services, http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/www/brokers/index.htm; Depositary
Receipts with Deutsche Bank, www.adr.db.com; ComissAo de Valores Mobilifrios,
http://www.cvm.gov.br; JP Morgan-Welcome to adr.com, http://www.adr.com. (Discrepancies
between these sources were reconciled by contacting companies directly.).
